The Treatment of Rape Victims within the Criminal Justice System: A comparative perspective by McCusker, Dana
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY









All those accessing thesis content in Queen’s University Belfast Research Portal are subject to the following terms and conditions of use
            • Copyright is subject to the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, or as modified by any successor legislation
            • Copyright and moral rights for thesis content are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
            • A copy of a thesis may be downloaded for personal non-commercial research/study without the need for permission or charge
            • Distribution or reproduction of thesis content in any format is not permitted without the permission of the copyright holder
            • When citing this work, full bibliographic details should be supplied, including the author, title, awarding institution and date of thesis
Take down policy
A thesis can be removed from the Research Portal if there has been a breach of copyright, or a similarly robust reason.
If you believe this document breaches copyright, or there is sufficient cause to take down, please contact us, citing details. Email:
openaccess@qub.ac.uk
Supplementary materials
Where possible, we endeavour to provide supplementary materials to theses. This may include video, audio and other types of files. We
endeavour to capture all content and upload as part of the Pure record for each thesis.
Note, it may not be possible in all instances to convert analogue formats to usable digital formats for some supplementary materials. We
exercise best efforts on our behalf and, in such instances, encourage the individual to consult the physical thesis for further information.
Download date: 10. Sep. 2019
The Treatment of Rape Victims Within the 
Criminal Justice System: A Comparative
Perspective
Thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
by
Dana McCusker
LL.B (The Queen’s University of Belfast)
School of Law
The Queen’s University of Belfast
May 2000
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my profound gratitude to Professor John Jackson who 
supervised this thesis, providing valuable suggestions on its content and direction and 
demonstrating enormous patience and understanding throughout. I would also like to 
thank Damien Curran for his endless support and encouragement, without which I 
fear I could not have completed this work. Finally, to my wonderful family and 




CHAPTER ONE Equal Injustice for AH 8
CHAPTER TWO Structural Defects 45
CHAPTER THREE Rape Victims Singled Out 82
CHAPTER FOUR Cultural Defects 117





Rape victims undergo a considerable ordeal when they embark upon the criminal 
justice process - not only does the system fail almost completely to vindicate them but 
it actually further abuses them also.1 2 3Very significantly, this proposition has recently 
been ratified by the government. In 1998, a Home Office report detailing a number of 
concerns about the treatment of this victim-group was published. Following from 
this report, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 was enacted, 
introducing several measures aimed at improving their experience specifically at 
court. ’ This thesis aims to explore the treatment of this victim-group in order to 
determine how their experience throughout the judicial process might be improved to 
best effect. It is acknowledged that this is a subject which has been written about ad 
nauseum4 However, it is suggested that the utility of most rape literature is limited 
for, whilst it describes /row rape victims are treated, its approach is too narrow to 
provide a full explanation of why they are so treated and, consequently, to present an 
effective challenge to this treatment.5 This thesis will provide a broader framework 
for understanding why rape victims are treated as they are and, as such, it will be 
much better placed to address the issue of reform.
The tendency of most rape commentators is to examine the treatment of rape victims 
in isolation, eschewing any meaningful comparison with the experience of victims as
1 This will be shown throughout the course of this thesis.
2 Home Office (1998).
3 These measures are discussed in Chapter Five below.
4 See, for example, LeGrand (1973); Weis and Borges (1973); Bohmer (1974); Bohmer and Blumberg 
(1975); Brownmiller (1976); Berger (1977); Clark and Lewis (1977); Holmstrom and Burgess (1978); 
Mitra (1979); Feldman-Summers and Palmer (1980); Newby (1980); Edwards (1981, 1996); 
McNamara (1981); Adler (1982, 1985, 1987); Temkin (1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1993, 1998); 
Chambers and Millar (1983, 1986, 1987); MacKinnon (1983, 1989); Patullo (1983); Williams (1984); 
Caringella-MacDonald (1985); Kelly and Radford (1987); Lees (1989, 1996, 1997); Rhode (1989); Los 
(1990); Russell (1990); Smart (1990); Brown, Burman and Jamieson (1992), (1993); Estrich (1992); 
Allison and Wrightsman (1993); Soothill and Soothill (1993); McColgan (1996).
5 This type of literature did serve a very valuable purpose in earlier times. The highly descriptive 
analyses of the abuses suffered by rape victims which began to surface in the 1970’s were instrumental 
in bringing the plight of this victim-group to the attention of the masses, something which clearly 
needed to be done. Of singular influence in this regard was Clark and Lewis’ 1977 study Rape: The 
Price of Coercive Sexuality. Moreover, the spate of rape law reforms which occurred world-wide in 
the 1970’s is to be attributed directly to such work - once exposed by this literature, the fact of the 
maltreatment of rape victims could not then be left unattended.
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a whole.6 This leads to the blanket assumption that the difficulties incumbent upon 
rape victims are singular to them and, following from this, that they derive from a 
specific prejudice against this victim-group. This thesis, on the other hand, adopts a 
comparative methodology, placing the treatment of rape victims alongside that 
accorded victims as a whole. This approach will reveal that, whilst there is a clear 
area of difference between how rape and non-rape victims are treated, there are also 
significant similarities. Consequently, it is clearly erroneous to explain the shoddy 
treatment of rape victims simply in terms of the specific social prejudices underlying 
rape cases and this thesis will demonstrate that, in fact, the structural and functional 
features of our criminal justice system are also to blame. Because most rape 
researchers have not employed a comparative methodology, they have underestimated 
- and in some cases even ignored - the role of these systemic factors.7 In turn, their 
approach to the issue of reform is too restrictive, considering only how the rape trial 
process might be improved rather than addressing the shortcomings of the criminal 
trial process in general. The present study is intended to meet the shortfall left by 
these commentators, addressing both the altitudinal and the structural factors shaping 
the treatment of rape victims.
As to the proposed form and content of this thesis. Chapter One begins by examining 
three aspects of the rape trial which have attracted considerable criticism in traditional 
rape literature. These are the brutality of the cross-examination process and the joint 
inadequacies of both prosecuting counsel and judiciary. Further, as a preliminary to 
establishing the reasons behind these objectionable features. Chapter One examines 
also the experience of non-rape victims in these three areas. It will be shown that, 
contrary to the image presented in most rape literature, these features are common to 
all trials, regardless of case-type. This finding is then critical to the evaluation 
undertaken in Chapter Two wherein it is intended to establish the factors underlying 
the treatment outlined in Chapter One. Because rape and non-rape victims endure an 
almost identical experience in this regard, Chapter Two begins from the premise that 
there is a common cause behind this treatment. This second chapter goes on to show
6 In recent years, a few commentators have elected to take a more balanced approach to the subject,
placing the treatment of rape victims within the context of the experience of victims as a whole. See 
McBarnet (1983); Brereton (1997); Ellison (1998), in this regard. It is suggested, however, that such 
work might also be guilty of verging on the simplistic, particularly Brereton and McBarnet who 
conclude that the plight of rape victims is substantially no different to that of victims as a whole.
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that this common cause lies among the structural and functional features of our 
criminal justice system.
Chapter Three then outlines those aspects of the rape trial which have attracted the 
most vehement criticism, namely the use of sexual history evidence, the corroboration 
warning requirement and the operation of section l(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence 
Act 1898.s Like Chapter One, Chapter Three is concerned to establish how these 
features of the rape trial accord with the conduct of trials generally. Therefore, a 
comparative methodology is again adopted whereby the treatment of rape victims in 
these three areas is measured against the treatment of victims as a whole. As before, 
this comparative approach is critical to establishing just why rape victims are treated 
as they are. In contrast with the commonality revealed in Chapter One, Chapter Three 
will demonstrate that these three aspects of the rape trial represent a significant and 
unjustifiable departure from the conduct of trials generally. Accordingly, Chapter 
Four explores the possibility that this discriminatory treatment derives from 
prejudicial attitudes towards rape victims.
Finally, Chapter Five is concerned to establish exactly how the difficulties outlined 
throughout the course of this thesis might best be resolved. The central proposition of 
this thesis is that, if real improvement is to be achieved, a root and branch approach to 
reform must be taken, any suggestions made going directly to the source of the 
problems. Hence the emphasis on determining accurately why rape victims are 
treated as they are. Thus, Chapter Five discusses structural, functional and cultural 
reform. Not only will this approach improve the rape victim’s experience at court but, 
because it addresses the flaws endemic to the criminal justice system, it will ensure 
significant improvement in their treatment throughout the criminal justice process. 
This is critical because, although the difficulties highlighted throughout this thesis 
pertain mainly to the trial process, it is the case that rape victims encounter 
objectionable treatment at all stages of the judicial process.
7 Brereton (1997), p 259.
8 It is acknowledged that the corroboration warning requirement was abolished by the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994. However, as will be shown in Chapter Three, section 3.3, the matter 
remains highly pertinent to the theme of this thesis.
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On a genera] note, because most of the important caselaw and academic research 
pertains to Great Britain, this thesis refers throughout to the legislative provisions of 
that jurisdiction. However, unless otherwise indicated, the Northern Ireland 
legislation may be taken to be identical. Also, whilst section 142 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 extended the legal definition of rape to encompass 
anal as well as vaginal penetration, thus rendering rape a gender-neutral crime, this 
thesis is framed throughout in terms of the female complainant’s experience only.9 
This is because, despite the growing incidence/awareness of male rape, rape is a crime 
which continues to affect predominantly women.10 In fact, in Northern Ireland, rape 
continues to be a gender-specific crime, article 2 of the Sexual Offences (NI) Order 
1978 which provides the legal definition of rape remaining unaffected by section 142.
Finally, a number of changes have recently been wrought within the law of rape by 
way of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Consequently, it might be 
questioned whether it is really necessary to reconsider the issue of reform. However, 
it is suggested that, in addition to enhancing the topicality of the present study, the 
fact of these latest developments actually increases its utility also. This is because it 
should not be assumed that the 1999 Act will bring about the necessary 
improvements. That is, it is not clear that the Act addresses all of the relevant 
problems or that it deals adequately with those to which it does defer. Therefore, an 
integral function of this thesis will be to evaluate these long-awaited changes in terms 
of whether or not they meet the demands of the situation.* 11 The information collated 
throughout this thesis as to the major difficulties which must be addressed as well as 
their reason for being will ensure that this evaluation is properly conducted. 
Therefore, in addition to enabling the making of appropriate and effective reform 
proposals, the research undertaken in this thesis lends itself also to the necessary task 
of assessing the worth of the recent reforms.
<J Whilst the crime is gender-neutral in terms of the victim, it remains gender-specific with regard to the 
perpetrator so that only a male can legally be guilty of rape.
10 Home Office (2000), p 49.
For an insight into the incidence of male rape specifically see, for example, Gillespie (1996).
11 This will be done in Chapter Five.
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Chapter One 
Equal Injustice for All
1.1 Introduction
Rape trials can be seen as a spectacle of torture, a feudal remnant, by which rather 
than protecting women, the trial can be seen as a public mechanism for the control of 
female sexuality.12
The principle aim of this thesis is to determine how the experience of rape victims 
within the criminal justice system can be improved to best effect. However, before 
the issue of reform can be specifically addressed, it is necessary to provide answers to 
the following preliminary questions. First of all, what are the specific aspects of the 
treatment of this victim-group which need to be changed? Secondly, why does this 
unsatisfactory treatment occur? The analysis undertaken in this present chapter will 
go some way towards answering these questions. Via a review of the literature on the 
topic, this chapter will provide an outline of three aspects of the rape victim’s 
experience at court that give rise to vehement criticism. The first of these is an 
aspect which is central to any discussion of this victim-group’s treatment at court - the 
cross-examination process. The second and third issues concern the way in which 
both prosecuting counsel and judiciary discharge their role in the course of the trial. 
In addition, because of its significance to the question of why rape victims are treated 
as they are, this chapter aims to establish whether or not rape complainants are treated 
differently to victims as a whole. To this end, this chapter examines also the 
experience of non-rape victims in the aforementioned areas.
12 Lees (1997), p 88.




The purpose of the cross-examination of the complainant appears to be to uncover 
the real culprit of the trial, the whore, the insatiable female harridan, vengeful and 
often in disguise; behind the young beautiful girl lurks the archetypal Eve who 
ensnares male rationality and drags men down.14
Referring to the cross-examination exercise, Temkin explains that while much 
criticism has centred on the use of sexual history evidence to blacken the character of 
rape complainants, “other strategies commonly employed against them are equally 
oppressive and invidious”.1'^ Leaving the issue of sexual history evidence to be 
discussed in Chapter Three below, this present section examines the other 
objectionable strategies commonly used by defence counsel in the cross-examination 
of rape complainants.
1.2.1.1 Discrediting the Victim
Various court procedures weight the trial in favour of the defendant, making it very 
difficult for jurors to convict, even when the evidence is convincing. This is mainly a 
result of all the extraneous factors that can be introduced and often involve attacks on 
the woman’s reputation, as not merely her sexual history but all kinds of irrelevant 
factors relating to her past are discussed. She is subjected to a ruthless character 
assassination, a humiliating trial, a form ofjudicial rape.16
Much of the focus in rape literature is directed at the emphasis which is placed during 
cross-examination on discrediting the complainant and the ways in which it is sought 
to do this.17 Temkin’s recent study on the problems encountered in prosecuting rape 
and the strategies involved when defending against rape charges, suggests that this 
literary attention is warranted.18 In this study, Temkin interviewed a small sample of 
highly experienced barristers who together had appeared in hundreds of rape trials as 
prosecuting or defence counsel. Asked about the way they defended rape cases,
14 Lees (1997), p 88.
15 Temkin (1987), p 6.
16 Lees (1997), p 56. (Emphasis added.)
17 See, for example, Bohmer and Blumberg (1975); Holmstrom and Burgess (1978); Newby (1980); 




Temkin reports that the barristers made it clear that their “central strategy” was to 
discredit the complainant.19
As to the ways in which this done, Holmstrom and Burgess found that defence 
counsel cast aspersions on all aspects of the complainant’s personal circumstances 
and character. Indeed, they report, almost anything other than completely proper 
and respectable behaviour can be used - criminal record, mental problems, psychiatric 
history, alcohol use, drug use, absence from school, religious views, even vague 
innuendoes. Similarly, Lees reports that questioning as to credibility routinely 
centres on the complainant’s lifestyle including her living arrangements; whether she 
was a single mother; whether the man she was living with was the father of her 
children; the colour of her present and past boyfriends (where the woman was white); 
who looked after her children while she was at work; whether she was in the habit of 
going to night-clubs on her own late at night; whether she smoked cannabis and drank 
alcohol (when there was no evidence of this); whether she had had an abortion, etc.22
Chambers and Millar, too, found that attacks on the complainant’s character are 
common and wide-ranging.23 They reveal that a variety of tactics are used to infer 
that the woman is of low moral character and, again, they identify the purpose as 
being to challenge the woman’s credibility in relation to the issue of consent and the 
veracity of her evidence in general.24 Like Lees, Chambers and Millar found that 
questioning centres on personal living arrangements and general social activities. 
They point out that such evidence is clearly extraneous to the incident itself and 
provides the court with highly selective items of information about the complainant.26 
This information, they report, has very strong moral overtones. For example, in 
more than half the cases where consent was at issue, it was brought out in questioning 










Temkin (1998), p 17. (Emphasis added.) 
Holmstrom and Burgess (1978), p 184. 
Ibid.
Lees (1996), pp 134-137.
Chambers and Millar (1986), p 107.
Ibid, atp 106.




28habit of either drinking with strangers or drinking to excess. Discovery of the 
existence of a criminal conviction was also part of this general attack on character.29 
In one case, the complainant was asked about the paternity of her children and in
on
particular about her illegitimate child. In another case, detailed questioning by the 
defence revealed that the complainant was separated from her husband, did not live 
with nor look after her children, had been living rough for some time and when the
31incident occurred was living in a hostel for the homeless.
Newby similarly found it to be a common defence tactic to impugn the character of 
the complainant.,2 This, he reports, may include but goes far beyond references to her 
sexual past so that attention may be drawn to behaviour such as hitch-hiking, 
excessive drinking or smoking, the use of bad language, and type of clothing. ’’' Other 
commentators, too, have noted the significance attached by defence counsel to the 
complainant’s clothing and his manipulation of this to depict her as immoral and 
hence untruthful. Lees reports how in one case, “great emphasis” was placed on the 
complainant’s clothing, most particularly her underwear, and concluded that the 
implicit objective seemed to be to undermine her credibility. ’4 Corroborating this, the 
barristers in Temkin’s study admitted that a favourite tactic for undermining the 
credibility of the complainant is to malign her clothing, suggesting that she brought 
the rape on herself by the way she was dressed.3^ Clothing worn in court as well as at 
the time of the rape might also be scrutinised.16
Paradoxically, even the complainant’s use of sexually explicit language in the 
witness-box is used to depict her as lacking in respectability despite the fact that she is 
required to be graphic and finds doing so alien and distressing. This was observed by 
Lees who says that the very use of such language, referring to private sexual parts of 
the anatomy, is sufficient to render a woman unrespectable because many women 










Ibid, at p 107.
Ibid.
Ibid, at p 108.
Ibid, at p 111.
Newby (1980).
Ibid, at p 120.
Lees (1996), p 139. 
Temkin (1998), p 17. 
Ibid.
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court.' Chambers and Millar similarly found that defence counsel tried to equate 
knowledge of sexual terminology with sexual experience or promiscuity.38 Smart also 
noted that the act of describing in detail what the man did and how she responded is 
enough subtly to render the complainant ‘unrespectable’.39
Ultimately, Lees observed that really any indication of autonomous behaviour on the 
part of the complainant is construed so as to depict her as ‘unrespectable’ and thereby 
untrustworthy.411 She concluded that “the defence’s strategy is clearly to use every 
means to cast doubt upon the woman’s credibility and ‘respectability’”.41 The 
barristers interviewed by Temkin all but admitted this, making it clear that their 
approach to the task of defending rape cases was robust to the point of ruthlessness.42 
One female counsel put it in the following terms: “when I’m defending it’s no holds 
barred”.4’ Whilst all the barristers in Temkin’s study denied that they personally went 
in for harassment of the complainant (most conceded that this does go on in rape 
trials), they did admit that they employed every tactic short of this.44
Of course, the most obvious way in which the complainant’s credibility may be 
attacked is by accusing her of telling lies. Chambers and Millar report that 
complainants were frequently accused outright of lying, being commonly asked “are 
you telling the truth?” and “is that the whole truth?”.4:1 In addition to outright 
accusations of untruthfulness, they report that it was also common practice for 
defence counsel to “insinuate” untruthfulness during cross-examination, asking, for 
example, “are you sure about that?”.46 Further, in order to bolster these accusations of 
untruthfulness. Chambers and Millar found that defence counsel allege motives for it, 
such as pregnancy, financial gain or spite.47 They cite one case where the 
complainant was accused of making a false complaint of sexual assault in order to
’ Lees (1997), p 79.
1 Chambers and Millar (1986), p 109. 
’Smart (1990), p 205.
1 Lees (1997), p 66.
Lees (1989a), p 13. (Emphasis added.) 
1 Temkin (1998), p 17.
1 Ibid.
1 Ibid.
' Chambers and Millar (1986), p I 14.
’ Ibid, at p 115.
’ Ibid, at p 116.
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claim money from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.4X Lees also found that 
it was an effective defence strategy to be able to suggest to the court that the 
complainant had a motive for making up the accusation, for example, was she acting 
in revenge because she had been jilted or because she did not dare to admit to her 
boyfriend that she had been unfaithful.49 Invariably, Lees explains, the motives 
imputed to complainants are often specious.r’°
The efforts to depict them as immoral liars must mean that rape complainants undergo 
a very arduous cross-examination ordeal. Nevertheless, this of itself cannot be proper 
grounds for criticism since fairness to the accused calls for the unreliability of the 
accuser to be disclosed. However, what is wholly objectionable is that, very often, 
complainants are subjected to invasive and defamatory questioning when no probative 
connection exists between this questioning and the issue of credibility - it is simply 
not clear what being a single parent, having had an abortion, drinking alcohol, 
swearing, or wearing short skirts has got to do with standing for credit. In fact, 
commentators argue that such matters are rarely properly relevant to the issue of 
credibility but serve, instead, to reduce the complainant’s standing by more insidious 
means. Rhode, for example, explains that the complainant’s character is maligned in 
order simply to prejudice the jury against her because, “as jury studies reflec[t], 
condemnation of the victim often mean[s] acquittal for the assailant, even under 
circumstances clearly demonstrating rape”.51 That this is the unedifying objective 
behind the routine character assassinations carried out in rape trials has been 
confirmed by actual defence practitioners. Counsel interviewed by Brown et al , for 
example, admitted that the purpose of raking the complainant’s “undesirable” lifestyle 
and characteristics before the court is to create a “smokescreen of immorality” around 
her. Similarly, Temkin learned that counsel regarded the facts to be of relatively 
minor significance, the main task being, as one barrister put it, “to undermine the 
woman’s personality”.
48 Ibid
49 Lees (1989a), p 12.
50 Lees (1997), p 66.
51 Rhode (1989), p 249.
52 Brown, Bunnan and Jamieson (1992).
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1.2.1.2 Blaming the Victim
[Responsibility for rape and male sexual violence gets subtly shifted on to women.
It is they who should take evasive action, ensure that they are not “asking for it” by 
being out late at night, or hitch-hiking or drinking in public; or that they are not 
“leading men on” by wearing a short skirt, or flirting, or going back to a man’s 
house, or in any way behaving autonomously. These popular sexist attitudes find 
expression in court.54
As outlined in the previous section, defence counsel frequently seek to paint rape 
complainants as lacking in respectability. This, it was explained, is done in order to 
undermine their credibility as witnesses.'^ However, commentators complain that it is 
also used to serve another highly popular cross-examination tactic, that of putting the 
blame for the rape incident onto the complainant. Bohmer and Blumberg, for 
example, report that the atmosphere in “most” rape trials appears to “place the woman 
in the position of having to prove herself innocent of soliciting the assault in some
56way .
Commentators report that blaming the rape victim takes the form of presenting her as 
having ‘asked for’ the assault or as having ‘deserved’ what she got. Lees, for 
example, observed that defence counsel would seek to show that the complainant had 
“provoked” the incident - by the amount she had drunk; dancing provocatively; going 
to the defendant’s flat; asking the defendant back; taking drugs; soliciting, etc/7 As 
with the discrediting exercise, the type of clothing worn by the complainant features 
heavily in efforts to place the blame on her. We recall how Temkin, for example, 
observed that one popular defence tactic involved maligning the complainant’s 
clothing so as to suggest to the jury that she had brought the assault on herself because 
of the way she dressed/8 Lees also observed that complainants are subjected to 
unnecessary and protracted questioning about their clothing, especially their 
underwear, and concludes that young women who dress quite normally in today’s
53 Temkin (1998), p 17.
54 Lees (1989b), p 14.
55 Where this exercise involves attacking the complainant’s sexual respectability, this is done with the 
added objective of showing that she consented to the intercourse in question (see Chapter Three 
below).
56 Bohmer and Blumberg (1975), p 398. (Emphasis added.)
57 Lees (1989a), p 12.
58 Temkin (1998), p 17.
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fashions are “put on trial because of it”.59 The purpose of such “distortion”, she says, 
is “to give jurors the impression that the woman is provocative and therefore to blame 
for the incident”.60
Chambers and Millar identified another way in which defence counsel seek to blame 
the rape victim for the assault and this is by implying that she acted foolishly.M Thus, 
a complainant may find herself castigated for being out alone at night, being in the 
company of strangers, or otherwise “taking risks”. Lees similarly found that 
defence counsel try to show that the complainant had “provoked” the incident by, for 
example, being out late at night.63 Temkin, too, learned from actual counsel that a 
favourite tactic is to question the complainant about her conduct at the time of the 
alleged rape in order to imply that she had behaved foolishly and so had only herself 
to blame.64 She reports that the barristers had found this tactic to be particularly 
effective with a jury containing middle-aged or elderly women.66 Estrich also 
observed this victim-blaming exercise and calls it the “assumption of risk” approach 
which invites outsiders to view women who put themselves in compromising 
positions as unentitled to complain when they have been compromised.66
The rationale behind depicting the complainant as provocative or foolish is that blame 
for the rape is shifted onto her and, this done, the jury is less inclined to blame the 
defendant and, consequently, less inclined to convict him. This victim-blaming 
process works in one way by prejudicing the jury against the particular complainant - 
perceiving her as immoral or as a risk-taker, jurors feel little sympathy for her, 
certainly not enough to justify sending a man to prison. It also works by playing on 
the pre-conceived notions which jurors hold about rape victims generally. Central to 
these misconceptions is the much-mentioned ‘real’ rape myth.67 According to this 
myth, rape occurs only in the following stereotypical circumstances: the victim is
59 Lees (1996), p 138.
60 Ibid.
61 Chambers and Millar (1986), p 116.
62 Ibid.
a Lees (1989a), p 12.
64 Temkin (1998), p 17.
65 Ibid
66 Estrich (1992), p 10.
67 See, for example, Kelly and Radford (1987); Williams (1984); McColgan (1996). 
This myth is discussed in detail in Chapter Four, section 4.4 below.
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sexually inexperienced and has a ‘respectable’ lifestyle, her assailant is a stranger 
whose company she had not willingly found herself in, she fought back, was 
physically hurt, and, afterwards, promptly reported the offence.68 Women whose rape 
conforms to this stereotype are seen as ‘genuine’ victims. Therefore, they are much 
more likely to be believed and much less likely to be blamed for the incident. 
Because of this, Weis and Borges explain, defence counsel routinely contrast the 
character and behaviour of individual rape complainants with that of the ‘ideal’ rape 
victim.69 That is, the complainant will be portrayed as being ‘unrespectable’ or 
otherwise ‘asking for’ the assault, or as being ‘foolish’ and bringing it upon herself. 
A ‘real’ rape victim, it will be explained, would not have taken the risks that the 
complainant took, nor would she drink alcohol, be divorced, or have an illegitimate 
child, etc. In this way, the jury are discouraged from believing the complainant or, 
believing her, encouraged to blame her.
As with discrediting the complainant, it seems that the blaming exercise pays little 
regard to the truth. Lees, for example, observed that “allegation rather than evidence 
is often enough”.70 However, even if a complainant did behave foolishly or 
provocatively, the chain of reasoning which enables the defendant to thereby escape 
liability is surely spurious. This is because by seeking to blame the complainant, the 
defence is conceding that a blameworthy incident - a rape - did indeed occur. It is 
wrong, therefore, that the complainant’s conduct should be manipulated in order to 
nullify the defendant’s guilt.71
1.2.1.3 Harassing the Victim
Another aspect of the cross-examination of rape complainants which draws major 
criticism is what is seen as the deliberate harassment of the victim by questioning her 
relentlessly on the details of the rape. Temkin states that this is a tactic which is 
frequently deployed in rape trials in many jurisdictions. In Western Australia, for 
example, Newby reveals that it is a “distinct” tactic with complainants being required
68 Adler (1987), p 119.
69 Weis and Borges (1973), pp 71-115.
70 Lees (1989a), p 12.
71 Unless this conduct impacted on the accused’s belief as to whether or not the complainant was 
consenting, thus affecting a substantive element of the rape offence. However, this is a quite separate 
issue from that under discussion.
72 Temkin (1987), p 6.
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# 73“to reiterate again and again the details of the rape incident”. In Scotland, too. 
Chambers and Millar observed many instances of rape complainants being 
persistently questioned by defence counsel on obscure minutiae of the incident.74 
They recount how one woman was asked detailed questions about the accused’s 
watch and jewellery even though it was dark at the time of the incident.7^ In another 
case, a young girl who had been violently assaulted in the stairway of a derelict 
building was asked how many stairs she had been dragged along and in what way she 
was facing when she was being assaulted.76 They report that some of the persistent 
questioning took the form of a very lengthy wearing down process which put the 
complainant under considerable strain and cite one cross-examination excerpt in full 
in order to illustrate its “relentlessness”.77 In that case, questioning continued for
78some considerable time, terminating only when the complainant fainted.
Estrich also refers to this type of questioning, noting its use particularly in 
acquaintance rape cases.74 She points out that in these cases, it is not the victim’s 
identification of her assailant but her account of exactly what happened which is the 
likely focus of defence scrutiny.80 Referring to the William Kennedy Smith rape trial, 
Estrich describes how, in discrediting Patricia Bowman’s testimony, defence 
attorneys exploited every single inconsistency in her statements, no matter how 
minor.81 In another highly publicised American case, intense cross-examination of 
the complainant by three defence attorneys focused on each, sometimes minute, 
inconsistency in her testimony.82 For example, part of the victim’s testimony was that 
the defendants (fellow university students) had gotten her so drunk that she was 
passing in and out of consciousness and that she had come round to find several 
young men sodomising her. However, rather than being persuaded by the 
overwhelming evidence of drunkenness - there were eye-witness accounts - the jury
73 Newby (1980), p 119.
74 Chambers and Millar (1986), p 117.
Other writers who have made much of this cross-examination tactic include Bohmer and Blumberg 
(1975) and Holmstrom and Burgess (1978).
75 Chambers and Millar (1986), p 117.
76 Ibid.
78
Ibid, at pp 117-120. 
Ibid, at p 120.
79 Estrich (1992), pp 27-32.
80 Ibid, at p 28.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid at p 29.
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seemed more influenced by the complainant’s inability to recount exactly the number 
of vodka drinks she had had. So intensely detailed was the cross-examination that the 
complainant is reported to have shouted, “I wasn’t paying attention. I was being 
abused.” In the end, the three defendants were acquitted. The jury foreman 
commented, “If you’re going to accuse someone of a serious crime, you’d better be 
able to back it up.”8j
As to the rationale behind this practice of relentlessly questioning the complainant, 
particularly about trivial or humiliating details, there can be little doubt that it is done 
in order to heighten the trauma experienced by her in court and thereby to reduce her 
competence as a witness - the more distressed she becomes, the more likely it is that 
she will also become angry, confused, unsure, incoherent, etc. In addition, Newby 
asserts that rape complainants are harassed in this way in an attempt “to twist their 
interpretation of events so as to make them consistent with an assumption of 
consent”.84 Chambers and Millar identified also a variation on this theme. This 
occurs when defence counsel doggedly persist with a detailed line of questioning, 
despite the complainant’s repeated denials.8' The purpose of this, they explain, is to 
introduce to the jury the idea that there might indeed be some truth in the denied 
allegations.86 In this way, it is possible io force an image of consensual sex upon the 
jury despite the complainant’s strong denials.
Estrich says that another reason why rape complainants are badgered about minor 
details is that juries still hold this victim-group to “higher standards of consistency”.87 
In fact, she suggests that rape complainants may face credibility tests whose burden is
oo
so high that no truthful victim could ever pass them. Estrich explains that there are 
a number of reasons for this, including ambivalence about the crime of acquaintance 
rape, disapproval of the woman’s behaviour, and the sort of racial animosity which 
has always played a role in rape cases.89 Therefore, by focusing on even very minor 
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advantage of these and other prejudices which make jurors predisposed to mistrust 
this victim-group.
1.2.1.4 Humiliating the Victim
Commentators complain also that defence counsel make concerted efforts to humiliate 
rape complainants. Chambers and Millar, for example, observed that an important 
defence strategy is to “embarrass or shame” the complainant.90 They reveal that this 
is done by asking questions “insensitively and making little allowance for the 
complainer’s feelings”.91 Whilst this is usually achieved by questioning the 
complainant on her sexual history, other methods are also used. Chambers and Millar 
describe how the complainant in the following case, for example, was asked a number 
of “unnecessary, detailed personal questions”:
DC: Are you wearing tights at the moment?
C: Yes.
DC: You are wearing pants at the moment?
C: Yes.
DC: Are your pants at the moment under or over your tights?
C: They are under just now because of...
DC: You were starting to tell us the reasons, weren’t you?
C: Yes, because 1 had my periods.
DC: But when you are not in that position you normally wear the pants outside
the tights?
C: Usually, sometimes, yes ... not always, it depends.92
Lees similarly observed that defence counsel routinely seek to humiliate rape 
complainants. She noted that a particularly effective way in which this is done is by 
handing the complainant’s underwear around in court. ' Indeed, in an interview on 
the Panorama programme The Rape of Justice (1993), Judge Perleman remarked that 
many rape complainants find this the most appalling part of the trial, even worse than 
describing the actual assault. The following excerpt illustrates the degrading nature of 
this exercise:
DC: Do you recognise that garment?
C: Yes.
90 Chambers and Millar (1986), p 116.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid, at pp 116, 117.
93 Lees (1997), p 61.
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DC: Your knickers. Are they clean?
C: I don’t know.
(The usher ostentatiously puts on rubber gloves and picks up the exhibit.)
DC: I think they are the ones you took off.
Judge: Would you like some plastic gloves? Or I don’t suppose you mind 
handling your own knickers? 94
Because the complainant’s underwear is unlikely to bear any forensic value (the fact 
of intercourse is not usually in dispute in most rape trials and it is to this end that 
forensic evidence really bears any value), there really seems to be no legitimate 
purpose behind handing the complainant’s garments round. Lees claims, therefore, 
that the practice is no more than a deliberate exercise in degradation of the woman.9'
Commentators reveal that another popular method of humiliating rape complainants is 
by questioning them about their period. Lees, for example, noted that defence 
counsel frequently make reference to whether or not the complainant was 
menstruating at the time of the alleged rape.96 She describes how the complainant 
referred to above underwent two further hours of “humiliating” cross-examination 
involving “demeaning” and “unnecessary” questions, such as, how had the defendant 
managed to remove her Tampax - had he difficulty with the string?97 Lees reports 
that the complainant frequently broke down in tears and the defendant was
• i 98acquitted.
Referring specifically to the humiliation caused by questioning rape complainants on 
their sexual history, McEwan explains that some of the motive is to cause them “as 
much distress as possible, thereby undermining [their] performance in the witness- 
box”.99 This rationale can equally be applied to the other methods used to humiliate 
rape complainants.
Summary
The previous discussion highlighted a number of aspects of the cross-examination of 
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Support into how these victims feel about their cross-examination experience 
confirms this representation of it as a very gruelling ordeal for respondents described 
it as “traumatic”, “patronising”, “humiliating”, making them feel “as if they were on 
trial”, a second victimisation, and “worse than the rape”.100 It is accepted, therefore, 
that defence counsel subject rape victims to a considerable ordeal in the witness-box. 
However, it remains to be seen whether only rape victims suffer in this way. In order 
to determine this, the cross-examination experience of victims as a whole will now be 
examined.
1.2.2 Other Trial Contexts
Cross-examination was waged as if to unmask those with false pretensions to 
knowledge, and it worried away at any semblance of contradiction, inconsistency, 
deceit, and error. It played on the expressions, gestures, and demeanour that seemed 
to betray the cheat and the liar. Witnesses were people whose very moral status was 
in contention.101
The dominant perspective in most rape literature is that rape complainants are treated 
differently from complainants of non-sexual offences. With specific regard to cross- 
examination, Ellison tells us that it is assumed that the types of questions routinely put 
to rape complainants would be considered unacceptable in other trial contexts.102 
Adler, for example, makes the explicit claim that defence counsel in rape trials use 
strands of attack to undermine the woman’s evidence and to shake her story which 
would be considered totally unacceptable in the context of a serious non-sexual 
assault. Elowever, as explained, rape commentators tend to examine the treatment 
of rape victims without making any comparative reference to the experience of 
victims generally. It was suggested that because of this simplistic approach, the 
image of singular maltreatment presented in most rape literature may not be wholly 
accurate. Empirical research conducted into the cross-examination experience of 
victims as a whole supports this proposition. Highly illustrative in this regard is
99 McEwan (1992), p 104. 
10(1 Victim Support (1996).
101 Rock (1993), p 86.
102 Ellison ( 1998), p 607.
103 Adler (1987), p 53.
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Rock’s study of trial proceedings at London’s Wood Green Crown Court.104 Rock 
reports that witnesses of all kinds “detested cross-examination so much that they 
reacted viscerally”.10^ He quotes one victim in this regard:
I was ill. 1 collapsed in the witness-box... you could tell I was shaking, I was going 
to pass out, but they didn’t offer me a chair or anything. I really wanted to sit down.
I could feel myself going, I was hanging on to the table.106 
All in all. Rock found that witnesses felt bullied, traduced, embarrassed, hurt, and 
basically as if they were on trial themselves. He quotes one witness who complained, 
“I felt 7 was trying to prove my innocence in all this.” 107 Not surprisingly, then. Rock 
found that witnesses tended to “detest the defence lawyers who had inflicted all that 
discomfort”.108
In the following pages, the specific methods used in the cross-examination of non­
rape victims will be examined. In so doing, the accuracy of the claim that rape 
victims undergo forms of questioning which would be considered unacceptable in 
other trial contexts is tested.
1.2.2.1 Discrediting the Victim
Almost as a matter of course, counsel would, as a judge put it, so ‘blackguard’ the 
witnesses that they were no longer believable. Under cross-examination, victims and 
prosecution witnesses could be asked about matters touching on their ‘title to credit’: 
their way of life, their associations, their past convictions, their disinterestedness, and 
their integrity. They could be vilified and shamed as they defended, in public and 
perhaps for the very first time, testimony about matters that were painful, 
embarrassing and once personal.109
From his trial observations. Rock noted that prosecution witnesses in all types of case 
are subject to vigorous attempts to discredit them.110 He explains that because victim- 
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time.111 Thus, they are almost automatically challenged by the defence about their
veracity, disinterestedness, integrity, knowledgeability, way of life, reputation, and 
112associations.
In this discrediting exercise. Rock observed that the most common strategy is to 
accuse outright the prosecution and its witnesses of lying. He explains that this 
takes the form of “slamming” whereby the witness is repeatedly and forcefully 
accused of falsehood.114 Rock observed that this is usually done in the final stages of 
cross-examination and is so vigorous that “it can damage the witness beyond repair, 
or destroy him”.1 Great distress is also engendered by the fact that this denigration - 
being “cast as tellers of untruths” - is conducted in full view of the public."6 Rock 
further observed that, in order to enhance the effectiveness of accusations of 
untruthfulness, defence counsel endeavour to show that complainants have some 
motive for making a false report to the police. For example, in one case, the 
complainant was accused of being motivated by the possibility of obtaining criminal 
injuries compensation."7 In his comparative study of rape and assault trials, Brereton 
similarly observed that complainants in non-sexual offence cases are accused of lying 
and of having particular motives for doing such.118 Referring to the relationship 
between rape and non-rape trials in this regard, he concluded that questions aimed at 
imputing a motive for making a false report were asked of “virtually an identical 
proportion” of rape and assault complainants.119
Examining other methods by which it is sought to undermine the credibility of 
complainants, Rock observed that there is little that counsel is not allowed to say so 
that “as a matter of course, and in the most ordinary trial, gravely wounding 
allegations would be put to witnesses”. Ultimately, he concluded that prosecution 
witnesses perceive cross-examination as “an assault on their identity”. Brereton
111 Ibid, at p 70.
112 Ibid.
" ’ Ibid, at p 83.
114 Ibid, at pp 29,30.
'15 Ibid, at p 30.
116 Ibid, at p 36.
"1lbid at p 72.
"8 Brereton (1997), p 254.
'"Ibid.
120 Rock (1993), pp 86,88.
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similarly found that defence counsel cast all sorts of aspersions about complainants, 
drawing into question such matters as their drinking and drug-taking habits and their 
mental or emotional stability. He also noted that complainants, particularly asssault 
complainants, were likely to be asked about their prior criminal record, even where 
this bore little relevance to the case at hand. Brereton concluded that issues relating 
to the complainant’s character and credit were just as likely to be raised in assault 
trials as in rape trials.124
Brereton makes the further point that, often, the information used to discredit 
complainants is of little proper relevance to the case at hand.12:1 Pattenden supports 
this finding, arguing that “much information about the character of complainants and 
of third parties which is at present admissible is of little value”.126 In addition, not 
only do commentators dispute the relevance of much of the evidence being brought in 
to discredit complainants, there is also considerable evidence that this information is 
often quite untrue. Rock cites one case where the female victim of an assault was 
accused, without grounds, of lying, taking drugs, being drunk, and being 
provocative.127 Shocked, she demanded:
How can he imply we were doing something with absolutely no proof? How can he 
do that? Can he do that, suggest that we were taking drugs when we weren’t? It’s 
total rubbish!128
It seems that, as in rape trials, the purpose of introducing defamatory character 
evidence in non-sexual offence trials is to prejudice the court against the complainant. 
Again, the rationale is that condemnation of the victim will mean acquittal for the 
assailant. Pattenden says that experiments on simulated juries bear this out, showing 
a direct relationship between the attractiveness of the victim in terms of character 
traits and social attributes and the determination of guilt. Therefore, it is clearly in 
the defence’s best interests to paint the complainant in an unfavourable light, even if 
this means distorting or bypassing the truth.
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All in all, studies examining the trial experience of non-rape victims contradict the 
assumption inherent in traditional rape literature that only rape victims have their 
character denigrated during cross-examination. As McBarnet says, cross-examination 
is an integral part of the trial and is essentially about discrediting the testimony of 
opposing witnesses. Therefore, she explains, discrediting techniques are not 
something specially reserved for rape victims in particular or even victims. Rather,
130“everyone who enters the witness box is ‘a victim’ of the court in this sense”.
1.2.2.2 Blaming the Victim
[TJrials are about morals and deserts as well as the law. Juries were sometimes 
thought to believe that certain victims, shown to be the kinds of people they were, 
were really entitled to no protection under the law.131
Just as they stand to have their credibility attacked, studies reveal that victims in all 
types of case are also likely to find themselves being blamed for the incident in 
question. Brereton, for example, observed that a great deal of irrelevant material is 
introduced to the court to suggest that a particular complainant deserved what 
happened to him or her. Similarly, Rock found that defence counsel frequently cast
1 TTvictims as “culpable as the defendant”.
Integral to this victim-blaming exercise is the ‘deserving’ or ‘ideal’ victim philosophy 
which, Shapland et al report, features heavily in all types of criminal case. They 
explain that this is because the present system has retained the necessary tradition of 
prosecuting an individual offender for a particular offence and has therefore had to 
retain some notion of a person against whom the offence has been committed.134 This 
person, they say, is the ‘ideal’ victim and is portrayed in the substantive and 
procedural criminal law as passive and inert, playing no part in any action prior to or
i or
during the commission of the offence. Should a particular victim fail to conform to
1311 McBarnet (1983), p 294.
131 Rock (1993), p 52.
132 Brereton (1997), p 253.
' Rock (1993), p 72. (Emphasis added.)
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this ideal, then there is a tendency in practice to switch to an idea of the “provocative”
1victim - the victim as sharing blame for the offence.
Brereton observed that, in order to exploit this tendency, defence counsel endeavour 
to contrast “explicitly or implicitly” a particular complainant’s conduct and character 
with that of the “legitimate” or “deserving” victim.1’7 And in this regard, he 
concludes, the line of questioning in non-rape trials bears “marked similarities” to the 
strategy used in rape trials.138 Rock’s findings bear this out. He describes how the 
victim of a knife attack was accused of cheating, plotting, drunkenness, 
vindictiveness, quarrelling, muddle, and mendacity and all “as a matter of course and 
in a few minutes”.139 Again, in a “quite routine case of assault” on a woman, he 
reports that doubts were cast on her truthfulness, her language, her aggressiveness, her 
self-discipline, her sobriety, and her conduct.140 In his closing speech, counsel called 
the complainant a “spiteful, bitchy woman with a drink problem”.141 It can be seen in 
these cases that defence counsel is painting a picture of the complainant which is far 
removed from the ideal victim stereotype.
The prolixity of the accusations levelled against individual complainants suggests that 
they are unlikely to be true. In support of this. Rock observed that the accusations 
made are dictated largely by the nature of the case - they are “standard fare” for that 
case-type - with the same line being taken by any lawyer handling such a case.142 
Basically, Rock explains, lawyers resort to a set of “operating typifications” whereby 
witnesses are translated into routine categories and are then subjected to the routine 
attacks that these categories warrant.143 In this way, “a unique offence, offender, and 
victim [are] subjected to a round of formulaic defence attacks”.144 Brereton, too, 
observed that the manner in which complainants are “delegitimised” depends on the 
nature of the trial.145 Thus, he explains, rape complainants are “likely to be painted as
136 Ibid, at pp 66, 67.
137 Brereton (1997), p 254.
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139 Rock (1993), p 83.
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sexually provocative risktakers, and/or as persons of suspect morality who d[o] not 
live a normal lifestyle”.146 An assault complainant, on the other hand, stands to be 
depicted as a “trouble-maker or a bully who ‘gave as good as he got’ and deserved 
what happened to him”.147 But, Brereton insists, these differences in content should 
not be allowed to obscure the very substantial similarities in the form and structure of 
questioning designed to impute blame to complainants in both rape and non-rape 
trials. Similarly, McBarnett argues that the only influence of gender and offence- 
specific factors is in helping to determine the particular form which degradation of the
i 149victim takes.
The Advisory Committee on the US Federal Rules of Evidence explain that the 
victim-blaming exercise works largely by
...distracting] the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on 
the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the goodman and 
to punish the badman because of their respective characters despite what the 
evidence in the case shows actually happened.150
Because the outcome of a case then depends on whether the complainant is 
characterised as a “goodman” or a “badman”, defence counsel will invariably 
endeavour to depict him or her as a “badman”. As with the discrediting exercise, the 
truth of the accusations aimed at doing such are quite irrelevant. Indeed, it may be 
that the objective can only be achieved by foregoing reality.
It can be seen, therefore, that the various studies examining the trial experience of 
non-rape victims oppose the assumption inherent in most rape literature that only rape 
victims stand to have their character and conduct blackened as defence counsel seek 
to impute blame to them. The reality is rather that victims in all kinds of case are 
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1.2.2.3 Harassing the Victim
[C]ross-examination would lean on the reiterated question, put over and over again 
and more aggressively, in a manner quite alien to mundane conversation...151
On top of vigorous attempts to discredit and blame them, research reveals that victims 
in all kinds of case are also subject to deliberate harassment during cross-examination. 
Rock, for example, observed that complainants may be questioned relentlessly, the 
same question being asked repetitively and more and more aggressively.152 In fact, he 
concluded that questions asked during cross-examination came across more as “sure 
statements”.153 The effect, he observed, is to suggest to the court that the dispute is 
attributable solely to the witness’s reluctance to admit the truth, rather than to the fact 
that he or she is actually telling the truth.'54 In addition, Brereton observed that 
complainants undergo relentless questioning about inconsistencies between their trial 
evidence and statements which may have been made months earlier to the police or in 
other court hearings.155 He explains that this is, in fact, one of the most important and 
commonly used of the barrister’s “tools of trade”.156 He reveals that lawyers consider 
this to be a “bread and butter” cross-examination tactic which is used in any case 
where the opportunity arises.157 Brereton explains that the primary objective behind 
this type of questioning is to undermine the complainant’s testimony and general 
credibility.158
Cross-examining witnesses about previous inconsistent testimony is generally 
permissible under the laws of evidence as relevant to the issue of credit.159 However, 
it is clear that defence counsel are exploiting this freedom so that questioning takes 
place which amounts to harassment. This can be seen from the types of questions 
which are asked in this regard. Brereton observed that much of such questioning 
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whole.160 Moreover, defence counsel seize on minor discrepancies between the 
complainant’s evidence in court and on previous occasions.161 McEwan similarly 
observed “valuable witnesses’’ being “relentlessly questioned on matters which by no 
stretch of the imagination had any useful part to play in the proceedings”.162
It seems, then, that defence counsel are able to undermine the credibility of witnesses 
by exploiting even the most trivial discrepancies in their testimony. In addition, 
relentless questioning of this kind is very oppressive, causing victims to feel bullied 
and manipulated, the impact on particularly fragile witnesses being especially severe. 
Therefore, a further motive behind this kind of treatment is clearly to cause 
complainants as much distress as possible so that their performance in the witness-box 
is impaired.
Once again, the assumption inherent in traditional rape literature that only rape 
victims undergo certain kinds of questioning in the witness-box is disproved for just 
as rape complainants face relentless questioning about prior inconsistencies in their 
evidence, so too do non-rape victims. Brereton’s study explicitly bears this out for, 
comparing the questioning undertaken in this regard in an assault trial with that 
undertaken in a rape trial, he concluded that the general structure of the questioning in 
the two samples was remarkably similar.163 Similarly, in his study study on the 
structure and logic of courtroom “talk”, Matoesian noted that “generating inconsistent 
testimony...functions as a generic courtroom tactic” and “operates across a broad 
spectrum of offences”.164
Summary
As explained, a major focus of rape literature is the complainant’s cross-examination 
experience. Heavy criticism is directed at the way in which this victim-group is 
routinely vilified, denigrated and humiliated as defence counsel endeavour to 
discredit, blame and unsettle them. All in all, the various cross-examination tactics
160 Ibid at p 256.
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utilised in rape cases have given rise to the repeated criticism that it is the 
complainant and not the defendant who is on trial:
[VJictims of rape deciding to pursue cases through legal channels have faced 
discrimination by and trauma from excessive scrutiny of their behaviour, credibility, 
demeanour, resistance, and provocation. The net effect has been to shift the burden 
in rape cases from demonstrating the offender’s guilt to demonstrating the victim’s 
innocence.165
The previous exposition of the type of treatment which rape complainants routinely 
experience during cross-examination leaves little doubt that this image of brutality is 
true. Indeed, the complaint that rape victims are raped for a second time in court 
seems well founded.166
However, the previous discussion also revealed that non-rape complainants are 
equally subject to an extremely arduous cross-examination ordeal. In fact, it was 
shown that they endure an almost identical experience, suffering vicious attacks on 
their character and conduct as it is sought to discredit and blame them.167 Researchers 
comment that non-rape victims, too, experience cross-examination as an “assault on 
their identity”, putting them “on trial” and making them “feel like a criminal”.168 
Ultimately, then, the previous discussion challenges the common assumption of most 
rape literature that rape complainants are subjected to forms of brutality during cross- 
examination which would not be tolerated in other trial contexts. The following 
section examines whether this ‘equal injustice’ extends also to the treatment 
experienced by rape and non-rape victims at the hands of prosecuting counsel.
165 Caringella-MacDonald (1985), p 66.
166 Lees, for example, remonstrates that rape trials are a “cruel hoax” and “equivalent to a second rape 
by the judiciary and legal profession” (1989a, p 10).
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and harassing tactics. However, whilst evidence exists that victims in non-sexual offence cases are 
also frequently humiliated during cross-examination, it is felt that such a tactic is arguably more 
prevalent in rape cases given the particularly conducive nature of the issues involved. It is hoped that 
the reader will appreciate, certainly by the end of Chapter Two, that cross-examination is largely a 
tactical exercise by which counsel endeavour to win their case. To this end, counsel vary the tactics 
from case-type to case-type in order to exact the most effective defence possible. Therefore, 





Whilst defence counsel attract by far the greatest adverse attention in rape literature, 
the way in which prosecutors discharge their role also comes in for considerable 
criticism. Much of this criticism centres around the fact that the prosecutor is not the 
complainant’s personal legal representative. Patullo, for example, remonstrates:
[The complainant] is just the witness in the case in which she must prove her 
innocence. She has no counsel to represent her and no one to defend her. She is, in 
judicial terms, out there alone.169
This procedural aspect of the trial process is seen to have a severely detrimental 
impact on the rape complainant’s experience in court. One major effect is that, 
because they are unrepresented, complainants feel isolated and vulnerable. Chambers 
and Millar observed that many women “felt vulnerable in court when they realised 
that there was no one there specifically to protect their interests at the trial”.170 In 
another study, they again noted complainants’s “feelings of vulnerability in court as a 
consequence of having no one on their ‘own side’ to protect their interests”.171
In addition, serious practical difficulties result from the fact of having no personal 
representation. Lees explains that prosecuting counsel is not allowed to meet the 
complainant before the trial or even to speak to her on the day of the court hearing.172 
Sometimes prosecutors do introduce themselves, she says, but this is not 
encouraged. This complete lack of meaningful contact with the complainant is 
seen to account for her unpreparedness for the rigours of the trial process. Chambers 
and Millar, for example, report that complainants were generally of the opinion that to 
have known something about court procedures and what was expected of them in the 
role of main prosecution witness would have considerably reduced the feeling of fear 
and anxiety which built up before their court appearance.174 In turn, they believed that 
such knowledge would have gone a long way towards reducing nerves and as a result
168 Rock (1993), p 35.
169 Patullo (1983), p 18.
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would have improved their performance in court because they would have felt more 
prepared and less tense when giving evidence.17^
Perhaps the gravest criticism is that because the prosecutor is not the complainant’s 
personal representative, this negatively affects the way in which he performs his 
prosecutorial function. Lees, for example, noted that the failure to allow the 
complainant in rape trials to meet with the prosecution beforehand “results in a highly 
disinterested representation on the woman’s behalf’.176 Chambers and Millar 
similarly observed that the complainant’s “expectations of advocacy contrasted 
sharply with the impartiality and detachment which was in fact the hallmark of 
prosecution decision-making”.177 This, they say, led many women to contrast the 
fiscal’s impartial position with the interventionist role of the defence agent or 
advocate. Regarding this contrast. Chambers and Millar explain that whilst the 
prosecution has responsibility for presenting the complainant’s evidence because she 
is the main prosecution witness, there is not the same “singleness of purpose” as 
exists in the relationship between the defence lawyer and the accused.176
The prosecutor’s disinterestedness is seen to manifest itself in a wholly inadequate 
presentation of the complainant’s case. Lees claims that the prosecution don’t ask 
relevant questions, for example. She reports that there are several areas which are 
usually neglected, for example, the circumstances of the alleged rape; the location of 
the intercourse; the effect of the incident on the woman’s life; the character of the 
defendant, and the trauma and dangers involved in bringing the case to court.181 Lees 
further reports that prosecutors fail to cross-examine the defendant effectively. She 
refers to one case in which the prosecutor failed completely to challenge the 
defendant on testimony betraying “not only woman-hating attitudes but an aggressive 
and contemptuous attitude towards the woman herself’.182 She also points out that
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crucial inconsistencies in the defendant’s testimony are frequently not taken up by the
• 183prosecution.
Lees also accuses prosecuting counsel of lacking sympathy for the complainant 
which, she says, can prejudice the woman’s case. She describes how, in one case, 
despite evidence from several police officers, including a police surgeon, that the 
complainant was in acute distress and showing every sign of having been raped, 
prosecuting counsel failed even to mention the woman’s distress in his summing-up. 
When Lees asked him why he had not done so, he replied that it was absurd to regard 
the woman’s state as important as she could be faking distress. " Soothill and 
Soothill similarly observed that prosecutors lack sympathy for the complainant and to 
such an extent that they actually participate in blaming her for what happened. They 
found in this respect that
...respective counsels seem to collude in their assessments of the parties concerned 
and so battle commenced with certain shared assumptions which clearly undermined 
the position of the complainant.186
They reveal that out of the sixteen rape cases which they looked at in 1985, seven 
instances of “woman blame” came from the prosecution. They listed the most 
striking example as being the case which attracted the second greatest amount of 
coverage during that year. In that case, the prosecutor was quoted as apologetically 
pointing out that “It would have been better if these girls had been tucked up in 
bed”.187
Another criticism is that prosecutors fail to protect rape complainants from brutality 
during cross-examination. Chambers and Millar, for example, noted that complainants 
felt “particularly let down” by the prosecution, who they thought “could have acted in 
a more robust way to provide protection from defence questioning”.188 Lees blames 
the lack of contact between prosecutor and complainant which, she says, gives rise to 
disinterestedness. Chambers and Millar similarly conclude that it is the 
prosecutor’s “impartiality” which leaves complainants “open to attack” and creates
18:5 Lees (1996), p 108.
184 Ibid, at p 124.
185 Ibid.
186 Soothill and Soothill (1993), p 22.
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“an imbalance in the conduct of trials and in the way evidence [i]s presented”.190 
They explain that there is simply no one acting solely to protect the complainant’s 
interests by, for example, seeking to prevent her character being maligned or being 
unfairly harassed.191
Prosecuting counsel in rape cases come in for further criticism for their role in the 
plea-negotiation process. In their Scottish study, Chambers and Millar found that 
approximately one-quarter of all sexual offence convictions were obtained on lesser 
charges resulting from private negotiations between the defence agent and the 
prosecution in relation to plea. They found the most common form of plea- 
negotiation to be the deletion, at the suggestion of the defence agent, of clauses or 
phrases from the common law charges which had the effect of lessening the charge.194 
Sometimes this even resulted in the removal of the sexual element of the offence.19' 
In a recent Home Office study, Harris and Grace revealed that plea-bargaining, or 
“horse trading” as one judge called it, “often” takes place in English Crown Courts 
too.190 In 1996, for example, twenty-four per cent of defendants pleaded not guilty to 
the principal charge of rape, but guilty to a lesser charge. Over three-quarters of these 
defendants were convicted of those charges only, indicating a form of plea-bargaining 
between the prosecution and the defence.197
I8; Lees (1996), p 106.
190 Chambers and Millar (1986), p 131.
191 Ibid, at p 95.
192 Ashworth explains that there are three types of plea-negotiation: the charge bargain, the fact bargain, 
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Whilst plea-negotiation is indeed one way of reducing the trauma experienced by the 
rape victim - a negotiated plea will mean that the trial is avoided and so she will not 
have to give evidence - it does not always meet with her approval. There are a 
number of reasons for this. First of all, as Lees explains:
It is not much comfort to a victim of attempted rape or sexual assault to have the case 
expedited and her own role in the trial made less traumatic, merely to see her attacker 
charged with a minor offence and given a trivial sentence.198 
She goes on to say that interviews conducted with victims revealed how “shocked” 
and “insulted” many complainants were at the lenient sentences frequently meted out 
to their attackers.199 Chambers and Millar explain that a second reason why rape 
victims disapprove of plea-negotiation is that it prevents them from having their side 
of the story heard. They report that complainants felt “cheated at not being able to 
give evidence” and “annoyed at the prosecutor’s acceptance of only a partial guilty 
plea”.200 A number of women, they reveal, felt that they wanted more say prior to 
sentencing and that the absence of a trial had deprived them of the opportunity of 
having their view put before the court. In fact, Lees found that not being able to 
describe the rape or her anguish is one of the aspects of rape trials that complainants 
find the most frustrating.202 A third reason that rape victims are unhappy to have their 
case settled by way of plea-negotiation is because this is generally done without any 
consultation being made with them. Instead, they result from private negotiations 
between defence counsel and the prosecutor.204 This causes complainants to feel 
excluded from the decision-making process, even though the outcome is crucially 
important to them. In this way, the complainant’s feeling of being “peripheral to the 
key relationship at a trial, that between the state as representing the ‘public interest’ 
and the accused” is exacerbated. Further to this, excluding complainants from the 
plea-negotiation process promotes the frustration and lack of acceptance referred to 
above. Chambers and Millar observed, for example, that some women in their study 
were aggrieved about charges being dropped which they thought were relevant.206
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The previous discussion highlighted the fact that prosecutors attract serious criticism 
for the way in which they carry out their prosecutorial function in rape trials. It was 
shown that prosecutors are disinterested, unsympathetic and ineffective leaving 
complainants feeling vulnerable, excluded and unrepresented. The question now is 
whether non-rape victims experience the same problems in relation to their treatment 
by prosecuting counsel.
1.3.2 Other Trial Contexts
As previously explained, the dominant perspective in most rape literature is that rape 
complainants are treated differently from non-sexual offence complainants. This 
perspective was illustrated with regard to the issue of cross-examination; it extends 
also to the conduct of prosecuting counsel in that the perceived inadequacies in how 
he discharges his role are presented as if unique to rape cases. However, an important 
proposition of this present study is that the non-comparative approach taken in most 
rape literature results in the rape complainant's treatment being misrepresented. This 
has already been demonstrated with regard to the issue of cross-examination for it was 
shown that non-rape victims undergo many of the very same abuses during this 
process as do rape victims. Similarly, research conducted into the experience of 
victims as a whole casts serious doubt on the assumption that only rape victims have 
cause to complain about the conduct of prosecutors. Jackson, for example, explains 
that “there is now increasing frustration on the part of victims that justice is being 
denied to them at court because of the way their cases are dealt with by lawyers”.207
An essential preliminary point in this regard is that no victim enjoys personal legal 
representation for, regardless of case-type, the prosecutor represents the public 
interest and not specifically that of the victim. In this way, all victims are simply 
witnesses for the Crown and, as such, enjoy no special status whatsoever. This is a 
fact which is rarely made explicit in traditional rape literature. Instead, misleading 
statements such as the following are made:
206 Ibid, at p 133.
207 Jackson (1997), p 5.
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In court, a woman who has complained of rape is almost entirely isolated. She has 
no barrister to represent her interests. She is not allowed to consult the prosecution 
barrister before the trial. She may not even see her statement.208 
Invariably, the uninformed reader is left with the view that this state of affairs is 
unique to rape complainants whereas, as stated, no complainant is personally 
represented. Consequently, victims as a whole experience the same sense of isolation, 
of being on the periphery, as do rape victims. This was observed by Rock who states 
that “witnesses could not understand why they were so shunned by the lawyers whom 
they supposed to act for them”.209
Research shows that non-rape victims experience also the same practical difficulties 
as rape victims through not having their own legal representation. For example, 
Jackson et al found that the majority of prosecution witnesses (including victims) felt 
that not enough had been done to prepare them for their case and that they did not 
have a sufficient understanding of what was going to happen in court, with only thirty 
per cent saying that they had received some explanation about this.210 This lack of 
preparation is attributable largely to the fact that prosecuting counsel do not consult 
with victims prior to trial. In addition, Jackson et al found that the predominant 
reaction of victims on receiving their summons was one of worry or anxiety, for 
reasons such as having to appear publicly in court to give evidence and of giving 
evidence against the defendant. In light of this, it is inevitable that the almost 
complete lack of consultation with victims leads also to heightened anxiety and 
diminished performance in the witness box.
Shapland et al observed that despite often very belligerent cross-examination, victims 
tend not to blame defence counsel because they more or less expect to be treated in 
such a manner.212 They found, however, that victims feel very disappointed and 
angered by the prosecutor’s treatment of them. Some victims commented on the 
prosecutor’s apparent disinterest in the case. Others complained that he did not seem 
well-prepared, did not emphasise the right points or did not protest when the defence
208 Lees (198%), p 14.
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210 Jackson, Kilpatrick and Harvey (1991), p 86.
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213was casting doubts on their story. Ultimately, Shapland et al report, the prosecutor 
was identified as “the most unsatisfactory courtroom participant as far as victims were 
concerned”.214 It can be seen that these criticisms echo those voiced in the context of 
the rape trial.
Aside from prosecuting counsel’s perceived ineffectiveness, McBarnet found that he 
is also guilty of abusing victims. She claims that “the degradation of witnesses in 
court is not just something meted out by their adversaries” but, rather, victims can 
find themselves treated just as “abruptly”, “unpleasantly” and “suspiciously” by 
“‘their own side’”. She observed, for example, that victims look “visibly aggrieved 
and frustrated as they are abruptly cut off in full flow by prosecutors”.216 Rock 
similarly found that prosecutors “steer[ed] their witnesses forcibly and peremptorily”, 
telling them to modulate their delivery, adhere to what was thought relevant, abstain 
from commentary, and cut short evidence that flouted the hearsay rule.217
In addition to the embarrassment which being treated so abruptly must obviously 
cause. Rock explains that victims feel aggrieved by this treatment because it prevents 
them from recounting their own history as they would like.218 In fact, it seems that 
victims generally feel very strongly that the actual offence is neither accurately nor 
fully presented, particularly at the sentencing stage and in cases which have been 
settled by way of plea-negotiation. With regard to plea-negotiation, Jackson et al 
observed that those who complained most were assault victims who felt that the 
extent of their injuries were not stressed sufficiently by the prosecution. They report 
that, when they heard the scanty account that was given of their injuries by the 
prosecution, the initial attitude of relief at not having to give evidence expressed by 
these witnesses changed to one of annoyance at the lack of opportunity to put their 
side of the picture.2 |l) We recall that rape complainants similarly feel that the conduct 
of the trial denies them adequate opportunity to put their view before the court; the
213 Ibid.
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practice of plea-negotiating is seen as robbing them completely of any such 
opportunity.
With regard to sentencing, Jackson et al found that those victims who were most 
aggrieved were again those who had been personally injured. In their view, the 
sentence imposed did not reflect the severity of the injuries inflicted and this was seen 
to be the result of the prosecutor’s failure to emphasise them sufficiently. Jackson 
provides the example of a man who suffered severe injuries to his head and neck after 
his home was broken into by three men who bore him a grudge. The men were 
charged with the serious offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm for which 
they would have been likely to receive an immediate custodial sentence. The 
prosecutors in the case, however, reduced the charges to common assault and the case 
was dealt with in the magistrate’s court instead of the Crown Court. The men pleaded 
guilty to this lesser charge and instead of a prison sentence they received a conditional 
discharge.
Summary
As explained, prosecuting counsel attract considerable criticism for the way in which 
they discharge their prosecutorial function in rape trials. The previous discussion 
revealed the most prevalent criticisms in this regard. It was shown, for example, that 
prosecutors are “disinterested” and “detached” from the complainant and her 
grievance with the result that they present her case half-heartedly, make no effective 
challenge of the defence case, fail to protect her from the brutality of cross- 
examination and generally fail to represent or take into account her interests.
However, the previous discussion also revealed that victims of all kinds of crime feel 
very dissatisfied with the way in which prosecuting counsel handle their grievance in 
court. In fact, the criticisms outlined in respect of non-rape trials can be seen to 
reflect exactly those voiced in the context of rape cases. Once again, therefore, the 
presumption inherent in most rape literature that rape complainants are subjected to 
singular maltreatment is challenged. The following section examines whether this
220 Ibid, at p 117.
221 Jackson (1997), pp 5, 6.
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assumption can be challenged also in respect of how the judiciary conduct themselves 
in a rape trial.
1.4 Judicial Intervention
1.4.1 Rape Trials
The judiciary also comes in for considerable criticism from rape commentators. One 
significant complaint is that trial judges fail to protect rape victims from the brutality 
of cross-examination. Temkin, for example, demands to know “where are the 
judges?” when rape victims are being abused by defence counsel.222 She argues that 
while it is for judges to control the conduct of the trial, “in rape cases, they appear all 
too often to have given defence counsel free rein”.
Chambers and Millar’s empirical research bears this criticism out. They observed that 
the judges in their study “rarely” intervened to prevent defence counsel from asking 
questions which were likely to cause the complainant undue distress.224 Moreover, 
they noted that the judges frequently failed to prevent counsel from asking even those 
questions which were inadmissible. Overall, Chambers and Millar observed only 
three clear-cut examples in their whole study of objections being raised to defence 
counsel’s cross-examination of the complainant and these were raised, not by the 
presiding judge, but by the prosecution for consideration by the judge. 
Furthermore, they emphasise that in none of these instances did the trial judge uphold 
the objection - in one case the objection was conclusively rejected and in the other 
two cases the outcome of the judge’s involvement was not clear but resulted in only a 
limited restriction of defence counsel’s questioning.227 Chambers and Millar 
concluded that it might have been expected that the judges would have made more 
objections to defence questioning since there were “many instances where the 
complainer was clearly very distressed” and, moreover, “there was much questioning 
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The criticism that trial judges don’t do enough to protect rape complainants from the 
cruelties of cross-examination is perhaps strongest with regard to the issue of sexual 
history evidence. This is because it is widely considered that this type of questioning 
causes rape complainants more distress and humiliation than any other aspect of the 
cross-examination process. Yet, despite the trauma caused to complainants and the 
judicial obligation to curtail this type of questioning, the judiciary is considered to 
offer little protection in this regard. Research conducted by Adler, for example, 
revealed that defence counsel frequently ask questions relating to the complainant’s 
sexual past without first making the requisite application to the trial judge. 
Nevertheless, she reports, in the majority of such instances the judge failed to 
intervene in any way so that the defence was free to ask a number of questions 
expressly prohibited by the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. Barbara 
Hewson QC claims that, in fact, “a defence barrister more or less has an expectation
9 T Tthat a judge will allow him to go fishing around in the victim’s past”.
Summary
The previous brief discussion highlighted the criticism that the judiciary do not 
protect rape complainants from the cruelties of cross-examination. Given the distress 
which is invariably caused by questioning of the type outlined in section 1.2.1 above 
and particularly by questioning on sexual matters (Chapter Three, section 3.2), it is 
certainly arguable that trial judges should be intervening much more to protect rape 
complainants. This lack of intervention is all the more remarkable where the 
questioning involved is in breach of the rules of evidence. Whether the judiciary is 
similarly remiss in non-rape cases will now be examined.
229 Due to the specific theme of each chapter in this thesis, the topic of sexual history evidence was not 
addressed in section 1.2.1 of this chapter but is reserved for discussion in Chapter Three, section 3.2 
below. However, it is pertinent to mention it briefly in the present context.
2 ,0 The judicial obligation to regulate the introduction of sexual history evidence was created by section 
2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. However, due to poor adherence to the spirit of this 
measure, it has been replaced by section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, a 
much less discretionary provision. The likely impact of section 41 on the introduction of this type of 
evidence is discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis.
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1.4.2 Other Trial Contexts
It was shown above that the judiciary comes in for considerable criticism for failing to 
intervene to prevent the harassment and humiliation of rape complainants during 
cross-examination. In keeping with the assumption that rape victims are treated 
differently than victims as a whole, this literature implies that it is only in rape trials 
that judges take this non-interventionist stance. However, it seems that this 
perspective is incorrect and that, in fact, trial judges don’t do enough to protect 
victims in all case-types.
It is possible to infer this simply from the fact that questioning of the type outlined in 
section 1.2.2 above goes on. That is, if the judiciary were intervening more often to 
prevent undue distress being caused to victims, then the use of deliberately upsetting 
cross-examination tactics would invariably be curtailed. Rock’s empirical findings 
bear this out. He observed that whilst judges did occasionally reprove counsel for 
irrelevance and for being unduly offensive or vexatious, they did not conceive it be 
their duty generally to defend witnesses: “It’s not our business to protect witnesses. 
That’s not our business at all”.234 The ultimate consequence of this stance, Rock 
explains, is that “counsel were given great latitude” in what they might say to a 
witness so that victims and other witnesses were very often distressed about the 
imputations that were made about them.
This lack of intervention on the part of trial judges was observed also by the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice.236 Following investigation into the trial process, the 
Commission observed that harassment and intimidation of witnesses, including expert 
witnesses, does go on but that the judiciary does not always act quickly enough to 
prevent this.2'7 Accordingly, the Commission urged that the judiciary take a “more 
interventionist approach”.238 As such, emphasising that it is they who are “in charge 
of the trial”, the Commission insisted that judges must be prepared to intervene as and 
when necessary to expedite the proceedings, to see that witnesses are treated by
234 Rock (1993), p 87.
235 Ibid, at p 88. 
236Home Office (1993). 
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counsel as they should be, to curtail prolix or irrelevant questioning, and to prevent 
the jury being confused or misled."
Summary
As illustrated, the judiciary draws considerable criticism for failing to protect rape 
complainants from the brutality of cross-examination. This is certainly a legitimate 
criticism given the nature of the cross-examination ordeal in a trial for rape. 
However, the previous discussion also revealed that the judiciary takes a similarly 
non-interventionist stance in non-rape trials. Again, this is despite the fact of the very 
real abuses to which victims as a whole are subject during cross-examination. It can 
be seen, therefore, that the assumption underlying most rape literature - that rape 
complainants are subjected to differential treatment within the criminal justice system 
- is once again thrown into question.
1.5 Conclusion
As explained, this thesis aims to explore the treatment of rape victims at court with a 
view to providing suggestions for improving their experience at this stage of the 
criminal justice process and also beyond. In order to facilitate this objective, this first 
chapter was concerned to delineate those aspects of the rape trial which give rise to 
severe criticism and which must, therefore, be addressed in any discussion on reform. 
Via a review of the literature on the topic, these areas of concern were shown to be the 
brutality of the cross-examination process and the joint inadequacy of prosecuting 
counsel and judiciary during the course of the trial.
The further crucial objective of this chapter was to examine the relationship between 
the trial experience of rape and non-rape victims. To this end, this chapter adopted a 
comparative methodology, measuring the treatment of rape victims in the above three 
areas against that accorded victims as a whole. It was shown that, contrary to the 
image presented in traditional rape literature, victims of non-sexual offences undergo 
much the same ill-treatment as do rape victims. With regard to cross-examination, for 
example, most rape commentators assume that rape victims are subject to forms of 
questioning which would not be considered acceptable in any other trial context.
2 ,9 Ibid, at para 2.
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However, as Brereton explains, despite the very different fact situations which are 
involved, defence counsel in non-sexual offence cases use much the same tactics to 
win their case as are deployed in rape trials.240 It was similarly shown that significant 
similarities exist between how prosecutors and judges conduct themselves in rape 
trials and in trials of a non-sexual nature.
This finding that rape and non-rape victims have a great deal in common in terms of 
their courtroom experience has critical implications for the question of why rape 
victims are treated as they are. That is, because most rape commentators assume that 
the maltreatment of rape victims is singular to them, they further assume that this 
treatment is the product of prejudicial attitudes specifically against this victim-group. 
However, in light of the similarities revealed throughout the course of this chapter, it 
is clear that one must look beyond altitudinal factors if one is to fully explain the 
treatment of rape complainants. With this in mind, the following chapter aims 
specifically to establish why rape victims are treated in the manner outlined in this 
present chapter. It is imperative that this issue is accurately determined if the ultimate 
objective of this thesis - the formulation of effective reform proposals - is to be 
achieved.





If the victim suffers at the hands of the criminal justice system it is in part at least 
because its fundamental function is not restitution or vengeance for the victim. The 
court is a symbol of law and order which must be upheld if necessary despite the 
victim’s wishes. In that sense both offender and victim are pawns in a game about 
social power and the struggle for dominant definitions of reality.241
As explained, this thesis aims to explore the treatment of rape victims at court with a 
view to providing suggestions for improving their experience at this stage of the 
criminal justice process and also beyond. The central proposition of this thesis is that, 
if real improvement is to be achieved, it is imperative that the factors shaping the 
treatment of this victim-group are properly understood for it is these which any 
reform proposals must aim to address. It is, therefore, the specific function of this 
present chapter to establish the reasons behind the objectionable treatment of rape 
victims as outlined in Chapter One above.
The fact that the tribulations outlined in the previous chapter affect all victims equally 
is critical to understanding why they occur. This can be seen from the chain of 
reasoning followed in most rape literature. As explained, the tendency is to examine 
the treatment of rape victims without making any comparative reference to the 
experience of victims as a whole. Consequently, it is assumed that the difficulties 
experienced by rape victims are singular to them and, following from this, that a 
pronounced prejudice against this specific victim-group is to blame. However, this 
theory cannot account for those difficulties highlighted in Chapter One for if 
prejudicial attitudes are responsible in the context of rape victims, is it then to be 
supposed that something quite different lies behind the almost parallel experiences of 
non-rape victims? Given the extent and degree of convergence between their trial 
experiences, this seems a highly improbable proposition. A much more convincing 
conclusion is that there is a common cause behind the negative experiences of both
241 McBamet (1983), p 302.
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rape and non-rape victims. This second chapter explores the possibility that this 
common denominator lies among the structural and functional features of our criminal 
justice system. Accordingly, section 2.2 examines whether the brutality of cross- 
examination is attributable to the adversarial nature of our criminal justice system, 
section 2.3 looks at whether the victim’s distinct lack of status within the criminal 
justice system is responsible for the disappointing conduct of prosecuting counsel and 
section 2.4 examines whether the adversarial tradition is responsible also for the 
judiciary’s failure to protect victims from the worst excesses of cross-examination.
2.2 Casualties of War
The adversarial system was dedicated to pitting the testimony, credibility, and 
reputation of victims and defendants against one another. Witnesses came 
unknowingly to be assailed in court, and to be seen and heard closely as they were 
assailed. They confronted a fonn of trial by ordeal in which their claims to 
knowledge and veracity were subjected to organised and sustained attack by 
professional adversaries.242
It was shown in Chapter One that defence counsel subject rape victims to gruelling 
cross-examination ordeals.243 This was shown to involve ridiculing, vilifying and 
shaming them by ruthlessly attacking their character and laying their once personal 
life bare before the court in distorted and contemptuous fashion. Rape victims also 
find themselves being harassed, intimidated and even blamed for the crime committed 
against them.
This brutality is typically explained in terms of a misogynist prejudice operating 
against this specific victim-group. Lees, for example, claims that whilst the image of 
the law is one of “impartiality, objectivity, rationality and neutrality”, this is far from 
the case in rape trials where stark examples of “male bias” can be found.244 Chambers 
and Millar also proffer that the cruelty of the cross-examination process in rape trials 
derives from the insensitivity of individual defence barristers to the needs and 
interests of these victims.242 However, these theories do not explain why victims in
242 Rock (1993), p 86.
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other trial contexts are subjected to many of the very same abuses.246 It is suggested 
that the better explanation of defence counsel’s conduct during cross-examination, 
whether of rape or non-rape complainants, is that it is strategic, taking the form of a 
series of tried and tested tactics carried out in order to win the case. Further, it is the 
adversarial concept of criminal justice which dictates that the cross-examination 
process functions in this way.
2.2.1 Tactics
The tactical nature of cross-examination is clearly evident from the type of questions 
asked, together with the manner in which they are asked. Dunstan, for example, 
argues that cross-examination questions cannot be described as simple requests for 
information because of the way in which they are produced and treated as 
“accusations, counter-denials and displays of disbelief’.247 Rather, as revealed in the 
previous chapter, questions asked during cross-examination often serve purely 
insidious purposes and may, in fact, be categorised depending on the spurious 
motivation behind them. For example, sections 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.2.1 above described 
how victims are routinely vilified during cross-examination in order to discredit their 
testimony and general standing. This works by prejudicing the jury against the 
victim so that they find in favour of the defendant. Introducing controversial 
information about the complainant in this way works also to distract the jury from the 
main question of what actually happened on the particular occasion.
A standard effect of current cross-examination practices is that victims are severely 
upset and unsettled. Archbishop Richard Whately admonished the process for this 
very reason:
[I] think that the kind of skill by which the cross-examiner succeeds in alarming, 
misleading or bewildering an honest witness may be characterised as the most, or one 
of the most, base and depraved of all possible employments of intellectual power.248 
Upsetting victims in this way is not incidental but is, instead, a deliberate ploy 
affording considerable tactical gains. McEwan explains that, despite the fact that 
research has found no consistent relationship between the confidence of a witness and 
his or her accuracy, the fact remains that in the courtroom it is the confident witness
246 Chapter One, section 1.2.2.
247 Dunstan (1980), p 64.
47
who is more likely to be believed.249 Similarly, Ellison explains that great importance 
attaches to the oral performance of witnesses in court; angry, upset or confused 
witnesses are less able to answer questions effectively, and the confidence with which 
they describe events is inevitably undermined. Rock, too, observed that “good”
251witnesses are “clear, audible, measured, succinct, forthright, and honest in manner”. 
This perceived link between the confidence of a witness and his or her credibility is 
routinely exploited by counsel, particularly defence counsel for whom the 
introduction of even a single doubt can ensure victory. This was observed by 
McEwan who states that the cross-examination of rape complainants is often used 
simply to humiliate them and therefore to undermine the confidence with which they 
describe the alleged events. Similarly, in non-rape trials, she explains that cross- 
examination is “frequently used to confuse witnesses, to get them to contradict 
themselves, showing their unreliability”. Ellison also claims that cross- 
examination is often "'directed at unsettling a witness and thereby reducing his or her 
credibility in the eyes of the jury”.2:14
Ultimately, then, contrary to the imputation made in traditional rape literature, the 
brutality evident in the cross-examination of rape victims should not be seen as the 
manifestation of personal animosity towards this victim-group. Rather, regardless of 
case-type, cross-examination is simply a strategic exercise incorporating a series of 
formulaic attacks aimed at securing a not-guilty verdict.2:0 Because it causes victims 
such deliberate distress, the cross-examination process raises fundamental questions 
about the premises on which justice in this jurisdiction is based. Basically, what 
notion of justice is it that compounds the suffering of those entering the criminal 
process seeking assistance and vindication? McEwan explains that, in fact, victims
248 Whately (1828), p 165.
249 McEwan (1992), p 17.
250 Ellison (1998), p 613.
251 Rock (1993), p 74.
282 McEwan (1992), p 16.
253 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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255 Of course, much of the tactical gains of cross-examination lie precisely in the fact that it comes 
across very much as a personal attack. That is, victims, already vulnerable, are more keenly affected 
by what they perceive as a very personally directed attack and jurors are more likely to be convinced by 
what counsel is saying if it is framed in such a way as to implicate the particular victim directly. Rock 
explains that this is the case “however wooden” the delivery of these attacks for they are “disturbing 
enough to the newcomer, the witness or juror, who kn[o]w nothing of courts, and that [i]s what ma[kes] 
them effective” (1993, p 83).
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may perceive their treatment during cross-examination as a type of punishment for 
having objected to the crime against them. This surely cannot be the object of the 
criminal justice process. The following section examines the adversarial concept of 
justice in order to explain why our cross-examination process evidences such scant 
concern for victims.
2.2.2 Adversariness
Damaska explains that the adversarial model of criminal justice is not committed to 
truth-finding, certainly much less so than the inquisitorial systems of Continental 
Europe. Going further, Thibaut and Walker argue that there is a fundamental
dichotomy between truth and justice in adversarial jurisdictions. Damaska 
attributes the adversarial model’s lesser emphasis on truth-discovery to its tendency to 
prioritise other values.2:19 One such value is the protection of the accused from 
wrongful conviction. The importance of this objective can be seen from the many 
evidentiary rules in place to minimise the chances of convicting an innocent person. 
Damaska explains that these rules operate as “barriers” to conviction and that by 
keeping these barriers high, as mandated by the adversarial tradition, the accuracy of 
outcomes in the total number of cases is ultimately decreased. That is, the 
opportunity for guilty defendants to escape conviction is considerably increased. 
However, this risk to the truth is seen to be offset by the more important, liberal 
objective of protecting innocent defendants. As Sanders and Young explain, 
“priority is given to protecting the actually innocent from wrongful conviction over 
bringing the actually guilty to justice”. Another overriding value within the 
adversarial tradition is the integrity of the criminal justice process. Damaska explains 
that this is an explicit concern because of the tendency in adversarial systems to 
mistrust public officials.263 This mistrust leads to a demand for safeguards against 
abuse.264 Accordingly, adversarial systems tolerate evidentiary barriers which impede
256 McEwan (1992), p 17.
257 Damaska (1973), p 580.
258 Thibaut and Walker (1975), (1978).
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260 Take, for example, the heavy burden of proof which the prosecution must discharge before a 
conviction can be obtained.
261 Damaska (1983), p 26.
2<>2 Sanders and Young (1994), p 3.
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truth-discovery rather than risk abuse of official power.^ In this way, a clearly guilty 
person can escape conviction if, for example, the evidence against him has been 
obtained by improper means.
It is clear, then, that because of the primacy of these other values and the evidentiary 
safeguards in place to promote them, guilt and innocence are not paramount under the 
adversarial model of criminal justice. However, if the primary objective of our 
criminal process is not truth-discovery what, then, is its defining function? Damaska 
tells us that the principal function of the adversarial criminal process is to facilitate the 
just settlement of conflict between parties in dispute. He explains that a legal 
process thus aimed at maximising the goal of dispute resolution cannot 
simultaneously aspire to maximise accurate fact-finding for the truth can “engender 
hatred and exacerbate a conflict”.268 Thus, in adversarial systems, truth and justice 
may actually be in opposition to each other.266
In order to implement the goal of conflict resolution most effectively, Damaska 
explains that the adversarial mode of legal proceeding is “organised around the key 
image of contest”.270 Thus, it takes its shape from a contest or a dispute, unfolding as 
“an engagement of two adversaries before a relatively passive decision-maker whose 
principal duty is to reach a verdict”.271 However, it is here suggested that not only
255 Preventing abuse of official power was the aim behind section 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, for example. This Act provided for the first time a detailed legislative framework 
for the operation of police powers and suspect’s rights. The content of the Act was derived from 
recommendations made by the 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure set up to investigate the 
criminal process in the wake of the so-called “Confait Affair” which had revealed the alarming extent 
of police misconduct. The Confait episode involved the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of 
three youths for the murder of Maxwell Confait. The spurious convictions were based on confessions 
made by the youths and later shown to have been coerced.
266 Damaska (1973), p 583.
267 Damaska (1973), (1986).
268 Damaska (1986), p 123.
269 At this point, it is worth noting the contrast between the adversarial legal process and the 
inquisitorial model which pertains in some European jurisdictions. Whilst the principal objective of the 
adversarial model is conflict-resolution, inquisitorial systems are perceived to be committed primarily 
to truth-discovery (Damaska (1973), (1986); Thibaut and Walker (1975), (1978)). This is evidenced by 
the inquisitorial mode of legal proceeding which takes the form of an official and thorough unilateral 
inquiry, triggered by the initial probability that a crime has been committed (Damaska (1973), p 564). 
This “inquest morphology” is seen as the best means of producing a correct view of reality.
270 Damaska (1986), p 88.
Note that the inquisitorial model is “organised around the key image of inquest” {loc. cit.).
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does this contest morphology facilitate conflict settlement, but it also accounts for 
much of the rough treatment which victims experience during cross-examination.
The principal way in which the contest nature of the adversarial model is responsible 
for the brutality of cross-examination derives from the competitiveness inherent in the 
proceedings. This can be seen from the nature of the relationship between 
prosecuting and defending counsel. Damaska explains that these protagonists have 
definite, independent, and conflicting functions. That is, the prosecutor’s role is to 
obtain a conviction whilst the defence’s duty is to block this effort. Rock explains 
how this functional opposition operates in practice. The whole of the prosecution 
case, he says, takes the form of a “thesis” at the core of which are “pointed allegations 
about wrongdoing, immorality, and mendacity whose acceptance would almost 
certainly lead to public disgrace and punishment”. 274 The role of defence counsel is 
to supply a rival way of explaining the incident in question, what might be called the 
“antithesis”.27:1 Rock explains that this antithesis does not have to be as solid or 
imposing as the thesis advanced by the prosecution but usually takes the form of an 
“attack” that seeks chiefly to “puncture the impression achieved by the prosecution 
and prosecution witnesses”.276
This fundamental opposition between the roles of defending and prosecuting counsel 
is thought to facilitate conflict resolution because it means that verdicts are reached 
only after each party has had the opportunity both to present fully his or her own 
evidence and to test vigorously the evidence of the opposition. Having done so, the 
parties are ostensibly more inclined to accept the final verdict and, further, the 
judgment itself is seen as more reliable. Stone praises the adversarial approach for 
this reason:
Less dynamic procedure could be imagined, where the evidence of witnesses is not 
challenged directly by adversaries, but is simply compared and assessed by the 
court... This would be less effective. Mere competition between contradictory 
assertions is not enough. It is best that parties test each other’s cases by head-on 
confrontation. This occurs when the opposing points of view meet in cross-
272 Damaska (1973), p 563.
273 Ibid
274 Rock (1993), p 32.
275 Ibid, at p 33.
276 Ibid, at pp 33, 34.
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examination. This is the cutting edge of advocacy. In this way, in forming sound 
judgements, the court is assisted by contentious advocacy, which directly tests 
evidence for accuracy, and exposes errors, gaps or lies.277 
However, this “contentious advocacy” leads also to the abuse of victims. Rock 
describes how defence counsel’s challenge of the prosecution case takes the form of 
an “attack” on the victim involving argument and questioning designed to reveal 
inconsistency, error, improper motives, forgetfulness, and falsehood. He reports 
that the questions asked are often searching, probing minor contradiction after minor
contradiction in order to give a different account of even small details, to raise a doubt
279as to the prosecution case because the jury have been told they have to be sure. 
These methods and their undesirable implications for victims were outlined in detail 
in Chapter One above. Ultimately, then, by virtue of defence counsel’s formal 
function within the adversarial model, victims suffer.
Heightening the conflict inherent in adversarial proceedings is the fact that counsel 
are required to discharge their role with partisan zeal:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in the world, and 
that person is his client.280
In this way, lawyers are encouraged to be very single-minded in representing their 
client and, again, this may be tied in with verdict acceptance and conflict settlement. 
Further, because of the accused’s special vulnerability, defence counsel are given 
particular encouragement to provide a zealous and partisan representation. The 
Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, for example, states explicitly that 
defence counsel must “promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful 
means his lay client’s best interests”. Therefore, not only are defence counsel 
officially charged with “puncturing” the prosecution case, but they are formally
277 Stone (1995), p 4.
278 Rock (1993), p 34.
279 Ibid.
280 Lord Brougham (1821).
281 This is to be contrasted with the conduct expected of prosecuting counsel for whom, Jackson 
explains, there exists a special obligation to act in the interests of justice (1997, p 15). In this way, it is 
not the duty of prosecuting counsel to obtain a conviction by all means at his disposal but, rather, to lay 
before the court fairly and impartially the whole of the facts which comprise the case for the 
prosecution. Furthermore, should information come to the knowledge of prosecuting counsel which 
may assist the defence, he is under an obligation to disclose this. This contrast between the conduct 
expected of defence and prosecuting counsel is clearly illustrated by Jackson’s games analogy:
There are some things in cricket which the rules would permit to be done, which are not done because this 
would be taking unfair advantage of an opponent, and that is not cricket. By contrast, defence counsel can 
adopt the football approach, take all the advantages which the rules and the umpire allow (toe. cil. at pp 15,
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required to act robustly in this regard. It is suggested that this duty encourages the 
treatment outlined in Chapter One above for, as Allison and Wrightsman point out, 
what defence lawyer who has agreed to defend his or her client zealously will not use
'JQ'l
every means available to ensure a verdict of not-guilty?
Certainly, restrictions are placed on how counsel conduct themselves. Damaska 
explains that certain procedural rules are in place to ensure that the contest is fought 
fairly. In addition, the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales proposes 
to regulate the conduct of cross-examination, making it clear that lawyers have certain 
legal duties that go beyond pursuing the partisan interest of the side they represent.2^ 
For example, a practicing barrister must not “make statements or ask questions which 
are merely scandalous or intended or calculated only to vilify, insult or annoy either a 
witness or some other person”. However, the exposition in Chapter One of the way 
in which victims are treated during cross-examination revealed that these are precisely 
the types of questions being asked by defence counsel indicating that the Code does 
little to curtail inappropriate questioning. Significantly, commentators argue that this 
failure to observe the guidelines precluding abusive cross-examination occurs because 
any ethical duty to protect complainants and witnesses from unnecessary distress in 
court necessarily conflicts with the partisan duty owed by defence counsel to his or 
her client.287
The basis upon which verdicts are decided under the contest model further encourages 
the competitiveness between opposing counsel. This is because, in adversarial 
jurisdictions, the verdict is not so much a declaration of the truth as it is a preference 
for one version of the facts over the other. In this way, judgment is awarded in 
favour of the party who has made the better evidentiary case, the party who has been 
better able to persuade the court. The favourable verdict is, therefore, attainable to 
both parties equally, whether or not they have the truth on their side, for essentially 
what wins the day is effective advocacy. It is clear, then, that truth is not fundamental
2X2 General Council of the Bar of England and Wales (1991), Part VI, para 203 (a). 
2K’ Allison and Wrightsman (1993), p 178.
284 Damaska (1986), pp 98-109.
285 General Council of the Bar of England and Wales (1991).
286 Ibid, at Part VI, para 610(e).
287 See, for example, Yaroshefsky (1989).
288 Stone (1995), p 6. See also Rock (1993), p 35.
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to the adversarial understanding of a just verdict. Rather, the justness of a verdict is 
tied to its acceptability to the parties concerned and it is assumed that this acceptance 
is achieved by having the parties fight, on equal terms, for the verdict. In turn, the 
overall objective of the adversarial process - conflict resolution - is achieved. In this 
way, the adversarial verdict may be seen to function as “a peace treaty putting an end 
to combat”.290 Whilst this may be so, it is also the case that winning verdicts in this 
way ensures the brutalisation of victims during cross-examination. Basically, counsel 
want to win the verdict and because forensic skill is more decisive than truth to the 
decision-maker, the parties do what they can to ensure their version of events is 
chosen over and above that of their opponent. This is where the undesirable tactics 
previously outlined come into play for these “arts of advocacy” are the means by
7Q1which counsel endeavour to achieve the desired end - the favourable verdict.
The degree of control which legal counsel exert over proceedings under the 
adversarial model is also greatly responsible for the rough treatment of victims during 
cross-examination.292 One aspect of this control is that counsel are responsible for 
setting the factual and legal parameters of the lawsuit.29’ Basically, the prosecutor 
chooses what to allege and marshalls evidence in support thereof and the defence, in 
its turn, chooses what to contest and what to admit and similarly adduces supporting 
evidence.294 In this way, the parameters of the dispute are restricted to points of 
actual disagreement.29^ Damaska explains that party control over the lawsuit is 
implicit in the adversarial model’s conflict-solving function.296 That is, it is assumed 
that parties who are free to run their case largely as they see fit will be more inclined 
to accept the final verdict, even if unfavourable. If, on the other hand, an
289 Damaska (1986), p 122.
290 Ibid, at p 123.
291 Stone (1995), p 6.
292 Damaska explains that party control over the lawsuit is widely accepted as a major characteristic of 
the adversarial system (1986, p 109). This is to be contrasted with inquisitorial proceedings wherein 
the judiciary are dominant (see section 2.4.1.1 below).
29’ Damaska (1986), pp 111-116.
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independent party were responsible for adducing the proofs, the loser of the lawsuit 
would be justified in believing that he could have prevailed if only he had been 
allowed to handle his own evidentiary case. Should this happen, the pronounced 
verdict is unlikely to be accepted by both parties and, thus, the object of the 
adversarial legal process has not been achieved.2 ,g
However, it is suggested that the degree of control which the parties exert over the 
lawsuit is responsible also for the difficulties which victims experience during cross- 
examination. In running their case, counsel are not required to present the tribunal 
with the truth.300 Therefore, they have no duty to seek out unfavourable evidence but
TO 1must, instead, present their case in the manner most advantageous to their client. 
Consequently, McEwan explains, counsel have become skilled at avoiding contact 
with evidence which could prejudice their client’s interests. In addition, advocates 
seek to steer the issues, witnesses and other evidence in the direction most favourable 
to their case.303 They are also able to limit what is said by these witnesses because of 
the strict editorial control which they exert over them. ’('4 Thus, McEwan says, the 
material available to the tribunal of fact is selected by the advocates who then in court 
control the narration.305 The overall result is that lawyers present highly “selective” 
versions of the case to the court causing potentially important aspects of the incident 
in question to be missed or deliberately ignored. This has serious negative 
implications for the truth for, as Damaska explains, “skilful orchestration of proof 
may obscure rather than clarify what actually happened”. Victims are a further 
casualty of this process for defence counsel are quite free to push cross-examination 
in the direction most likely to achieve their tactical objectives which, as we have seen, 
centre generally around causing victims maximum distress and discomfort. McEwan 
decries the adversarial mode of legal proceeding for this very reason, remonstrating
Damaska (1986), p 121.
m Ibid.
300 McEwan (1992), p 6.
301 Ibid, at p 5.
There are, of course, limits upon this for advocates do have duties towards the court, for example, they 
must not knowingly mislead it, and, in some cases, they must reveal evidence in their possession even 
if unfavourable to the client (loc. cit.).
’°2 Ibid, at pp 5, 6. 





that ‘'the degree to which the defence can control which issues should figure in the 
trial and therefore ensure exposing the alleged victim to a humiliating ordeal” is one
T AO
its “least appealing features”.
Summary
The brutality evident in the cross-examination of rape complainants is typically 
explained in terms of a pronounced prejudice operating against them. This 
explanation does not, however, take into account the fact that victims in other trial 
contexts suffer the very same abuses. The previous discussion, on the other hand, 
provided an explanation which accounts equally for the experience of rape and non­
rape victims. This is that much of the degradation which victims undergo during 
cross-examination is an inevitable consequence of the structure and function of the 
adversarial criminal trial.
Basically, the adversarial criminal process is organised around conflict - it is activated 
by human conflict and it functions specifically to resolve this conflict. Moreover, the 
adversarial model operates upon the ironic premise that this objective is best achieved 
using procedures which exploit existing conflict. Rock observed in this regard that 
trials were “devised to revive and sustain an old anger, fuelling it quite deliberately 
for purposes of interrogation and judgement”.309 Further, the adversarial process 
actually generates new conflict, a type of organised and controlled conflict between 
professional adversaries, whereby competitiveness and opposition are encouraged as 
the best way in which to facilitate settlement of the original conflict.
Following from this, the courtroom is a place where hostility and antagonism are 
commonplace.310 Based on his observations at Wood Green Crown Court, Rock 
described trials as “struggles”, “trials of strength” and even “fights”.311 He explains 
that the words “fight”, “side” and “opponent” are also commonly used by 
professionals of the court. Jerome Frank, a judge of the US Federal Court of 
Appeals, similarly observed that the adversarial legal system subscribes to a “fight
307 Damaska (1986), p 122.
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309 Rock (1993), p 85.
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theory” of justice.313 Cross-examination in its current practical form fits well within 
this hostile environment. Perhaps at no other point in the criminal process is the 
conflict inherent in adversarial proceedings so clearly in evidence, the hostile 
opposition so tangible. Matoesian, in fact, describes cross-examination as a “war of 
words, sequences, and ideas”.314 Indeed, advocates commonly speak of “breaking”
•*315and “destroying” witnesses during cross-examination. Advocacy manuals actually 
advise that such treatment is a necessary part of good advocacy. Evans, for example, 
uses the term “butchering a witness”.316 Similarly, Sherr advises that quite often “the 
most devastating cross-examination can be a fairly short build up rather like in boxing
T 1 7
with one blow to the body followed by a quick blow to the chin”.
Essentially, cross-examination is the most effective weapon in the armoury of the 
warring factions, its value lying in the gains to be had from employing such tactics as 
those outlined throughout the course of Chapter One above. As Matoesian explains, 
the “capability to finesse reality through talk represents the ultimate weapon of 
domination” in the conflict that is the adversarial criminal trial. It is clearly wrong, 
therefore, to attribute the abuses which rape victims undergo during cross- 
examination simply to specific social prejudices against them. Rather, much of this 
treatment is best explained in terms of the inherently combative nature of the 
adversarial cross-examination process.316 In this way, all victims are casualties of the 
adversarial criminal process.
2.3 Orphans of Social Policy
The victim is so totally out of the case... We leave him outside, angry, maybe 
humiliated through a cross-examination in court... He has a need for understanding, 
but is instead a non-person in a Kafka play.j2°
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Chapter One revealed that prosecutors come under considerable fire for the way in 
which they discharge their prosecutorial function in rape trials. A significant 
grievance is the almost complete lack of contact with the rape victim. This causes her 
to arrive at court totally unprepared for the rigours of the trial process so that her 
anxiety is heightened and her performance in the witness-box impaired. Another 
consequence is that she feels very alone and vulnerable throughout her court 
experience. It is also complained that prosecutors are disinterested and detached from 
the rape victim and her grievance with the result that they present her case only very 
half-heartedly and make no effective challenge of the defence case. Other criticisms 
include the prosecutor’s failure to protect rape victims from defence counsel’s 
onslaught during cross-examination. Indeed, prosecutors are themselves accused of 
maltreating rape victims by, for example, participating in blaming them for the attack.
Typically, traditional rape literature implies that these difficulties are unique to rape 
cases and following from this that they are the product of a negative mindset towards 
this specific victim-group. Lees, for example, argues that if prosecutors “took 
seriously the idea of the woman’s experience of rape”, they would provide a more 
effective representation.322 However, this theory does not explain why victims in 
other trial contexts are similarly dissatisfied with the way in which prosecutors handle 
their grievance.’2’ It is suggested that the better explanation of the prosecutor’s 
treatment of victims, whether in rape or non-rape cases, is that it is derivative of the 
status which victims as a whole have within the criminal justice system. Moreover, 
this factor shapes the treatment of victims in many ways throughout the criminal 
process.
2.3.1 Status
The status of victims within our legal system has undergone a steady but radical 
evolution. Henderson tells us that in Europe and England after the collapse of the 
Roman Empire, the victim and the criminal process were intimately linked.324 This 
was because no formal government structure existed and so criminal justice depended
321 Section 1.3.1.
322 Lees (1989b), p 14.
323 Chapter One, section 1.3.2.
324 Henderson (1984-85), p 938.
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largely on self-help or the help of kin. ' On this basis, the victim or his or her kin 
exacted vengeance against and repayment from the perpetrator or his kin. It is 
clear, then, that at this point in English legal history the criminal process centred 
around the victim.
However, as English society became more organised and feudal lords began to assert 
dominion over others, the law of the blood feud became more refined and 
subordinated to public interests. Monetary compensation for victims and fines 
payable to the king began to take over as the primary vehicle for enforcing criminal 
law. However, whilst this system of compensation appears to remain solicitous of 
the victim’s right to restoration from the wrongdoer, Henderson explains that, in 
practice, victims seldom received any compensation. Therefore, the traditional 
primacy of the victim had most definitely started to erode by this stage. Further 
societal development meant that kings gained and solidified authority and the concept 
of “the king’s peace’’ prevailed so that criminal acts came to be seen as offences 
against the Crown rather than against the individual. By the thirteenth century, 
Henderson explains, the criminal law had come to serve the feudal system and the 
lords far more than it did victims thus transforming it from a mixture of public and 
private law, to law of an exclusively public nature.3,1 Ostensibly, therefore, the 
criminal process was no longer to be used by individuals as a facility by which to 
settle private scores but was, instead, to operate for the good of society as a whole.
Contemporary English criminal justice sees the evolution of the victim complete. In 
the transition from private to public criminal justice, the State has assumed the role of 
the victim and in this way has completely displaced him in the criminal process. 
Christie speaks of this development in terms of case “ownership” - the original 
conflict between victim and offender has been taken away, stolen, from them by the 
professionals of the criminal justice system, the police and lawyers.3 '3 The result of 
this reallocation of case ownership is that victims have been completely divested of
Ibid, at pp 938
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any formal role or status within the criminal justice system. Christie explains that the 
victim is acknowledged merely as “triggerer-off’ of the criminal process. Rock 
tells us that the victim functions only as a witness - having suffered, he or she must 
“attest to the injuries to person and property that [have been] translated 
metaphysically into an attack on the community as a whole”.334 Ultimately, Shapland 
explains, victims are “non-persons” in the eyes of criminal justice professionals. '
The victim’s complete lack of status dramatically shapes his experience within the 
criminal justice system. Christie explains that the overriding implication is that the 
victim has lost all participation in his own case.336 In fact, he says, victims are pushed 
completely out of the arena for most of the proceedings. The following sections 
discuss three major consequences of the victim’s exclusion from the criminal process. 
These are their lack of input into the prosecutorial decision-making process, the 
failure to provide them with informational support and the negative treatment of them 
and their grievance by prosecuting counsel.
2.3.1.1 Prosecutorial Decision-Making
An immediate indication that victims are excluded from the handling of their own 
grievance is the fact that they have been consigned no official, documented role in the 
prosecutorial decision-making process. Rather, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
makes the decision whether or not a particular crime will be prosecuted. The only 
deference to the actual aggrieved party in this regard is contained in the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors which states that the CPS must take into account the interests of 
the victim when considering whether or not prosecution in any particular case is in the 
“public interest”.339 However, the practical value of this concession is nominal for.
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exorbitant costs coupled with unpredictable outcomes prove considerable disincentives to the average 
person. The instigation of criminal proceedings is, therefore, necessarily done almost wholly by the 
Crown.
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Ashworth explains, “the general approach is that, whilst account should be taken of 
any views expressed by the victim, the general public interest must continue to 
prevail”.340
It is clear, then, that despite the victim’s obvious stake in the outcome, the 
prosecutorial decision-making process defers to the interests of the public over and 
above those of the victim. This state of affairs derives from the fact that the criminal 
sanction operates to serve society as a whole and not specific individuals. Further, 
assigning the prosecutorial decision-making process to officials is seen to enable a 
consistency of prosecution policy which would be impossible if the task were left to 
victims. Ashworth explains that if prosecutorial decision-making were placed in the 
hands of victims, the disposal of a defendant’s case would depend on whether a 
particular victim was vengeful or forgiving. ’41 Officials, on the other hand, exercise 
their coercive power to punish uniformly, dealing comparably with those whose 
offences are similar in terms of harm and culpability.342 Consequently, arbitrary 
decision-making is reduced and legitimate expectations of the criminal process, on the 
part both of defendants and society as a whole, are enabled.
From the point of view of victims, however, the Crown’s monopolisation of 
prosecutorial decision-making clearly denies them the right to participate in 
something of immediate importance to them. Moreover, it raises the question whether 
decision-making in this regard, either to prosecute or not to prosecute, respects the 
legitimate expectations of victims. That is, are there occasions when prosecutorial 
discretion is exercised in clear conflict with victim wishes?
effect in 1994. Basically, the Code sets out two tests, both of which must be satisfied if a particular 
crime is to be prosecuted. The first of these is whether or not, on the evidence, there is a “realistic 
prospect of conviction”. This test reflects the perception that it is wrong for a person to undergo 
prosecution where the evidence is insufficient. Ashworth explains why:
The essence of the wrongness lies in the protection of the innocent: if this principle is taken seriously, it 
should mean not merely that innocent people are not convicted, but also that innocent people should not be 
prosecuted. The reason for this may be found in the dictum that “the process is the punishment”.... There 
are therefore sound reasons for not prosecuting someone against whom the evidence is insufficient. There 
are also good economic reasons: it is a waste of police time in compiling a full file on the case, of 
prosecution time in reviewing the case, and of court time in dealing with the case (1994, p 161).
The second test is whether or not prosecution in the particular case is in the “public interest”.
’40 Ashworth (1994), p 184. (Emphasis added.)
341 Ibid.
Ibid, at p 185.
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With regard to decisions taken to prosecute, Shapland et al found that seventeen per 
cent of the victims in their study showed, at some stage of the case, unwillingness to 
help prosecute the offender or to press charges.',4, Despite this, the majority of these 
victims ended up at court, the police having finally persuaded them or having gone 
ahead regardless of the victim’s wishes.344 Shapland et al report that the victims who 
were ignored in this way were caused great distress and all of them felt that it should 
have been them who had the final word on prosecution, not the police. Shapland et 
al remark that whilst it is perhaps desirable that the police have the final say on 
prosecution from the point of view that offenders who intimidate victims will still get 
prosecuted, it does express the central dilemma of a criminal justice system with a 
centralised power of prosecution - that of the ownership of the case.346 That is, whilst 
victims think in terms of a case belonging to them, the reality is that it belongs to 
officials who may dispose of it as they see fit, regardless of the victim’s wishes.
This ownership dilemma is expressed also in the context of decisions made not to 
prosecute. In fact, this is a much more problematic area because these decisions lack 
visibility and, as such, make it very difficult to determine the legitimacy of the 
reasoning involved. The major question is whether victims, particularly of serious 
crimes, can reasonably expect to have their grievance prosecuted. The following 
highly publicised incident suggests that victims cannot make any assumptions in this 
regard. In December 1994, Shiji Tapite, a Nigerian-born man, was stopped by two 
plainclothes officers, PCs Paul Wright and Andrew McCallum, for “acting 
suspiciously”. These officers took Mr. Tapite into custody and thirty minutes later he 
was dead. Post mortems found that death was due to asphyxia caused by a neck-hold 
which had fractured bones in Mr. Tapite’s larynx. An inquest jury brought in a 
verdict of unlawful killing. Despite this, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), 
Dame Barbara Mills, decided not to prosecute the officers. It was only in July 1997, 
as the High Court was about to hear a challenge brought by the deceased’s widow, 
that the DPP revealed her intention to review her initial decision.347
347




The Guardian (24/07/97), p 2.
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The DPP’s conduct in this case indicates that victims really have no locus standi in 
the prosecutorial decision-making process, however serious the crime committed 
against them. Certainly, the success of Mr. Lapite’s widow in challenging the initial 
CPS decision indicates that there does exist some facility (judicial review) by which 
individuals may contest official decision-making and to good effect. However, it is 
suggested that but for the damning publicity provoked by the racial controversy of the 
case, the DPP decision not to prosecute Mr. Lapite’s unlawful killing might well have 
stood. This may be implied from the fact that deaths in police custody seem regularly 
to go unprosecuted. Deborah Coles, co-director of Inquest, an organisation which has 
waged a long campaign over deaths in custody, claimed that the Lapite case simply 
confirmed the general “unwillingness” to charge police officers whose conduct has
348led to death or serious injury.
If prosecution is not guaranteed even in cases involving unlawful killing, it is highly 
unlikely that victims of less serious crime exert any influence over prosecutorial 
decision-making. This, it seems, is particularly true where the victim is of low social 
status. Elias claims that, in fact, officials have “incentives to ignore entire victim 
categories” and, among those routinely “de-emphasised”, are “less influential” 
victims such as women, minorities, and the poor.349 Conversely, research shows that 
officials are willing to defer to the wishes of ‘important’ victims. McConville et al, 
for example, suggest that the CPS have been willing to persevere with some 
prosecutions that ought to have been dropped on public interest grounds, simply in
350order to placate certain victims such as local businesses.
Ultimately, because of their lack of status within the criminal justice system, victims 
are denied any meaningful participation in the prosecutorial decision-making process
348 Ibid.
349 Elias (1986), p 141.
’50 McConville, Sanders and Leng (1991), p 14.
Sanders and Young claim that police authority is similarly exercised in favour of powerful victims, 
rather than those of low status (1994, p 94). This is clearly evidenced by their handling of domestic 
violence cases where the “explain the position and do nothing” strategy is quite often adopted, even 
where the situation is potentially dangerous {ibid.). Kemp and Fielding explain that in such cases, the 
victim’s views are basically ignored and the offence and offender become police property to be 
disposed of in a manner which most suits police rather than victim priorities (1992, p 73). Sanders and 
Young explain that the police adopt this attitude in domestic violence cases because this particular 
victim-group is in a weak position thus offering little incentive to arrest (1994, p 94). This, it seems, is
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and, as shown, this would seem to be the case however serious the particular 
victimisation. Following from this, victims may well find that decision-making in this 
regard goes against their express wishes and when this happens, there is very little 
that they can do about it for their lack of legal status denies them any real political 
leverage in the criminal process.'^1 Further, this political leverage is reduced 
depending on the race, gender, and class of individual victims and, in this way, the 
criminal process can be seen to reflect “the same configuration of interests and power 
as in the broader society”.
2.3.1.2 Information
A further significant consequence of the victim’s lack of formal status within the 
criminal justice system is the distinct failure to provide him with information 
concerning even the most critical aspects of the processing of his grievance. In fact, 
this is a source of bitter disappointment for victims whose need for informational
T C "2
support has been found to be even greater than their need for emotional support.
Pre-Trial
To begin with, there is no cohesive policy in support of ensuring that victims are 
notified of CPS decision-making. This is the necessary implication from research 
which shows that after making their statement to the police on the day of the offence, 
the majority of victims are provided with no further information until they receive 
their summons.04 Victims report, therefore, being “left in the dark” during this 
period, usually a considerable length of time.355 Clearly, then, victims are often not 
aware that their case is being prosecuted until they receive a summons to court.
perfectly legal because there are no laws establishing locus standi for victims or formalising the criteria 
which should or should not be used by the police in exercising their discretion {ibid.).
351 Elias (1986), p 160.
352 Ibid.
See, for example, Brown and Yantzi (1980); Kelly (1982); Shapland, Willmore and Duff (1985); 
Temkin (1987).
354 See, for example, Jackson, Kilpatrick and Harvey (1991), p 52.
In fact, in Jackson et al’s study, only those victims who had gone to the police station for a specific 
reason, for example, to identify articles or for the purposes of an identification parade, gleaned any 
information from the police following the initial contact (loc. cit. at pp 52, 53).
355 Ibid, at p 52.
The summons to attend court is usually issued close to the date of required attendance which is 
generally a considerable time after the offence has been reported. Jackson, Kilpatrick and Harvey, for 
example, found that cases reached the magistrates’ court within nine months of the offence, but only 
one-third of Crown Court cases came to trial in this time, and almost another third did not come to trial 
until fifteen months or more after the offence {loc. cit.).
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Alternatively, those whose case the CPS has decided not to proceed with may receive 
no notification of this at all.
Unsurprisingly, there is then no general policy in support of explaining to victims the 
reasons behind CPS decision-making. That is, it is only in homicide cases that the 
CPS is required to meet with the victim’s family in order to explain their decision on 
prosecution, particularly in cases where it has been decided to reduce the charge to 
manslaughter and where it is decided not to proceed at all.356 In non-homicide cases, 
on the other hand, information about prosecutorial decision-making is ostensibly 
provided by the police. Therefore, if the CPS decides to accept a plea of guilty to a 
lesser charge or that the evidence does not justify proceeding at all, a police officer 
will be charged with trying to explain this to the victim. However, in his extensive 
review of the CPS, Sir Iain Glidewell noted that whether the police perform this 
function adequately must sometimes be in doubt.358
Another indication of the startling lack of communication with victims is the fact that 
they may find themselves attending court needlessly because nobody has informed 
them that their case has been adjourned. Jackson et al, for example, found that cases 
ere frequently adjourned but while in many cases the police are able to inform victims 
of these adjournments before they attend court, in some cases, this does not happen, 
"hey detail one case where the victim had taken the morning off work to attend the 
Crown Court where he waited for three hours during which time no one approached 
him or allowed him to see his statement. It was only upon his own inquiry that he
O/-A
discovered that his case had been adjourned. Similarly, a study conducted by
Victim Support revealed that in thirty-seven per cent of cases where victims were 
lequired to attend court, the hearing did not take place on the appointed day. Of those 
effected, a startling seventy per cent were unaware of the change until they arrived at 
court.’61 In view of this, it is not surprising that Glidewell found prosecution
3;6 7Glidewell (1998), para 83, p 113.
7 Ibid, at para 84, p 113.
3’8 Ibid.
l> Jackson, Kilpatrick and Harvey (1991), p 66. 
”H Ibid, at pp 83, 84.
3,1 Victim Support (1991), p 7.
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witnesses to be increasingly reluctant to attend court, being unwilling to “waste their 
time further”.362
At Court
From their research into the experience of victims at court, Shapland and Bell 
concluded that in terms of informational support, many Crown Court centres cannot 
be considered as “victim-aware”.363 A primary indicator of this is that information to 
help victims find out where their case is being heard is really quite inadequate. 
Shapland and Bell, for example, report that whilst they expected witness information 
points to be “universal” in Crown Courts, in fact, only 76 per cent had one by 1996.364 
In the Northern Ireland context, Jackson et al report that victims have difficulty in 
identifying anyone to assist them in finding their bearings.366 They explain that the 
duty solicitor facility does not necessarily ease this situation for he is frequently in 
court so that this information point is often left unattended.366 The only other 
information system in existence, they report, are two notice-boards in the magistrates’ 
court and one in the Crown Court. However, whilst lists of cases and courtrooms are 
posted on these notice-boards, there is no indication of this so that victims do not 
know to look there.367 Further, cases are listed on these notice-boards in numerical 
order by the defendant’s name. The problem with this is that victims often do not 
know the defendant’s name so that they are unable to identify their case. 
Ultimately, as one duty solicitor commented, “if you are a victim or a witness, or a 
first time offender, you are thrust into a frightening situation with no point of 
reference”.369
Another major complaint is that if there is a guilty plea at the last minute, no one tells 
the victim so that they may remain sitting in the waiting area unawares. Shapland 
md Bell found that only sixty-eight per cent of magistrates’ courts and sixty-seven 
per cent of Crown Courts were clear that victims would be told of these last minute
3.2 Glidewell (1998), para 89, p 114.
3.3 Shapland and Bell (1998), p 541.
3.4 Ibid, at p 540.
3.5 Jackson, Kilpatrick and Harvey (1991), p 78.
3.6 Ibid, at p 77.
3.7 Ibid.
3.8 Shapland and Bell observed this problem also in their English study and explain that victims are 
(ften not told the name of the defendant in order to prevent any possible intimidation (1998, p 539).
3.9 Jackson, Kilpatrick and Harvey (1991), p 78.
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developments.’71 Therefore, as many as one-third of courts have no established 
practice of keeping victims informed of when their case is about to start or if it is to 
start at all. Similarly, in their Northern Ireland study, Jackson et al found that in 
both the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court, victims did not always find out 
about a change of plea until some time after the case had been dealt with so that they 
would themselves waiting to give evidence when they were no longer needed/’73
Post-Trial
Another example of the failure to communicate sufficiently with victims is the fact 
that the majority of them receive little or no information about compensation. 
Ashworth explains that although victims of violent crime have access to the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Board for compensation (within the regulations), an early 
study showed that only thirty-nine per cent of victims of violence got to know about 
the Board’s existence.374 Further, efforts to improve the situation by imposing a duty 
on the police to inform victims have not met with complete success, largely because 
of incomplete understanding by police officers of the scheme and its relationship to
375court compensation.
It can be seen, then, that victims are not being kept properly informed throughout the 
processing of their case. This is a direct consequence of their lack of status within the 
criminal justice system. Shapland et al observed this with regard to police attitudes 
and behaviour towards victims. They noted that these tend to convey the common 
denominator that victims are not necessarily valued as an important part of the 
criminal justice system.376 Consequently, the police do not see it as their role to offer
-777
either emotional or informational support to victims. This state of affairs reflects 
again the case ownership dilemma. That is, victims think in terms of the case 
belonging to them and, following from this, assume that they are entitled to all 
information pertinent to the case. In reality, however, the Crown has divested the
:70 Shapland and Bell (1998), p 540.
;71 Ibid.
;72 Ibid
73 Jackson, Kilpatrick and Harvey (1991), p 83.
74 Ashworth (1994), p 46.
75 Ibid.
76 Shapland, Willmore and Duff (1985), p 30. 
r77 Ibid
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victim of title to the case and, consequently, of any attendant ownership rights, 
including the right to information.
Certainly, progress has been made in this regard beginning with the Victim's Charter 
mandate that victims be kept informed of significant developments in their case. 
Following from this, research has been undertaken and pilot schemes have been run to 
ascertain the best way to keep victims informed. However, as with the wider 
history of services for victims, major official statements and grand gestures are 
followed at a much slower pace by actual practical facilities on the ground so that, as 
shown, there is currently no cohesive provision of informational support for 
victims.380 A major reason for this is that the provision of services for victims is 
largely dependent on the availability of resources. With specific regard to 
informational services, Glidewell stated:
Regarding informing witnesses and victims, the role of the CPS will no doubt 
become more prominent but will, as always, depend upon the resources available to 
it.381
Ironically, the subordination of victim care to the availability of resources underscores 
the lack of value attached to victims and their interests. That is, if victims were 
properly valued, improving their experience within the criminal justice system would 
be considered such an imperative that adequate funding would be made available as a 
priority.
2.3.J.3 Legal Representation
A third major indication that victims have no formal role or status within the criminal 
justice system is the fact that they are not legally represented - the prosecutor 
represents the public, not the victim. Once again, this derives from the victim’s 
displacement by the State - because a crime is considered to be a wrong against the
378 Home Office (1991) and (1996).
,79 A major research initiative has been Sir Iain Glidewell’s review of the CPS (Glidewell, 1998). This 
commission examined, inter alia, how the CPS can be more pro-active in contacting victims direct in 
order to keep them informed of developments and decisions on prosecutions whilst taking into account 
their needs. The pilot scheme which has been running is the so-called ‘One Stop Shop’ which aims to 
provide a single police point to gather and pass on information to victims (Home Office (1998), para 
6.22, p 43). If a particular victim opts into this scheme, the police will ostensibly ensure that they are 
kept informed of all significant developments in the progress of their case. In addition, information 
provided by other agencies will also be passed on.
380 Shapland and Bell (1998), p 538.
381 Glidewell (1998), para 91, p 115.
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State or the public, it is prosecuted on their behalf by the Crown/ Therefore, 
despite being the actual aggrieved party, the victim is considered to have no legal
TOT
interest in the criminal process. Consequently, he or she is not legally represented 
for this is reserved for the official parties to the case, the State and the defendant, 
whose legal interests are at stake.
The fact that the prosecutor is not the victim’s personal representative can be used to 
explain how he treats them and their grievance. First of all, it accounts for why 
victims so often feel that he neglects their interests. Take, for example, the plea- 
negotiation process which comes in for considerable criticism in this regard. Victims 
blame the prosecutor for failing to take their concerns into account when deciding 
whether or not to settle cases by way of plea-negotiation and when deciding the terms 
of such settlements. For example, victims feel dismayed at the lesser sentences 
handed out in plea-negotiated cases, remonstrating that these do not reflect the full 
extent of their victimisation. Victims also complain that plea-negotiation denies them 
the opportunity to give evidence and thereby to tell their story.
However, the fact is that the prosecutor has no obligation to defer to the victim, either 
during plea-negotiation or at any other stage of the criminal process, for his duty is 
first and foremost to the public. As such, victim interests are always secondary to 
those of the public, if considered at all. In the specific context of plea-negotiation, 
for example, the victim’s needs are routinely subordinated to the desire to save public 
resources by avoiding a full-blown trial. Certainly, victim interests may 
complement those of the public and, when this happens, their needs will be met. 
However, in this situation, victims are viewed “functionally, as possible ingredients to 
help pursue cases, or to promote public relations, but not as people whose interests
TR7constitute ends in themselves”.
3,2 Ibid at para 79, p 112.
3i3 Ibid.
3 4 The various criticisms directed at prosecuting counsel for his conduct in both rape and non-rape 
cases are outlined in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 respectively of Chapter One above.
3!5 Elias (1986), p 140.
"b Shapland, Willmore and Duff (1985), p 54.
3(7 Elias (1986), pp 140, 141.
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The fact that the prosecutor’s client is the State, not the victim, can be used to explain 
)ther aspects of victim dissatisfaction. For example, the failure to prevent the abuses 
)f cross-examination can be attributed partially to the distinct lack of affiliation 
ictween prosecutor and victim. Basically, prosecutors are unlikely to be as motivated 
o protect victims as they might be if a lawyer-client relationship existed between
hem. As it is, such is the lack of connection between them that, often, the prosecutor
^88loes not even know who the victim is on the very day of the trial. Moreover, 
prosecutors themselves treat victims unkindly by, for example, bringing them 
insympathetically and curtly through their evidence-in-chief. This, too, can be 
explained in terms of the victim’s lack of special status within the criminal justice 
'ystem. Because the victim is merely a witness for the Crown, prosecuting counsel 
perceive and treat him as no more than a resource, and a problematic one at that. It is 
n managing this resource that prosecuting counsel cause victims frustration and 
degradation.389 McBarnet explains that failing to limit the victim’s testimony to the 
minimum evidence required for conviction carries with it potential disaster for the 
Crown case.390 The hazards involved in allowing the victim free rein thus lead to the 
employment of preventive techniques to manipulate the information presented.391 
However, these techniques constitute abrupt and suspicious treatment of the victim as
TQ9they are interrupted, cut off and even scolded whilst giving their evidence.
Summary
"he implication in traditional rape literature is that prosecuting counsel treat rape 
detims badly because they have no regard for this particular victim-group. However, 
bis does not explain why victims in other trial contexts are often similarly dissatisfied 
vith how prosecutors treat them and their grievance. The previous analysis, on the 
ether hand, accounts for the experience of both rape and non-rape victims in this 
regard. It also explains two other major sources of victim dissatisfaction - why they
1 Chapter One, section 1.3. 





are denied any say in the prosecutorial decision-making process and why information 
about the processing of their complaint is not provided as a priority.393
These matters were explained in terms of the victim’s lack of official status within the 
criminal justice system as a consequence of having been displaced by the State - the 
State is not just the arbiter in a trial between victim and offender; the State is the 
victim.394 By thus assuming the role of the victim, the State has divested the actual 
aggrieved party of his legal interest in the case, reducing his standing to that of mere 
witness for the Crown. Having lost ownership of his case, the victim is consequently 
deprived of all attendant rights and privileges, for these are reserved for the official 
parties to the case - the State and the defendant. Hence, the victim is not entitled to 
any generalised informational support, to participate in decision-making, or to 
personal legal representation. In fact, such is the lack of provision for victims within 
the criminal justice system that Mayhew describes them as the “stepchildren”, not to
'1QZsay the “orphans” of social policy. ' Ultimately, McBarnet explains, if victims feel 
that nobody cares about their suffering, it is in part because institutionally nobody 
does - the trial is an “institution of proof not comfort, on behalf not of the victim but 
of the state”.396
2.4 Passive Umpires
Judges, it is said, should exhibit both authority and restraint, remain aloof yet ever 
attentive, act as umpire rather than player...1<)7
It was shown in Chapter One that rape victims undergo a considerable ordeal during 
cross-examination. ’98 It was also shown that this has given rise to the criticism that 
trial judges are failing this victim-group by not intervening to prevent their abuse in
393 In addition, it is suggested that the victim’s lack of status is relevant also to the issue of why cross- 
examination is such an ordeal for them on the basis that if victims were valued, such treatment would 
not be tolerated.
394 McBarnet (1983), p 300.
395 Mayhew (1984), p 67.
Very recently, however, greater deference is being shown towards victims. This shift in attitude is 
referred to in greater detail in Chapter Five below.
396 McBarnet (1983), p 300.
397 Jackson (1997), p 18.
398 Section 1.2.1.
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the witness-box.39l) The assumption inherent in most rape literature is that judges take 
this non-interventionist stance in rape cases only and, further, that they do this 
because of a deep-seated prejudice towards this victim-group. However, this 
explanation does not account for the fact that judicial non-intervention seems to be a 
problem in non-rape cases also.400 It is here suggested that the better explanation of 
why judges grant defence counsel such wide latitude for abusing victims, in both rape 
and non-rape cases, is that it is derivative of the judiciary’s formal role within the 
adversarial criminal trial.
2.4.1 Neutral Arbiters
As explained, the adversarial criminal trial is structured as a contest between two 
parties in conflict with each other, the prosecution representing the public interest and 
the defence representing the interests of the defendant.401 Within this contest 
structure, the parties monopolise the proceedings - it is they who control the proof 
process, setting the factual and legal parameters of the dispute and gathering and 
testing all available evidence.402 The judiciary necessarily occupy a much weaker 
position within the adversarial trial context - there is simply no room for another 
highly active, interested party. What is needed, however, is an adjudicating body - 
someone to supervise the proceedings, arbitrate between the contestants, and facilitate 
the final judgement.403 Thus, the role of the adversarial trial judge is limited to 
umpiring the proceedings.
The adversarial judge’s role as umpire to the proceedings naturally places significant 
restrictions on the level of activity in which he is permitted to indulge. However, 
adversarial jurisdictions evince also a cultural unwillingness, stemming from their 
historical mistrust of officials, to allow the judiciary a more active role within the 




401 Section 2.2.2 above.
402 Ibid.
403 In the context of a jury trial, this involves assisting the jury with points of law so that they may 
reach a verdict. Where there is no jury in attendance, as in Northern Ireland’s so-called ‘Diplock 
Courts’, the judge himself will decide the verdict.
4(14 Section 2.2.2 above.
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could not be guaranteed and, thus, the “cornerstone” of the adversarial model would 
be eroded, leaving little else to be said for it.40'"’
Take, for example, the proof process. Jackson and Doran explain in this regard that it 
is very difficult for active investigators to suspend judgement and weigh evidence 
dispassionately.406 Consequently, the situation could arise that a judge who had 
participated in the pre-trial preparation of a case arrived at court with his mind already 
made up. This would undermine the objective of the adversarial mode of legal 
proceeding which requires each side of the controversy to be carefully considered and 
given its full weight and value before a decision is reached.407 In fact, the primary 
value of adversarial advocacy is that it enables fact-finders to suspend judgement in 
this way. Fuller refers to the American Bar Association which claims that, in the 
absence of an adversary presentation, there is a strong tendency by any deciding 
official to reach a conclusion at an early stage and to adhere to that conclusion in the 
face of conflicting considerations later developed.4(18 Adversarial advocacy is seen to 
prevent this “natural human tendency to judge too swiftly” because the arguments of 
counsel “hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two opposing interpretations 
of it” allowing all of its peculiarities and nuances to be fully explored before a 
decision is reached.400 It can be seen, therefore, that were judges to decide the issues 
before each side had a chance to make its case, this would invalidate the adversarial 
mode of legal proceeding.410 To avoid this, the judiciary is largely kept from 
participating in the proof process. In this way, the exclusion of the judiciary from the 
proof process may be seen to reflect, not only the natural dominance of the parties 
within the adversarial tradition, but also the concern that judicial neutrality will be 
affected.
To further ensure their neutrality, the judiciary is not entrusted with deciding the 
verdict in a criminal trial. This task falls, instead, to the jury as official fact-finding
405 McEwan (1992), p 15.
406 Jackson and Doran (1995), p 68.
407 Fuller (1961), p 35.
408 Ibid, at p 43.
4W Ibid at p 44.
410 Of course, in jury trials it is not for the judge to decide the verdict. However, there is the danger 
that the judge will influence the jury’s decision-making. Therefore, even in jury trials, the need for the 
trial judge to retain his neutrality is paramount.
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body.411 It is considered that if judges were to perform this task, they would use it as 
a vehicle for their own interests or for the interests of more powerful bodies. Juries, 
on the other hand, are comprised of twelve individuals so that the likelihood of self- 
interested verdicts is much reduced. Another danger of giving judges the power to 
decide verdicts is that, over time, they may come to prefer certain kinds of litigants 
over others and so will consistently decide in favour of these litigants, whatever the 
particular facts of the case.412 Related to this is the risk that judges may become 
‘case-hardened' and this, say Jackson and Doran, is one argument against the 
Northern Ireland ‘Diplock-Courts’.413 Decision-making by juries, on the other hand, 
is considered to be free from these negative influences by virtue of the fact that jury 
compilations change from case to case so that there is no such thing as a regular, 
professional jury. In fact, such is the historical preference for jury trials that even 
when they became so complex that they could not continue to be used in every case, 
the preferred alternative was to waive trial altogether rather than to waive jury trial in 
favour of a trial by a judge or a bench trial.414 Jackson suggests that so strong is this 
cultural obstacle to judicial fact-finding that it is responsible for the continuing, if 
waning, presence of the jury in contemporary criminal trials.41^
It can be seen, then, that the adversarial model places significant restrictions on the 
level of activity that trial judges are permitted to indulge in throughout the processing 
of a case. It is here suggested that this restrictiveness significantly affects both their 
capacity and their willingness to protect victims during cross-examination.
2.4.1.1 Protecting Victims
The extent to which judges protect victims from abusive cross-examination is directly 
related to the level of activity in which they are permitted to indulge. This can be 
seen from the inquisitorial trial context wherein, Pizzi explains, the judiciary play a 
much more decisive role in the treatment of victims because of their greater freedom 
to intervene and restrict unfair and irrelevant questioning.416 Their power to intervene
411 However, in the ‘Diplock-Courts’ which operate in special cases in Northern Ireland, there are no 
juries and so it falls precisely to the judge to decide the case.








In this way reflects their generally active role under the inquisitorial model - in 
complete contrast with the adversarial system, it is the judge who monopolises 
inquisitorial proceedings, determining the contours of the dispute within the ambit of 
the substantive law and gathering, testing, and evaluating the evidence relevant to the 
dispute.417 Further, after actively pursuing the facts and availing of all evidence,
418including witnesses, it is the judge himself who decides the verdict.
Theoretically, then, the failure of our judiciary to protect victims from abusive cross- 
examination may be explained in terms of the restrictions placed on them by the 
adversarial model. However, it seems that, in practice, adversarial trial judges are by 
no means as restricted as the previous discourse would suggest. Jackson tells us that, 
in fact, they have a long history of playing a much more active role in trial 
proceedings.414 He explains that English judges historically played much more than 
an umpireal role and when lawyers did come to dominate the trial process, judges 
never ceased to exercise what may be classified as inquisitorial rather than umpireal 
powers.420 These include powers to amend indictments, call witnesses and withdraw 
weak cases from juries.421 In fact, Jackson explains, not only are judges empowered 
to undertake certain fact-finding responsibilities, but they may be under a duty to do 
so.422 Jackson explains that judges also enjoy a broad latitude to comment on the 
evidence in summing up to the jury and may even put forward certain defences which
117 Jackson and Doran (1995), p 67.
The degree of control vested in inquisitorial judges derives from the objective behind the inquisitorial 
legal process. That is, whilst the adversarial criminal process is geared towards conflict resolution, the 
inquisitorial model is dedicated to truth-discovery (see note 269 above and accompanying text). 
Following from this, just as the adversarial model adopts a contest morphology as the best means of 
achieving its objective, the inquisitorial mode of legal proceeding takes the form of an official 
unilateral inquiry (Damaska (1973), p 564). The bias of the parties naturally precludes them from 
leading this inquest and so the task necessarily falls to an independent third party - the judge - who then 
monopolises the proceedings. This high level of judicial activity is supported by the inquisitorial 
model’s tendency to trust its officials so that great faith is placed in the neutrality of trial judges, 
despite their active, inquiring role (Ellison (1998), p 617).
118 McEwan (1992), p 6.
It can be seen, then, that because of the power vested in the judge, inquisitorial lawyers do not exert 
anywhere near the same degree of control as do their adversarial counterparts (Jackson and Doran 
(1995), p 67). McEwan explains that the more active the court itself, the less important the role of legal 
counsel (1992, p 9). In addition, inquisitorial systems have no use for jury trials.
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have not been raised by the defence but are available on the evidence.41 Ultimately, 
McEwan explains, "the passive umpire is a creature of theory rather than practice”.424
Ironically, this extension of the umpireal role is attributable, at least in part, to the 
contest nature of adversarial trial proceedings. This is because under the contest 
model the legitimacy of the verdict depends heavily on procedural integrity.42'^ 
Therefore, particularly in light of the degree of control vested in the protagonists, the 
observance of rules regulating the argument and ensuring their proper conduct 
assumes great importance.426 Unregulated, Damaska explains, the contest would 
“provoke reprisals, spinning off additional conflict rather than containing or absorbing 
the existing one” and, thus, the core objective of the adversarial legal process would 
be defeated.427
The trial judge plays an important role within this context and this is to ensure that the 
parties abide by the rules regulating their contest. Ellison explains that judges have 
an “overriding duty to ensure fairness of criminal proceedings”.429 To facilitate this 
role, a number of powers and duties exist which enable judges to play a much more 
active part than that contemplated for the truly passive judge, the sine qua non of the 
pure adversarial model. In fact, there is a considerable body of caselaw outlining the 
acceptable parameters of judicial activity.430 Particularly pertinent to the issue of
For example, the trial judge must put the defence of provocation to the court if there is sufficient 
evidence to make it a reasonable possibility. This must be done even if it means going against defence 
counsel’s wishes as where he intends to make the tactical gamble that the jury, when confronted with 
the stark alternative either to convict of murder or to acquit, will choose the latter. This objective may 
be thwarted by the introduction of the provocation defence for this provides the jury with a less 
extreme third option - the manslaughter verdict. Damaska says that judicial interference with the 
“proof strategies” of the parties in this way goes against pure adversariness for, he explains, the 
autonomy of the parties in managing the lawsuit should not be interfered with, nor should the tactical 
interests of the litigants, as they perceive them, be second-guessed, even if this autonomy results in 
substantial distortion of what the adjudicator takes to be proper factual determinations (1986, p 112).
424 McEwan (1992), pp 14, 15.
425 Damaska (1986), p 101.
426 Damaska (1973), p 564.
427 Damaska (1986), p 98.
421i Damaska (1973), pp 563, 564.
But, Damaska says, in a pure adversarial model, the judge’s attitude should still be one of passivity for 
he should rule on the propriety of conduct only upon the objection of the side adversely affected {loc. 
cit.).
429 Ellison (1998), p 609.
430 The classic statement of the English trial judge’s function is to be found in the judgement of 
Denning LJ in the civil appeal case, Jones v National Coal Board [\951] 2 QB 55:
The judge’s part in all this is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking questions of witnesses when 
it is necessary to clear up any point that has been overlooked or left obscure; to see that the advocates
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victim protection is the common law duty that trial judges restrain unnecessary, 
protracted cross-examination.* * * 4 ’1 This duty extends to ensuring that cross-examination 
is not conducted in an unfair or oppressive manner.432 Of further significance are the 
principles which govern the judiciary’s discretion to disallow cross-examination as to 
credit. These are set out in Hobbs v Tinling wherein Sankey LJ held that judges 
should intervene to prevent improper cross-examination if questioning relates to 
matters so remote as to have negligible impact on the credibility of the witness.4j3 
This duty is derivative of the judiciary’s general obligation to ensure that any 
evidence going before the court is relevant.434
All in all, it seems that our trial judges have considerable powers of intervention, 
giving rise to the common assumption that they are well equipped to protect victims. 
McEwan, for example, argues that judges have the power to prevent some of the 
worst abuses of cross-examination.43^ This attitude is manifest also in the 
recommendation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice that trial judges adopt 
a firmer stance in protecting witnesses from the excesses of counsel.4 ’6 However, the 
obvious implication from the treatment of victims during cross-examination is that 
trial judges are not exercising their powers of intervention properly, even in extreme 
instances.437 Why is this? Ellison explains that this is because there is an 
“irreconcilable conflict” between the role of the adversarial trial judge and his duty to 
restrain unnecessary and improper cross-examination. This conflict arises because, 
whilst there is an area of permissible activity, it is also possible forjudges to intervene 
excessively or inappropriately and this may lead to re-trials or quashed convictions. 
Therefore, judges are wary of straying too far from their original role of passive 
umpire even in instances clearly calling for their intervention.
behave themselves seemly and keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude irrelevancies and discourage 
repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he follows the points the advocates are making and can 
assess their worth; and at the end to make up his mind where the truth lies {loc. cit. at 64 ).
It should be noted that in criminal cases it is for the jury to make the ultimate decision on the truth.
43' See Mechanical and Genera! Inventions Co. Ltd. and Lehwess v Austin Motor Co. Ltd. [1935] AC
346; Kalia [1975] Criminal Law Review 181.
432 See Wong Kam-ming v /? [ 1980] AC 247 at 260.
433 [1929] 2 KB 1 at 51.
4 ,4 Wigmore explained this duty as follows:
...the judge, in his efforts to prevent the jury from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of 
being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty reasoning, has constantly seen fit to exclude matter that does not 
rise to a clearly sufficient degree of value (1940, p 969).
435 McEwan (1992), p 15.
436 Home Office (1993), para 182.
4,7 Chapter One, section 1.2.
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There are two main occasions when judicial intervention may be deemed excessive or 
inappropriate and thereby lead to an appeal. The first of these is where the 
intervention is seen to interfere with the basic adversarial principle that each side 
should proceed largely unhindered to present its case to the court.* 4 * * *’9 Saltzburg 
identifies this as arguably the most important principle in the adversary system on the 
basis that it enables the parties to present their strongest arguments to the tribunal of 
fact and he goes on to illustrate how excessive or inappropriate judicial intervention 
can thwart the proof strategies of the parties in this regard.440 Doran explains that the 
argument that judicial intervention renders the form of the trial “alien to the tenets of 
the adversary system” has provided a “more theoretical line of attack” for defence 
counsel to successfully appeal convictions on the basis of unacceptable intrusions.441 
He explains that this was the line taken in Gunning where the Court of Appeal 
concluded that
...when a judge’s interventions were on such a scale as to deprive the accused of the 
chance, to which he was entitled under the adversarial system, of developing his 
evidence under the lead and guidance of defending counsel, the trial must be 
regarded as a mistrial even in the absence of an allegation that the judge’s 
questioning was hostile to the accused.442
The later appeal of Matthews and Matthews relied on the same argument.443 There, 
counsel contended that the effect of the interventions was to substitute an inquisitorial 
process in the Continental mould. Doran explains that whilst the Court concluded that 
the development of the applicant’s case had not been defeated from its true course (as 
had happened in Gunning), the propriety of counsel’s submission was accepted.444
The second problem with judicial intervention is that the judge may be seen to have 
developed a commitment to one side or the other.44' This is forbidden under the 
adversarial model for, in keeping with their role as umpire, judges are required to be 
wholly neutral. As Lord Devlin stated:
4j8 Ellison (1998), p 609.
4’9 See Hirock and Others [ 1970] 1 QB 67; Hamilton [ 1969] Criminal Law Review 486.
440 Saltzburg (1978).
See also note 423 above.
441 Doran (1989), p 1149.
442 [1980] Criminal Law Review 592.
443 (1983) 78 CAR 23.
444 Doran (1989), p 1149.
445 Jackson and Doran (1995), p 65.
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It is always open to the judge to probe, but the tradition is strong that he is an arbiter 
and not an inquisitor and that the coming to the aid of a party in distress might impair 
his impartiality.446
Doran explains that the danger is that the jury will be improperly influenced.447 This 
is quite likely given that the judge may well be considered to be more authoritative 
than the lawyers for the parties.448 Doran tells us that many of the appellate decisions 
in this area of judicial intrusion have been based squarely on the possible prejudicial 
effects of the judge’s intervention on the jury’s decision-making process.449 A case in 
point is Rabbitt in which the trial judge had asked questions of witnesses which 
tended to suggest that he himself was satisfied about the defendant’s guilt.4:'<l For 
example, he asked one witness, “You are very glad you did not employ him [the 
defendant]?”. This question was answered in the affirmative and Doran explains that 
the effect was thus to convey to the jury, “you are pleased you did not engage a man 
who has committed the crime with which the appellant was charged”.4:11
Summary
Traditional rape commentators allude to a judiciary unwilling to intervene to protect 
rape victims because of a specific prejudice against them. However, this proposition 
does not account for the fact that judges are not intervening enough to protect victims 
in other trial contexts either. The previous discussion revealed that, in fact, 
adversarial judges generally take a non-interventionist stance and that they do this, not 
out of bias towards particular victim-groups, but because of the constraints placed on 
judicial activity by the adversarial tradition.
The adversarial trial judge is an impartial umpire who is expected to remain 
somewhat aloof from the party contest.4^2 High levels of judicial activity threaten to 
undermine this traditional umpireal role and, consequently, judges are wary of 
intervening to protect victims. This hesitancy persists despite the fact that a certain 
amount of judicial activity is permitted in the name of protecting victims. This is 
because the line between permissible and impermissible activity in this regard is by
446 Devlin (1979), p 62.
447 Doran (1989), p 1147.
448 Jackson and Doran (1995), p 65.
449 Doran (1989), p 1147.
450 (1931) 23 CAR 112.
451 Doran (1989), p 1147.
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no means clearly marked and since the penalty for getting it wrong is an overturned 
conviction, adversarial judges are faced with a considerable dilemma when it comes 
to stepping in to protect victims. Ellison explains that adversarial judges, in fact, 
“tread a judicial tightrope” when they intervene in the course of a criminal trial to 
protect victims. 4!'3 Ultimately, the structural constraints within which the adversarial 
trial judge must exercise his discretion preclude adequate protection of victims, 
whether in rape or non-rape trials, from irrelevant and inappropriate questioning.4r’4 
Traditional rape literature largely overlooks this factor and implies, instead, that the 
judiciary don't protect rape victims because they simply don’t care about them.
2.5 Conclusion
As explained, this thesis aims to suggest ways in which the rape victim’s experience 
throughout the criminal justice process might be improved. Fundamental to this 
objective is a proper understanding of the reasons behind the maltreatment of this 
victim-group for it is these which any reform proposals must address if real 
improvement is to be achieved. This present chapter has, therefore, been concerned to 
provide an accurate explanation of the treatment of rape victims as outlined in 
Chapter One above. The traditional perspective is that this maltreatment is the 
product of prejudicial attitudes towards this specific victim-group. However, Chapter 
One’s finding that rape and non-rape victims actually have a great deal in common in 
terms of their negative courtroom experiences naturally undermines this argument - it 
cannot be expected that there are separate causes behind their shared experiences. 
The better explanation is that the like experiences of rape and non-rape victims are 
attributable to a common factor. This present chapter has duly found that this 
common factor lies within the structural and functional features of our criminal justice 
system - section 2.2 revealed that the brutality of cross-examination is an inescapable 
feature of the adversarial trial process, section 2.3 showed that the perceived 
inadequacies of prosecuting counsel derive from the victim’s lack of status within the 
criminal process and section 2.4 explained the judiciary’s failure to protect victims 
from abusive cross-examination in terms of the conflict between their traditional role
452 Ellison (1998), p 611. 
m Ibid, at p 610.
454 Ibid, at p 611.
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as passive umpire and their duty to curtail improper and inappropriate cross- 
examination.
Ultimately, by recognising the impact which these structural factors have on the 
experience of victims as a whole, this thesis is well on its way towards understanding 
the treatment of rape victims and, following from this, is better placed to achieve its 
central objective of providing effective reform proposals. However, so far, only a 
partial exploration of the rape victim’s experience at court has been undertaken. The 
following chapter, therefore, develops this analysis by examining three further crucial 
aspects of her trial experience - the use of sexual history evidence, the corroboration 
warning and the operation of section l(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898.
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Chapter Three 
Rape Victims Singled Out
3.1 Introduction
The myth of equal justice for all is nowhere more blatantly exposed than in a rape 
trial.455
As explained, the shoddy treatment of rape victims within the criminal justice system 
is a well-documented fact, recently receiving governmental ratification by way of a 
report highlighting a number of areas of concern456 and subsequent legislative 
reform.457 Prompted by this state of affairs, this thesis aims to explore the treatment of 
rape victims at court with a view to providing suggestions for improving their 
experience at this stage of the criminal justice process and also beyond. To this end, it 
is intended to obtain a fully accurate understanding of the source of the problems 
which it is sought to eradicate. This has already been achieved to some extent 
throughout the course of Chapters One and Two wherein the brutal nature of cross- 
examination and the joint inadequacy of prosecuting counsel and judiciary were 
attributed to the structural and functional features of the Anglo-American criminal 
justice system.
However, the matters discussed in Chapters One and Two represent only some of the 
difficulties experienced by rape victims at court and, in fact, the gravest criticism of 
the rape trial has yet to be examined. This is that the rules of evidence which apply in 
a trial for rape permit rapists to avoid conviction. The specific rules in question 
concern the separate issues of sexual history evidence, corroboration and the 
accused’s bad character.458 Following Chapter One’s format, this present chapter will 
examine how these evidential rules operate in the context of the rape trial and also 
how they equate with the conduct of criminal trials generally. As explained, this type
455 Lees (1997), pp61,62.
456 Home Office (1998).
457 The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
^ The corroboration warning rule was finally abolished in 1994 by way of section 32(1) of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act. However, as will be shown, it remains highly pertinent to the 
evaluation undertaken in this thesis.
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of comparative approach is critical if a proper understanding of the problems facing 
rape victims is to be achieved and, in turn, effective reform proposals are to be made.
3.2 Sexual History Evidence
Nineteenth century England saw the establishment of certain common law rules 
pertaining to the use of sexual history evidence in rape trials. These rules were based 
on the notion that a complainant’s chastity was directly probative of both her 
credibility and whether or not she consented to the intercourse in question. In other 
words, it was thought that unchaste women were more likely to lie than those who 
were chaste and were also much more likely to consent indiscriminately to sexual
459intercourse.
Accordingly, when a man accused of rape sought to rely on a defence of consent, he 
was entitled to prove the entire relationship subsisting between him and the victim, 
including consensual sexual acts indulged in before or after the act charged.460 In 
addition, he was entitled to adduce affirmative evidence of specific acts of intercourse 
between her and unnamed men and to cross-examine in anticipation thereof to prove 
that the complainant was or had been a common prostitute or had a reputation in the 
community for being indiscriminately promiscuous.461 Secondly, evidence of sexual 
misconduct on the part of the complainant which was not covered by the charge or 
which was not incidental to her relationship with the accused or which was not 
tantamount to prostitution or indiscriminate promiscuity was not considered to have 
any bearing on the issue of consent but was, instead, held to be relevant solely to the 
issue of credibility. Since credibility is a collateral matter, although the complainant 
could be cross-examined by the defence about any such relationship, her answers in 
this regard had to be taken as final and, as such, evidence could not be led to 
contradict her.462
These rules were carried forth into twentieth century English criminal law where little 
if anything was done to modify them or to regulate the adduction of such evidence
459 McColgan (1996), p 280.
460 Riley (1887) 18 QBD482.
461 CVoy (1851) 5 Cox CC 146; Barker {\S29) 3 Car & P 588; Tissington (1843) 1 Cox CC 48; Krausz 
(1973) 57 Crim App Rep 466.
462 Holmes [1871] LR 1 CCR 334.
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until 1976 when the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act was enacted.463 Section 2 of 
this Act purported to restrict the admissibility of sexual history evidence by requiring 
trial judges to exclude it unless they were “satisfied that it would be unfair to the 
defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced or the question to be 
asked”.464 This measure was, however, notoriously ill-fated and women continued to 
be systematically cross-examined about the details of their sexual behaviour with men 
other than the defendant.465 In addition, the Court of Appeal tended to undermine the 
efforts of those trial judges who did seek to adhere to the spirit of section 2. Temkin 
explains that the willingness of the Court of Appeal to see a wide range of evidence as 
relevant to consent meant that trial judges who refused to allow in sexual history 
evidence did so at some considerable risk of a quashed conviction on appeal.466 
Ultimately, commentators claim, the situation actually worsened following the 1976 
reform. McColgan, for example, argues that section 2, designed to narrow the 
common law scope for the introduction of sexual history evidence, was in fact 
interpreted so as to widen the circumstances in which such evidence could be 
introduced.467
Therefore, throughout the last two centuries, the introduction of the complainant’s 
sexual history has formed the centre-piece of the rape trial, provoking more criticism 
than any other single aspect of the law of rape.468 Now, at the turn of the twenty-first
463 This legislation followed the Heilbron Committee’s finding that:
...procedures have developed in regard to cross-examination and to a much lesser degree the admission of 
evidence generally which many now regard as inimical to the fair trial of the essential issues but which 
may also result in the complainant suffering humiliation and distress... We have come to the conclusion 
that, unless there are some restrictions, questioning can take place which does not advance the cause of 
justice but in effect puts the woman on trial... (Heilbron Committee (1975), para 91).
464 The Northern Ireland equivalent is article 4 of the Sexual Offences (NI) Order 1978.
465 See, for example, Adler (1982), (1987); Temkin (1987), (1993); Lees (1989), (1996), (1997); 
McColgan (1996); Home Office (1998).
Why section 2 failed to achieve its objective will be apparent following Chapters Four and Five of this 
thesis.
466 Temkin (1993), p 17.
In fact, she says that, whilst the Court of Appeal is generally unwilling to quash decisions of trial 
courts, the chances of a successful appeal in cases where trial judges have excluded sexual history 
evidence have never been better {loc. cit. at p 20).
467 McColgan (1996), p 276.
Barbara Hewson QC similarly observes that whilst sexual history evidence used to be admitted in two 
situations (where the woman was either a prostitute or known to have sexual relationships with a lot of 
men and where she had had previous sexual relationships with the defendant), following section 2 such 
evidence is being admitted in a whole range of cases and the result is that a defence barrister “more or 
less has an expectation that a judge will allow him to go fishing around in the victim’s past, which is, 
ironically, the very thing that the legislation was supposed to prevent” {Dispatches, Channel 4, 
February 1994).
468 McNamara (1981), p 26.
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century, a fresh attempt to curtail the use of such evidence has been made. Since 
April 2000, the admissibility of sexual history evidence has been newly governed by 
sections 41 to 43 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Although 
much more restrictive than section 2, this new legislation still permits sexual history 
evidence to be adduced in certain situations. The potential value of this latest reform 
is assessed in Chapter Five of this thesis wherein it will be shown that, on its own, 
section 41 will not significantly reduce the introduction of such evidence.469 
Consequently, it remains pertinent to outline why this aspect of the law of rape is so 
objectionable.
3.2.1 Sexual History Evidence and Relevance
A major objection to the adduction of sexual history evidence is the acute distress and 
humiliation which is caused to complainants by dissecting their sexual life in open 
court. Lees describes the process as “judicial rape” and explains that many victims 
find the experience as humiliating as the actual rape.470 Indeed, she argues that this 
judicial rape is worse than the actual rape being “more deliberate and systematic, 
more subtle and more dishonest, masquerading in the name of justice”.471 A further 
criticism is that the notorious humiliation suffered by rape complainants as a 
consequence of exposing their private life and sexual past deters many victims from 
reporting their rape.472 In the words of one commentator:
[M]uch injustice has been done because victims of rape were fearful of the legal 
process itself, notably the horrendous experience of cross-examination about remote 
and irrelevant aspects of sexual behaviour. Many victims failed or refused to put 
themselves through this experience, and many rapists escaped unpunished, to attack
■ 473again.
However, the ultimate criticism is that by introducing the complainant’s sexual 
history to the court the conviction of rapists is severely inhibited.474 A major reason 
for this is the hugely prejudicial impact of this type of evidence. The fact that juries 
are less willing to convict in cases where they have heard evidence of reputed 
unchastity and sexual promiscuity is well documented. In the United States, for
469 Chapter Five, section 5.2.1.
470 Lees (1997), p 53.
471 Ibid.
472 McNamara (1981), p 25.
473 Woods (1981), p 4.
474 See, for example, Temkin (1993); Lees (1996); McColgan (1996).
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example, Kalven and Zeisel found that in rape cases the jury “often harshly scrutinises 
the female complainant particularly, it would seem, where she has a sexual history”.475
However, whilst cross-examining complainants about their sexual history or 
otherwise adducing such evidence is certainly the most distasteful aspect of the rape 
trial, the fact remains that, as an integral part of his right to a fair trial, the accused is 
entitled to adduce all evidence relevant to his defence. Therefore, insofar as the 
complainant’s sexual activities are relevant to an issue in the case, evidence of such 
must be admitted regardless of her feelings. However, the argument put forward by 
many commentators is that the admission of much sexual history evidence has been 
inconsistent with ordinary, common law notions of relevance. For example, Home 
Office research conducted just prior to the 1999 reform revealed that
The extent of the use of such evidence seems to go far beyond that demanded in the 
interests of relevance to the issues in the trial and suggests that it is used, contrary to 
section 2, in an attempt to discredit the victim’s character in the eyes of the jury.
This goes beyond the need for fairness to the defendant, who is protected from 
exposure to questioning on his own previous misconduct.47f>
Moreover, in 1975, the Heilbron Committee concluded that “a woman’s sexual 
experience with partners of her own choice is neither indicative of untruthfulness nor 
of a general willingness to consent”, thereby denouncing the existence of any general 
probative link between chastity and either consent or credit.477
3.2.1.1 Sexual Activities Relevant to Consent
Will you not more readily infer assent in the practiced Messalina in loose attire, than 
in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?478
The United States Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as that which 
has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
475 Kalven and Zeisel (1966), p 249.
See also Catton (1975); Bordiga and White (1978); La Free, Reskin and Vischer (1985); Adler (1987) 
and Brown, Burman and Jamieson (1993).
476 Home Office (1998), para 9.63, p 69.
477 Heilbron Committee (1975), para 131.
See also McColgan (1996) for an in-depth analysis of the relevance of sexual history evidence.
478 Eisenbud (1975), p 403.
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the evidence”.47‘' In this way, the legal concept of relevance can be seen to depend not 
only upon a logical link being established between the evidence and an issue to be 
proved, but also upon the strength of that link.480 In other words, legal relevancy 
denotes something more than a minimum of probative value; each single piece of 
evidence must have a “plus value”.481 Similarly, according to Thayer, evidence “must 
not merely be remotely relevant, but proximately so”.482
McColgan argues that in order for sexual activity to be properly relevant to the issue 
of consent, it must be accepted that the group of women who have sexual intercourse 
with men to whom they are not married is sufficiently small, in comparison with the 
group which does not.483 However, in contemporary society, the position is that the 
proportion of women who engage in non-marital sexual relations is overwhelming in 
relation to the proportion who do not. Therefore, McColgan explains, evidence that a 
woman belongs in the former group is not relevant to the issue of consent because this 
membership does not distinguish her from the norm.484 The Heilbron Committee 
similarly explained that the permissiveness of modern society means that a woman’s 
sexual experience cannot be taken as a general indicator of either untruthfulness or 
consent.485
Indeed, even in nineteenth century England when extra-marital sex was much less 
common, the common law refused to accept the proposition that chastity was 
generally probative of consent. That is, save where evidence of sexual activities came 
within one of the exceptional categories, it was considered to have no weight in 
relation to the issue of consent.486 The exceptions concerned evidence of the 
complainant’s prostitution or “notoriously immoral character for lack of chastity”, and 
evidence concerning sexual contact between the complainant and the defendant. This 
narrow approach is surprising considering the Victorian attitude towards sexual 
matters. McColgan explains that, during this era, women who engaged in extra-
479 Federal Judicial Centre (1975), Rule of Evidence 401.
480 McColgan (1996), p 284.
481 Wigmore (1940), p 969.
482 Thayer (1898), p 516.
483 McColgan (1996), p 285.
484 Ibid, at pp 285, 286.
485 Helbron Committee (1975), para 131.
486 McColgan (1996), p 283.
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marital sex were often perceived as mentally abnormal.487 This was because the 
Victorian attitude to female sexuality rested upon an accepted distinction between 
‘good’ and ‘bad' (asexual and sexual) women. Good women were “not very much 
troubled with sexual feeling of any kind” and remained as virgins until married; bad 
women, described as nymphomaniacs, derived pleasure from sex and were “low and 
vulgar”.488
Today, however, judicial interpretation of section 2 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976 may be seen to constitute a “volte-face” in terms of the law’s 
previous categorisation of sexual history evidence as generally irrelevant to consent.489 
In Viola, an early decision concerning section 2, Lord Lane stated that
[I]f questions are relevant to an issue in the trial in the light of the way the case is 
being run, for instance relevant to the issue of consent, as opposed merely to credit, 
they are likely to be admitted.490
Temkin explains that this left the door open for rulings that evidence of past sexual 
experience is in any particular case relevant to the issue of consent and therefore 
admissible.491 The caselaw following Viola reveals that this is precisely the approach 
being taken, the Court of Appeal evidencing a particular willingness to see a wide 
range of sexual history evidence as relevant to consent.492
On analysis, much of the sexual history evidence being admitted under section 2 
depends, in the first instance, upon the acceptance that unchaste women are more 
likely to consent to sexual intercourse.493 That is, women who have consented to non- 
marital sexual relations in the past are, by simple virtue of this prior activity, 
presumed to have consented to the intercourse forming the rape allegation. Eisenbud 
supports the use of sexual history evidence for this purpose:
Regardless of the value judgment made by society about pre-marital or extramarital 
sexual behaviour, its characterisation will not alter the fact that people who engage in 








Ibid, at p 284.
Ibid.
Ibid, at p 282.
[1982] 1 WLR 1138 at 1142.
Temkin (1993), p 5.
For a review of the caselaw following Viola, see Temkin (1993) and McColgan (1996). 
McColgan (1996), p 283.
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randomly selected moment than are people who have never engaged in that 
behaviour before.494
However, McColgan illustrates the spuriousness of this reasoning by drawing an 
analogy with a man having a reputation for generosity, asking is it more likely that he 
consented to the appropriation of his possessions in a case where he alleges theft, than 
a man with a reputation for meanness.495 She answers that neither his generosity nor a 
rape complainant's sexual past render it more likely that they consented to the 
activities of which they now complain.496 In fact, the use of character evidence for the 
purpose of demonstrating the probability that one with a certain moral trait acted 
conformably with his nature at the specific time in question is generally strictly 
prohibited.497 Therefore, the use of sexual history evidence to show consent on the 
basis of propensity to act can be seen to fly in the face of an important rule of 
evidence.498
3.2.1.2 Sexual Activities Relevant to Credit
No evil habitude of humanity so depraves the [female] nature... as common, 
licentious indulgence. Particularly this is true of women whose character is virtue, 
whenever that is lost, all is gone; [their] love of justice, sense of character and regard 
for truth.499
McNamara explains that the purpose of cross-examination as to credit is to elicit 
material which will support an inference that the witness is not to be believed on his 
oath.500 Therefore, it is proper during cross-examination to disparage the conduct and 
credibility of the witness if there are reasonable grounds for such an attack.501 
Axiomatically, where bad character or previous misconduct is relied upon as casting 
doubt on the witness’s reliability and veracity, the character or conduct must be such 
as to involve a moral failure on the part of the witness which makes it more probable 
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dishonesty, betrayal of trust or confidence, unscrupulous behaviour, unreliability or 
dereliction of duty.503 In rape trials, non-marital sexual activity could be put to the 
complainant during cross-examination in order to impugn her.
The assumption of a link between chastity and truthfulness operates only in sexual 
offence trials, past sexual activity in general not being accepted as having any bearing 
upon the trustworthiness of a witness.504 Moreover, only women stand to have their 
reliability tested in this way:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does 
not even in the remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that 
alone, while it does that of a woman. It is no compliment to a woman to measure her 
character for truth by the same standard that you do that of a man, predicated upon 
character for chastity. What destroys the standing of the one in all walks of life has 
no effect whatever on the standing for truth of the other.503 
Following from this, Lees observed that whilst the rape complainant’s reputation is 
judged on the basis of her assumed sexual character and past sexual history, the two 
main factors deemed to be relevant to the accused’s credit are his occupation and lack 
of previous criminal record.M)h
The exceptional treatment of rape complainants in this respect derives from Hale’s 
assertion that sexual offence complainants have a greater tendency to lie than any 
other type of witness and, relatedly, that unchaste complainants are the most 
untrustworthy of all.507 However, the basis on which it can be said that women who 
indulge in extra-marital intercourse can for that reason alone not be taken at their 
word has to be questioned. As McEwan says, “the logic of cross-examination on 
sexual history designed to discredit the prosecutrix is not obvious; the most extensive 
promiscuity does not suggest that a woman is not honest”. McColgan says that, in 
fact, no evidence has ever been preferred in support of this notion - there simply is no 
logical link between sexual behaviour and truthfulness per se.509 Rather, she explains, 
the perceived relevance of sexual history is to the complainant’s moral, rather than
504 McNamara (1981), p 28; Temkin (1984), p 946; McColgan (1996), p 280.
505 State v Sibley 131 Mo. 519, 532, 33 S.W. 167, 171 [1895],
506 Lees (1996), p 131.
507 Hale (1736), pp 633,635.
508 McEwan (1992), p 104.
McColgan (1996), p 281.
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her probative credibility.510 Probative credibility relates to the truth-value of a 
witness’s testimony whereas moral credibility relates to his or her standing as a 
person.511 She explains that sexual history evidence is used to attack the 
complainant’s moral credibility, to suggest that the morality and humanity of the 
witness is so inferior that no verdict can be based on her testimony, to show the 
complainant to be “so morally inferior as either not to deserve the court's sympathy or 
not to provide a suitable foundation for punishing the accused”.512 In other words, it is 
sought to prejudice the court against the complainant and this, it can be seen, is quite 
different from demonstrating that she is untruthful.
3.2.1.3 Probative Value versus Prejudicial Impact
It can be seen, therefore, that the logical relevance of sexual history evidence to the 
issues of consent or credit is extremely tenuous.513 However, the argument against 
admission of this type of evidence does not rest simply upon its lack of probative 
value.514 This is because the legal concept of relevance depends not only upon logical 
relevance but also upon a balance of that logical weight against the potential dangers 
flowing from admissibility.515 In this way, Hoffman explains, legal relevance is “a 
variable standard, the probative value of the evidence being weighed against the 
disadvantages of receiving it”.516 Accordingly, Bentham accepted that evidence could 
properly be excluded on the basis of undue vexation, delay and expense.517 Thayer, 
Stephen and Wigmore argued that logically probative evidence could be excluded on 
the grounds that it might create a multiplicity of issues.518 McNamara explains that 




513 Evidence of prior sexual activity might be more relevant to the issue of consent in cases where it 
pertains to the complainant’s previous sexual experience with the defendant himself. However, here 
too, a connection should not always be presumed. The Scottish Law Commission, for example, 
instanced the situation of “a chance encounter accompanied by some sexual behaviour many years 
before the alleged offence” and recommended that sexual relations with the defendant should also be 
included in any prima facie embargo (1983, para 5.5). Commendably, section 41 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 does include evidence of sexual activity with the defendant within its 
embargo, something which section 2 failed to do.
514 McColgan (1996), p 286.
515 Ibid.
516 Hoffman (1975), p 205.
517 Bentham and Bowring (1838-43), p 599.
518 See Twining (1985), pp 68-75 and Thayer (1898), p 516.
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annoying or needlessly offensive might be disallowed in the discretion of the court 
notwithstanding some tenuous relevance to a main or collateral fact.519
A major factor bearing on the admissibility of logically probative evidence is the 
potential prejudicial impact of that evidence.520 That is, in determining whether a 
particular piece of evidence should be admitted into the trial the judge must consider 
whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial nature. This policy is reflected 
in the general rule that the prosecution shall not be permitted to adduce evidence of 
the accused’s bad character or to cross-examine witnesses for the defence with a view 
to eliciting such evidence. Wigmore explains that evidence indicating moral 
disposition may be excluded in this way because its probative value may be 
exaggerated and “condemnation be visited upon the accused not for the act but
522virtually for his character”.
It has been suggested that rape complainants as a category are more prone than any 
other witness-group to this type of moral condemnation so that judgments about fact 
are frequently displaced by, or transformed into, judgments about value.523 In this 
way, Grace et al explain, questions about consent fall on the boundary between 
factual and moral domains and, as such, are prey to all the prejudices and 
preconceptions which many people have about sexual behaviour.524 Complainants 
with a sexual past are especially vulnerable to these value judgments, finding it much 
more difficult to persuade juries that they did not consent to the intercourse in 
question. This is clear from the numerous studies which have revealed a distinct 
unwillingness on the part of juries to convict defendants of rape where the 
complainant’s sexual history has been introduced.525 In Canada, for example, Catton 
found that any information at all implying that the victim had a prior sex history had 
the effect of reducing the perceived guilt of the accused regardless of whether this
519 McNamara (1981), p 26.
:,2<’ In this context, ‘prejudicial’ means liable to mislead or provoke an irrational response from the jury 
or magistrates at the trial itself.
521 See section 3.4 below.
522 Wigmore (1940), p 969.
52'’ See, for example, Adler (1987); Chambers and Millar (1987); Temkin (1987); Lees (1996), (1998); 
McColgan (1996).
524 Grace, Lloyd and Smith (1992), p 12.
525 See, for example, Kalven and Zeisel (1966); Catton (1975); Bordiga and White (1978); La Free, 
Reskin and Vischer (1985); Adler (1987) and Brown, Burman and Jamieson (1993).
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information was verified.526 In fact, LaFree et al found that juries are so prejudiced 
against complainants with a sexual past that even evidence that the accused used a 
w eapon or injured the victim may not persuade them of his guilt.527
Despite its profoundly prejudicial impact, sexual history evidence is admitted in 
wholly unwarranted situations. In fact, the policy stipulating that unduly prejudicial 
evidence be excluded seems to have been completely undermined in the context of 
sexual history evidence. This can be seen from the dictum in Lawrence, the first 
major case interpreting section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976:
The important part of the statute which I think needs construction are the words “if 
and only if he (the judge) is satisfied that it would be unfair to that defendant to 
refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced or the question to be asked”. And, in my 
judgment, before a judge is satisfied or may be said to be satisfied that to refuse to 
allow a particular question or a series of questions in cross-examination would be 
unfair to the defendant he must take the view that it is more likely than not that the 
particular question or line of cross-examination, if allowed, might reasonably lead the 
jury, properly directed in the summing-up, to take a different view of the 
complainant’s evidence from which they might take if the question or series of 
questions was or were not allowed.528
The only requirement of admissibility here seems to be that the evidence must be 
likely to cause the jury to take a different view of the complainant’s testimony than it 
would have done had they not heard such evidence. Given the reaction of juries to 
complainants with a sexual past, this is surely a dangerous approach to deciding the 
admissibility of sexual history evidence.
3.2.2 Sexual History Evidence and Non-Rape Trials
As well as the extreme distress and humiliation caused to complainants, the 
introduction of sexual history evidence in rape trials has serious negative 
ramifications for attrition rates (including reporting) for this crime.529 The practice is 
made doubly repugnant by the fact that the admission of much of this type of 
evidence is inconsistent with the principles of legal relevance. Flowever, Chapter One 
revealed that complainants in all case-types are routinely subjected to onerous cross-
52<> Catton (1975), p 173.
!'27 La Free, Reskin and Vischer (1985), p 397.
528 [1977] Criminal Law Review 492 at 493.
529 See, for example, Temkin (1987); Grace, Lloyd and Smith (1992); Lees (1996).
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examination ordeals during which they are made to answer questions which cause 
them distress, humiliation, frustration and anxiety. Further, it was shown that such 
questioning frequently bears little or no relevance to either a fact in issue or to the 
witness’s credibility. Rather, much of the abusive treatment of victims during cross- 
examination is purely tactical, serving a number of insidious objectives and geared 
ultimately towards winning the verdict.530
Following from this, can the practice of cross-examining rape complainants on their 
sexual history really be taken as evidence that this victim-group is subject to unique 
treatment at court? Is it not, in fact, simply the case that this type of questioning 
operates as just another defence tactic, albeit a singularly cruel and effective one? 
Grace et al explain that as in most cases in relation to those offences where consent is 
a possible defence, if that defence is to succeed, it must necessarily attack the 
credibility of the complainant.531 This, they explain, may involve appealing to 
unfounded generalisations to imply that the complainant’s denial of consent was a 
fraud.532 Thus, it may be implied that she was promiscuous, sexually provocative or 
devious and manipulative, on the assumption that jurors will either doubt her general 
character or her specific claim to have said “no” to the defendant.533 They add that it 
is in this type of case that it is often said that the complainant is “on trial”.534 Indeed, 
it is obvious that defence practitioners often introduce sexual history evidence for 
purely tactical purposes, seeking to exploit the considerable prejudice which juries 
tend to have about sexual behaviour. Thus, McNamara explains, it is in the accused’s 
interest to paint the complainant in the worst possible light.535 Temkin similarly 
found this to be a very popular defence tactic, quoting one eminent QC who said that 
he always applies to the judge to admit the woman’s sexual past because if she can be 
“depicted as a slut” the jury will be disinclined to convict.536
From this perspective, the adduction of sexual history evidence is really quite 
indistinguishable from any other tactical device employed by defence counsel during
5,0 See both Chapters One and Two in this regard.
531 Grace, Lloyd and Smith (1992), p 10.
532 Ibid, at p 11.
533 Ibid
534 Ibid
535 McNamara (1981), p 26.
536 Temkin (1998), p 17.
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cross-examination. The question of why it is not employed in other trial contexts is 
answerable simply in terms of the specific nature of the rape trial which makes it 
more conducive to raising sexual matters. However, it is suggested that there is a 
significant point of difference between the generic brutalities of cross-examination as 
outlined in Chapter One above and the practice in rape trials of introducing the 
complainant’s sexual history. This difference is that the wide latitude enjoyed by 
defence counsel for abusing victims generally is largely attributable to judicial failure 
to regulate properly the cross-examination process.537 In other words, defence counsel 
are often acting outside of the rules but are simply getting away with it. The 
systematic degradation of rape victims by examining their sexual life in open court is, 
on the other hand, a legitimate defence exercise deriving from the enduring perception 
that such evidence is probative of both the issues of consent and credibility. The 
perceived legitimacy of the treatment of rape victims in this regard is further 
evidenced by the fact that the judiciary is also known to question complainants on 
their sexual past.538 The appellate courts, too, evince their clear endorsement of this 
type of questioning by frequently upholding appeals brought on the basis of failure to 
allow such evidence.539 Therefore, the major anomaly of the use of sexual history 
evidence in rape trials is that, whilst it generally bears no genuine relevance to either a 
fact in issue or to the complainant’s credibility, it is still a fully endorsed and integral 
part of the cross-examination of rape complainants.
Summary
Chapter One of this thesis revealed that, contrary to the image traditionally presented 
in rape literature, victims as a whole are subjected to an extremely arduous cross- 
examination ordeal.540 In fact, to a great extent, rape and non-rape complainants 
suffer an almost identical experience in the witness-box. However, the previous 
discussion revealed that, in addition to these generic abuses, rape victims are subject 
to further maltreatment in the form of questioning them about their sexual history (or 
otherwise adducing such evidence). Whilst victims generally are faced with a tactical 
onslaught during cross-examination, they are not required to put up with questioning 
of this type. As such, rape victims clearly endure a much more harrowing ordeal at
1,7 See Chapter One, section 1.4 and Chapter Two, section 2.4.
538 Adler (1982), p 673.
539 Temkin (1993); McColgan (1996).
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court and, ultimately, are faced with greater obstacles to conviction than victims 
generally. However, as explained, the fact that sexual history evidence does not 
feature in trials generally is not what makes its use in rape trials so anomalous. 
Rather, the real ignominy of the brutalisation of rape victims in this regard is that it is 
a fully accepted and endorsed practice which has constituted the central feature of the 
rape trial throughout the last two centuries. Whether or not the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 will reduce reliance on this most distasteful practice 
remains to be seen.541
3.3 The Corroboration Warning
Until February 1995, trial judges were obliged to issue a corroboration warning in 
respect of sexual offence complainants and accomplices giving evidence for the 
prosecution/42 The requirement as it applied to children giving sworn testimony had 
already been abolished in 1988.543 The obligatory care warning now applies only in 
cases involving persons who are mentally handicapped where they have made a 
confession which has not been witnessed by an independent person.544 The warning 
consisted of directing the jury that it would be dangerous to convict on the 
uncorroborated evidence of the relevant witness-groups. Precisely why it was 
regarded as dangerous had also to be explained. This meant telling the jury that 
witnesses of the type immediately before them were predisposed to tell lies and 
possible reasons for this dishonesty would be given. Further, any items of evidence 
which could serve as corroboration, if accepted by the jury, had to be identified. If 
there was no such evidence, this too had to be pointed out.545 Finally, judges had to 
explain to the jury that, notwithstanding the warning, they were entitled to convict on 
the uncorroborated testimony if they were satisfied of its truth. Failing to issue this 
warning or to issue it in the requisite terms constituted a ground for appeal.
340 Chapter One, section 1.2.
541 Chapter Five of this thesis examines the likely effect of this legislation.
542 This obligation was abolished by section 32(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
543 This was by virtue of section 34(2) of the Criminal Justice Act. However, magistrates still need to 
warn themselves of the dangers of convicting on the uncorroborated but sworn evidence of children 
(Uglow (1995), p 198, note 7).
344 Section 77 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
543 Because otherwise the judge’s silence may lead the jury to suppose that there is something in the 
evidence that may be taken to be corroboration, and their only job is to find it {People (AG) v Moore 
[1950] Ir. Jur. Rep. 45; Anslow[\962\ CLR 101).
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As stated, the corroboration warning requirement has now been abolished in respect 
of sexual offence complainants. Nevertheless, it remains highly pertinent to the 
evaluation undertaken in this thesis. In the first place, having been abandoned only as 
late as 1995, it provides a still contemporaneous example of the arbitrary treatment 
accorded rape victims at court. In the second place, it is not clear that its abolition has 
brought this treatment to a complete end. This is because, whilst the judiciary are no 
longer required to issue the warning, they retain a discretion in this regard.546 Lack of 
research makes it difficult to ascertain how this discretion is being exercised although 
Makanjuola, the first major case following the reform, did appear to adhere to its 
spirit.547 In this case, the Court of Appeal laid down guidelines as to how the judiciary 
should exercise their discretion to issue the warning. Critically, it was stipulated that 
there should be an “evidential basis” for suggesting that a witness is unreliable.548 
Where there is no such basis, the accused must rely on the protections available 
throughout the normal conduct of the criminal trial to protect him from unreliable 
evidence.549 In effect, this puts sexual offence complainants and accomplices in the 
same position as witnesses generally. However, the major drawback of Makanjuola is 
the Court’s statement that it would be “disinclined to interfere” with a trial judge’s 
exercise of his discretion save where it was Wednesbury unreasonable. This plainly 
leaves those trial judges who would thwart the reform quite free to do so. It is 
suggested that this tendency will be very high in rape cases for, whilst abolishing the 
warning may have delegitimised to some extent the traditional perception of sexual 
offence complainants as liars, the cultural mistrust of this witness-group (of which the 
corroboration warning was only one manifestation) continues to be very strong.550 In 
explaining why the various witness-groups attracted the corroboration warning, the
546 Section 32(1) prohibits the issuing of the warning “merely because” the witness concerned is an 
accomplice or a sexual offence complainant. Birch explains that the purported aim of the reform was 
not to prevent judges from commenting on the credibility of these witness-groups but to require them 
to make such comment only when required and in terms appropriate to the circumstances of the 
individual case (1995, p 524).
547 [1995] 3 All ER 730.
548 As to what could constitute such a basis, the Court instanced situations where the witness is shown 
to have lied, to have made previous false complaints, or to bear the defendant some grudge.
549 The trial judge’s general obligation to direct the jury on the evidence is seen as a major protection in 
this regard (Law Commission (1991), paras 3.4-3.10 and Appendix C). This duty consists of (a) a 
general duty to put the defence fairly to the jury and, in doing so, to draw attention to items of the 
prosecution case which are actually or potentially unreliable or open to criticism, and (b) in specific 
cases, to give a warning about certain witnesses who may have an interest of their own to serve in 
giving evidence.
550 See Chapter Four, section 4.4 below.
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following discussion illustrates the singular strength of the attitude of mistrust 
towards rape complainants.
3.3.1 Justifying the Warning
The common law holds that, in the absence of some specific rule to the contrary, the 
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to prove the case against the accused.'^1 
This principle reflects the presumption that witnesses coming before the courts are 
generally truthful and reliable. The corroboration warning practice represented a 
clear exception to this common law rule. The justification for this disparity was that, 
in complete contrast with the usual approach to witness testimony, the relevant 
witness-groups were “presumed by the law to be likely to be untruthful”. ' 
Therefore, when they gave evidence, it was considered necessary to provide 
defendants with additional protection against wrongful conviction. Thus, the 
corroboration direction was given, warning juries in no uncertain terms that these 
witnesses were inherently untrustworthy. Following this enormously prejudicial 
direction, juries were required to decide whether they nevertheless believed the 
particular witness on his or her oath.
It is clear, then, that the witness-groups attracting the corroboration warning were set 
quite apart from witnesses generally in terms of the attitude towards them and their 
consequent treatment in court. However, it is suggested that sexual offence 
complainants were set even further apart for they seem to have been considered less 
trustworthy than either children or accomplices and, following from this, to be the 
least trustworthy witness-group of all. This can be seen by examining precisely why 
these witness-groups were so mistrusted.
551 Murphy (1992), p 505.
5:12 Certainly, some risk of dishonesty or mistake is conceded but is thought to be adequately offset by 
the protections existing within the normal conduct of the criminal trial (Dennis (1984), p 332).
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3.3.1.1 Accomplices.
Accomplices were considered to have numerous motives for giving false testimony.554 
For example, it was thought that they might try to exculpate themselves or to 
minimise their own part in an offence by exaggerating or fabricating the role of the 
accused. It was also thought that they might be motivated by spite or revenge, as 
where they believed themselves to have been informed against by the accused. Or 
perhaps they had purchased immunity from prosecution or obtained a lesser charge or 
more favourable prospects of early release by ensuring the conviction of others.'^
3.3.1.2 Children Giving Sworn Evidence
The perceived unreliability of this witness-group derived from their immaturity and 
lack of responsibility which, it was thought, led them to lie, exaggerate, fantasise and 
make mistakes.556 Dennis explains that it was thought that children would give false 
evidence out of spite or a desire to make mischief. It was also thought that they 
were suggestible and easily influenced by adults and other children so that they might 
be induced to believe a story which was untrue. Children were also considered to 
be highly imaginative causing them to give grossly coloured testimony.559 In 
addition, their powers of observation and memory were considered to be less reliable 
than those of an adult with the consequence that they might miss important details or 
fail to understand the significance of what they do see.560 It was considered that these 
dangers were compounded by the fact that juries were emotionally swayed by child 
witnesses, particularly child victim-witnesses.561
McEwan (1992), p 90.553
554 See Wigmore (1940), para 2057; Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972), paras 181-185; 
Williams (1963), pp 144-147; Heydon (1973); Cross (1979), p 217.
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1 McEwan (1992), pp 117-124. 






3.3.1.3 Sexual Offence Complainants561
The argument for issuing the corroboration warning was strongest in respect of sexual 
offence complainants. Commentators forcefully ascribed various and numerous 
motives for lying to this witness-group. Elliott, for example, listed the following 
causes for lying: extrication from difficulties caused by arriving home late; becoming 
pregnant; contracting VD; being caught in the act of intercourse; feelings of guilt 
about what was done in two minds and is now repented; selective recall which may 
mean that the incident is genuinely remembered as rape; getting one’s own back at an 
unfaithful, or contemptuous lover; blackmail; and confusions of fantasies with 
reality.563 In addition, he explained, operating during the actual giving of evidence in 
the witness-box, was the prospect of the cruellest public humiliation if the defendant 
was acquitted for any reason/64 On an official level, the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee decried sexual offence complainants in similar terms, explaining that 
women make false allegations because of “sexual neurosis, jealousy, fantasy, spite or 
a girl’s refusal to admit that she consented to an act of which she is now ashamed”.566
These and many like statements incorporated the dominant perspective that sexual 
offence complainants were generally either malicious liars or mentally deluded.566 As 
to this latter notion, Dennis explains that it was believed that certain women created 
fantasies of having been the victim of a sexual attack, or suffered from other rather ill- 
defined sexual hysteria or neurosis which caused them to press false complaints in the 
belief that they were genuine.567 John Henry Wigmore proposed to explain why some 
women were prone to delusions of this nature, claiming that their “psychic complexes 
are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements 
or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environments, partly by temporary
562 It should be noted that where the sexual offence complainant was a child, the judge had to give a 
composite warning comprising the need to be wary of their evidence on two counts - first of all, 
because of the unreliability of children and secondly, because of the unreliability of sexual offence 
complainants. As stated, the corroboration warning requirement vis a vis children giving sworn 
evidence was dropped in 1988. However, the warning against the evidence of sexual offence 
complainants remained in force until 1994 and so, until then, the evidence of children in sexual offence 
cases had still to be accompanied by a corroboration warning.
563 Elliott (1984), p 13.
564 Ibid.
565 Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972), p 113.
566 Dennis (1984), p 325.
567 Ibid, at pp 325, 326.
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physiological or emotional conditions”.568 This “unchaste” mentality, he explained, 
“finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of 
which the narrator is the heroine or the victim”.569
Children and accomplices were not similarly presumed to be psychologically 
unbalanced. Glanville Williams, for example, stated that the “distinctive reason for 
the warning in sexual cases is that experience shows that the complainant’s evidence 
may be warped by psychological processes”. Therefore, in terms of why they were 
so mistrusted, sexual offence complainants were clearly set apart from the other 
witness-groups attracting the corroboration warning. Moreover, this extra dimension 
to the corroboration warning in sexual cases resulted in a much stronger suspicion of 
this witness-group than either accomplices or children. In the first place, there was 
seen to be an added reason why sexual offence complainants would lie - not only 
might any number of malicious motives be in operation, but complainants might also 
be mentally deluded. In the second place, this extra risk was seen to be compounded 
by the perceived inability of juries to detect it. Williams explained that because of the 
“subtlety” of the “mental complexes” causing women to lie about sexual matters, the 
danger of relying on the uncorroborated evidence of sexual offence complainants was 
not usually “evident to the eye of common sense”.571 The danger of relying on the 
evidence of an accomplice, on the other hand, was obvious even to an “unintelligent” 
person.572
This heightened suspicion of sexual offence complainants led many commentators to 
demand greater protection for defendants in sexual cases than that afforded by the 
corroboration warning. Williams, for example, argued that whilst permitting juries to 
convict on the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices “may not be objectionable”, it 
was “dangerous” in sexual offence cases. The reason for this, he explained, was 
that
The whole point of giving the warning in sexual cases is that the ordinary man may 
not realise the possibility of serious psychological abnormality in the complaining
568 Wigmore (1940), p 2061, para 924a.
569 Ibid.
’7I1 Williams (1962b), p 663. (Emphasis added.)
571 Ibid.
572 Ibid
573 Ibid, at p 669.
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witness, even after his attention has been called to it. To tell the jury in such cases
that they can disregard the warning, which experience shows to be necessary, is to
. • 574invite disaster.
Consequently, Williams demanded that all sexual offence accusations be subject to a 
statutory requirement of corroboration.^ He also suggested that sexual offence 
complainants be made to undergo lie-detector (polygraph) testing before their 
complaint be received.576 Other commentators have gone even further. Wigmore, for 
example, suggested that rather than warn the jury of the dangers of uncorroborated 
evidence, it would be better to employ “expert scientific analysis of the particular 
witness’s mentality as the true measure of enlightenment”.777 In this way, he argued, 
no sexual offence charge should be allowed to go to the jury unless the female 
complainant’s social history and mental make-up have been examined and testified to 
by a qualified physician.77S Another commentator, similarly pressing for rape 
complainants to undergo psychiatric examination, stated that false accusations are 
often made by mentally disturbed women. Thus, he said, if the State offered neither 
corroborative evidence nor a psychiatric report, “it would not be assumed that the 
witness is a normal individual, notwithstanding the persuasiveness of her 
testimony”.779 In other words, all sexual offence complainants would be presumed 
mentally abnormal unless evidence to the contrary was produced.
Demands for polygraph or psychological testing have never been made with regard to 
the testimony of accomplices or children. Clearly, then, sexual offence complainants 
were under much greater suspicion than these other witness-groups. This is further 
evident from the fact that, when the utility of the corroboration warning finally came 
under question in the case of accomplices and children, the decisive opinion was that 
it should be retained in sexual offence cases. For example, in 1972, the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee advocated abolishing the warning with regard to the evidence of
At his time of writing, only the sexual procuration offences covered by sections 2-4 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 carried this requirement of actual corroboration.
576 Ibid, at p 664.
577 Wigmore (1940), p 2061, para 924a.
578 Ibid
Even Glanville Williams recognised that such a practice would represent a huge “indignity” for 
complainants and “would tend to hinder charges from being brought even when they were clearly well 
founded” (1962b, p 664).
579 Anon (1950), p 102.
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accomplices.580 However, it was firmly opposed to such a move in the case of sexual 
offence complainants, arguing that the “hidden” dangers of their evidence needed to 
be made known.581
Williams similarly felt that the warning should be abandoned in respect of 
accomplices.582 He was strongly opposed to the inflexibility of the practice, arguing 
“why a fixed unvarying rule should be applied to a subject which admits of such 
endless variety as the credit of witnesses, seems hardly reconcilable to the principles 
of reason”.583 Williams also disapproved of the fact that failure to issue the warning 
in exactly the requisite terms constituted sure grounds for appeal:
It might have been thought that the proper function of a judicial tribunal, both at first 
instance and on appeal, is to decide whether the defendant is shown on the evidence 
to have committed a crime, not merely whether the violation of some rigid rule has 
deprived him of a chance before the jury.584
In respect of sexual offence complainants, on the other hand, Williams considered the 
warning to be absolutely critical, arguing that it provided “almost the only way by
')') 585which the peculiar dangers of sexual charges are reflected by the legal process”. 
Curiously, however, Williams did not consider either the inflexibility of the practice 
or the rigidity of the warning’s content to be at all undesirable in this context. For 
example, he made no reference to the fact that failure to issue the warning in the 
requisite terms gave rise to many unmeritorious appeals in sexual cases also.586 
Ultimately, it seems that what Williams regarded as arbitrary in the case of 
accomplice evidence, he considered to be perfectly acceptable in sexual offence cases. 
Presumably, he justified this questionable stance on the basis that sexual offence 
complainants were singularly untrustworthy.
580 Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972), para 183 et seq.
581 Ibid.
The Committee did admit that there must be some cases where there can be no danger in relying on the 
uncorroborated evidence of a sexual offence complainant but gave the example of an indecent assault 
on an elderly woman where the only issue is the identity of the offender. It must be said that this is a 
rather negligible concession.
582 Williams (1962a).
583 Ibid, at p 595. (Williams was here quoting Henry Joy, 1844.)
584 Williams (1962a), pp 595, 596.
585 Williams (1962b), p 664.
386 In New Zealand, Young noted that errors in judge’s summings-up on corroboration resulted in a 
disturbing number of mistrials in rape cases (1983, p 141). In England, too, there have been frequent 
cases in which there was ample corroborating evidence but because the judge failed to administer the 
warning the conviction had to be quashed (Cross and Tapper (1985), p 222). Similarly, it has been
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Not only did sexual offence complainants appear to be viewed with greater 
circumspection than accomplices but it seems that children, too, were considered to be 
more reliable. This perspective is implicit in the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s 
statement that “children are often very observant and, at least in non-sexual cases, 
often give very good evidence”. Further, the warning was abandoned in respect of 
their evidence a full six years ahead of its abolition vis a vis accomplices and sexual 
offence complainants. McEwan says that the move “presumably representfed] new 
faith in the credibility of child witnesses”. The fact that sexual assault 
complainants and accomplices were only accorded this same “new faith” some six 
years later evidences a much greater unwillingness to trust them. Indeed, Wells 
argues that what really brought down the last two categories of corroboration warning 
was, not any “realisation that women have been wrongly judged”, but the growing
^09concern over child sexual abuse.' She refers to the 1989 Pigot Report which argued 
that its proposals for assisting children to give evidence and thus convict more child 
abusers would have only limited effect unless the corroboration rule was dropped.^0 
She argues that, in following this recommendation, it would have been untenable to 
drop the warning with regard to child sexual offence complainants only but to have 
retained it where the complainant was an adult and so it was dropped altogether.
3.3.2 Empirical Evidence
It has just been shown that sexual offence complainants were viewed with greater 
suspicion than the other witness-groups attracting the corroboration warning and, 
following from this, it can be seen that they were considered to be the most 
untrustworthy witness-group of all. If this level of suspicion were warranted, it could 
not be argued that sexual offence complainants were treated arbitrarily - at most, all 
that could be said is that they were subject to unique treatment. However, it is 
suggested that the greatest anomaly of the corroboration rule as it applied to sexual 
offence complainants was that the reason for it seems to have been no more than a 
deep-seated but ultimately unsupported suspicion of this witness-group.
noted that such technical questions as “what is corroboration?” and “was the jury warned in the right 
terms?” are currently quite a fertile source of appeals {toe. cit., p 237).
’s7 Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972), para 208. (Emphasis added.)
588 McEwan (1992), p 116.
589 Wells (1990), p 1032.
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As explained, the rationale behind the corroboration warning was the presumed 
unreliability of the witness-groups attracting it. This proposition has been debated 
with regard to the three relevant witness-groups. With regard to children, for 
example, there has been a lobby of opinion arguing that they are equally as reliable as 
adults.591 However, there is also a considerable body of evidence pointing to the 
contrary.592 Dennis takes the stance that the case for the relative unreliability of 
children as reporters is unproven.593 McEwan, on the other hand, argues that children 
are in a significantly different position from that of other witnesses. She argues that 
not only have they comparatively underdeveloped cognitive abilities, but they are, in 
sexual abuse cases, subject to a process of suggestion and repeated interrogation in a 
way no other potential victims are likely to be.594 Again, with regard to accomplices, 
the justification for the warning has been questioned. Dennis, for example, says that 
it is a serious thing to say that accomplices are presumptive liars unless the jury is 
satisfied otherwise/95 However, he does say that it might just conceivably be 
defensible on the ground that they are persons willingly involved in a criminal act and 
are therefore of bad character.596 There is, of course, the further argument that 
accomplices might well have interests of their own to serve in giving evidence against 
the accused.
Whilst it is perhaps possible to justify a greater mistrust of children and accomplices 
than of witnesses generally, to say that all female victims of sex crimes are perjurers 
or fantasists unless the jury is convinced otherwise is “truly extraordinary”.597 In fact, 
there is a distinct lack of empirical evidence establishing a greater propensity in 
sexual offence complainants to make false allegations than witnesses in general. 
Research carried out by police forces in the United States, for example, has 
consistently shown a false reporting rate of two per cent or less for sexual offences, a
590 Ibid.
591 Notably Spencer (1987).
592 See research referred to by McEwan (1992), pp 117-124.
593 Dennis (1984), p 330.
594 McEwan (1992), p 130.
This is not, she says, to argue for the strictness of the Baskerville corroboration test (/oc. cit.).




rate which is comparable with that for other crimes.598 In England, Gregory and Lees 
found “no clear-cut cases of false allegations” in their London study and reported that 
the Branch Crown Prosecutor could recall no clear-cut examples of such in five years 
of CPS work.599 In their Scottish study, Chambers and Millar found that, despite a 
certain amount of rhetoric from police officers about the frequency of false 
complaining, individual officers were unable to document many individual cases 
which fitted the category of false complaints.600 Further, they learned from senior 
detectives that false reporting was not thought to be any more common in sexual 
assault complaints than in other types of violent crime.601
It seems, therefore, that no conclusive, factual evidence existed to justify the 
corroboration warning in sexual cases. In fact, many commentators argue that false 
complaints are probably less common in this context than in any other. The Pigot 
Commission, for example, acknowledging that false allegations are sometimes made, 
recommended abolishing the warning on the following grounds:
We know of no evidence whatever which suggests that this takes place on such a 
scale and in a way so calculated to successfully deceive the jury that a special 
measure designed to enhance the normal standard of proof is necessary. On the 
contrary, all the evidence which we received suggests that the stress, trauma and 
public humiliation so often experienced by the victims of sexual offences in court, and 
the intim idation to which they are sometimes subjected out of court, deter many from 
testifying at all and certainly militate against the bringing offalse evidence™2 
Similarly, Dennis refers to the notorious difficulty and embarrassment of pursuing a 
sexual offence complaint - the victim has to cope with the police, who may be 
unsympathetic, sceptical or even hostile; with the ordeal of going through the story in 
detail in examination-in-chief at the trial; finally with the distress and humiliation of 
cross-examination on the minutiae of the offence and sometimes on her past sexual 
history as well - and argues that these factors are surely a powerful disincentive to 
pressing any charges of rape and, in fact, have been said to produce gross under-
598 In 1979 The New York Sex Crimes Analysis Survey found a false reporting rate of two per cent. 
More recently, figures collected by the police in Portland, Oregon, showed a false reporting rate of 1.6 
per cent, compared with 2.6 per cent for vehicle theft (Schaffan (1993), p 1012).
V,'J Gregory and Lees (1993), p 3.
600 Chambers and Millar (1983), p 86.
601 Ibid, at p 85.
602 Pigot (1989), para 5.27. (Emphasis added.)
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reporting of such offences.603 It would be surprising if they did not filter out false 
claims also. Temkin, too, suggests that the many “disincentives” to prosecute which 
the system currently affords the victim of rape might be thought to be sufficient to 
deter false allegations.604
Temkin explains that, in fact, judges and writers grounded their mistrust of sexual 
offence complainants in “folkloric assumption”.605 Similarly, the Law Commission 
attributed the justification for the warning in sexual cases to “oft-repeated assertion” 
as distinct from empirical evidence.606 This can be seen from the fact that 
commentators referred elusively to “experience” demonstrating that juries were 
hoodwinked by false claims by complainants.607 Dennis explains that documentation 
of this experience was not, however, impressive.608 He describes how Glanville 
Williams based much of his argument that women had hidden sexual motivation to lie 
on only two cases discussed at length, neither of which involved offences coming 
under the warning.609 Wigmore, he explains, took almost all of his examples of false 
complaints from one casebook and certain letters of early twentieth century 
psychiatrists.610 Significantly, only one conviction is referred to and then only 
anecdotally.6"
3.3.3 The Final Insult
In light of the distinct absence of empirical evidence to this effect, the presumption 
that sexual offence complainants were so inherently untrustworthy as to necessitate a 
corroboration warning is truly objectionable. That they were then viewed with greater 
circumspection than the other witnesses attracting the warning is insupportable. But 
perhaps the ultimate insult to sexual offence complainants in this regard were the 
rulings in Bagshaw and Spencer.6'2
603 Dennis (1984), p 327.
604 Temkin (1982), p 417.
605 Ibid.
606 Law Commission (1990), p 57.





[1984] 1 All ER 971 and [1987] AC 128, respectively.
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Whilst declining to hold that mental patients should constitute a class of persons in 
respect of whom a corroboration warning should always be given, the Court of 
Appeal in Bagshaw took the view that
...patients detained in a special hospital after conviction for an offence or offences... 
may well fulfill to a very high degree the criteria which justify the requirement of the 
full warning in respect of witnesses within accepted categories. It seems to us that 
nothing short of the full warning that it is dangerous to convict on the uncorroborated 
evidence of the witness will suffice.613
It can be seen, then, that the Court of Appeal equated sexual offence complainants 
with witnesses of criminal character and severe mental abnormality. Moreover, by 
refusing to make such witnesses a whole new category under the corroboration rule, it 
effectively adjudged them to be more trustworthy as a class than those witnesses 
coming under the warning. As a result of Bagshaw, Dennis explains, women were 
treated less favourably by the law of evidence than mental patients, to whom a general 
corroboration requirement did not apply.614 This stance is all the more incredible 
given that the major justification for mistrusting sexual offence complainants was 
their alleged disturbed mentality - one would then have expected witnesses with 
actual clinically diagnosed mental illnesses, particularly those disposed to 
hallucination and paranoia as in Bagshaw, to have encountered at least similar 
circumspection.
In the event, the House of Lords expressly overruled Bagshaw’ when it came to 
answer the following certified point of law in Spencer-.
In a case where the evidence for the Crown is solely that of a witness who is not in 
one of the accepted categories of suspect witness, but who, by reason of his particular 
mental condition and criminal connection, fulfilled the same criteria, must the judge 
warn the jury that it is dangerous to convict on the uncorroborated evidence.615 
Lord Ackner made it clear that there was to be no new category of mental patients, 
with respect to whose evidence a full corroboration warning was required. Rather, it 
was considered much more satisfactory to leave the trial judge to give the jury such 
cautionary directions as seem appropriate in the case of any individual whose 
evidence might be suspect. Following Bagshaw, Temkin admonished that “sexual 
assault victims currently keep company with children, accomplices to crime, severely
6I3[1984] 1 All ER 971 at 977.
6U Dennis (1984), p 326.
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disordered criminals prone to delusion and paranoia and persons of admittedly bad 
character”.616 However, the Spencer ruling was clearly more damning for it 
established that sexual assault complainants were, in fact, not fit to keep company 
with mentally disordered criminals.
Summary
The practice of issuing a corroboration warning against the testimony of sexual 
offence complainants represented a clear departure from the conduct of trials 
generally. It caused complainants a great deal of humiliation and, moreover, was 
responsible for inhibiting significantly the prosecution and conviction of sex 
offenders.617 Certainly, sexual offence complainants were not the only witness-group 
to merit this peculiar treatment. However, because the warning had to be given 
against every sexual offence complainant, prosecution and conviction rates for an 
entire class of related offences were negatively affected.618 In the case of children and 
accomplices, on the other hand, the warning cut across disparate cases. In addition, 
the attitude of mistrust which gave rise to the warning was clearly strongest in respect 
of complainants in sexual cases. It will be shown that dispensing with the mandatory 
warning has not spelt the end of this cultural mistrust for it continues to pervade the 
criminal justice system, negatively affecting the experience of rape complainants at all 
stages of the judicial process.619 And, it is suggested, this continued prejudice may 
well sustain the use of the corroboration warning in sexual offence cases.
3.4 The Accused’s Bad Character
One of the clearest statements of the rule governing the admissibility of evidence of 
the accused’s bad character is provided in Makin v Attorney-General for New South 
Wales:
615 1 1987] AC 128 at 142 (per Lord Ackner).
616 Temkin (1987), p 137.
617 See, for example, Dennis (1984); Temkin (1987); Pigot (1989); Birch (1990); Birch (1995).
618 This did not include the sexual procuration offences which, until the 1994 reform, required actual 
corroboration. In addition, in Chance [1988] QB 932, the Court of Appeal held that the warning did 
not have to be given in cases where the fact of the sexual abuse was not in dispute but the only defence 
relied upon was that of mistaken identity. Whilst this decision was welcome in that it removed the 
acute anomaly presented by warning the jury of the danger of relying on the complainant’s 
uncorroborated testimony of sexual assault even when the fact of the assault was conceded by both the 
prosecution and the defence it should be noted that it left untouched the assumption upon which the 
complainant rule was based that such evidence is prone to fabrication.
619 See Chapter Four, section 4.4.
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It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to 
show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the 
indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person 
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for 
which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence tends to 
show the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it bears upon 
the issue whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime are designed or accidental, 
or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused. 620 
In this famous passage, Lord Herschell stated a fundamental rule of English criminal 
law, namely that the prosecution may not use the accused’s previous bad character to 
suggest to the jury that he acted in conformity therewith in relation to the offence 
charged, or in other words that an accused of known bad character is more likely to 
have committed the offence charged, simply by reason of his previous character.621 
This is the overriding rule even where the evidence is prima facie relevant to an issue 
before the jury.
In this way, defendants are placed on a substantially different footing to witnesses in 
general who are liable to attack on their character.622 Defendants are treated 
differently because it is recognised that information about their bad character may 
have little probative worth and yet go on to form the basis of their conviction because 
of its prejudicial impact on the fact-finding tribunal. As Murphy points out, if guilt 
could be proved by past record in this way, the defence of an innocent person of 
previous bad character would become difficult, if not impossible. This, in turn, 
would seriously compromise some of the most immutable propositions of Anglo- 
American criminal justice, namely the presumption of innocence and the requirement 
that the prosecution prove the case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and 
without his or her assistance (to enable the defendant’s past record to go to prove the 
case against him or her would obviously go some considerable way towards relieving 
the prosecution of the full extent of their burden).624
zu [ 1894] AC 57 at 65.
621 Murphy (1995), pp 117, 118.
622 However, adduction of the bad character of witnesses and complainants is not an unfettered exercise 
for, as shown in section 3.2 above, such attack is ostensibly restricted by the requirement that the 
questions asked and the information sought be relevant to either the witness’ credibility or a fact in 
issue.
623 Murphy (1995), p 118.
624 However, McEwan says that other countries espousing the presumption of innocence do not place 
similar restrictions on the introduction of the accused’s previous record (1992, p 55).
3.4.1 Exceptions to the General Rule
Also contained in Lord HerschelFs dictum is the proposition that the accused’s bad 
character may be admitted in certain situations. The position is that the mere fact that 
the evidence to be adduced tends to show extraneous misconduct does not render it 
inadmissible // it is relevant to a fact in issue for a purpose other than showing that the 
defendant acted in conformity with his character on the occasion in question. Of 
the situations in which evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct may be adduced, 
section l(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 is most pertinent to the evaluation 
undertaken in this thesis.
3.4.1.1 Section l(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898('2(>
Before the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 came into effect, the accused in a criminal 
case was not a competent witness in his own defence. Section 1 of the Act rendered 
him competent (though not compellable) as a witness for the defence at every stage of 
the proceedings. Murphy explains that, in the absence of further provision, this would 
have meant that the accused, like any other witness, would be open to attacks on his 
credit by cross-examination as to his character.627 However, because of the risk of 
prejudice peculiarly associated with character in criminal cases, Parliament gave the 
accused a substantial, albeit not unlimited, protection against such an attack, in the no 
doubt justified belief that the right to give evidence might otherwise be rarely 
exercised.628
This protection exists in the form of section 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act - a 
complete code regulating the cross-examination of an accused who gives evidence. 
This code is such that it provides the accused with what is usually referred to as a 
‘shield’ in respect of the introduction of evidence of extraneous offences and bad 
character. Section 1(f) provides as follows:
A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, 
and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has 
committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that 
wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character...
625 Murphy (1995), p 118.
626 The Northern Ireland equivalent is section l(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act (NI) 1923 as 
amended by the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1988.
627 Murphy (1995), p 129.
628 Ibid.
Section 1(f) therefore provides a prohibition on four types of question - those tending 
to show previous charges, those tending to show previous offences, those tending to 
show previous convictions and those tending to show bad character. However, this 
shield may be lost in any of the circumstances envisaged by subsections (i), (ii), or 
(iii) and, if this happens, the accused becomes liable to be cross-examined about the 
matters otherwise prohibited. It should be noted that evidence of bad character 
adduced under section l(f)(i) is to go to the issue of the defendant’s guilt, whilst 
evidence adduced under l(f)(ii) and (iii) is to go only to the issue of the defendant’s 
credit.
We are here concerned only with section l(f)(ii) or, more specifically, the second 
limb of this subsection which shall be referred to hereafter as section l(f)(ii)b. 
According to section l(f)(ii)b, the accused will lose the shield provided by section 1(f) 
if
...the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the 
character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution; or the deceased 
victim of the alleged crime...
This particular exception to the shield is very frequently encountered in practice. It 
has a significant impact on the way in which the accused conducts his defence. As 
with the rest of section 1(f), this subsection applies only to those defendants who do 
not exercise their right of silence for if an accused person does not testify he can run a 
defence which involves imputations on the witnesses for the prosecution without fear 
of his bad character being revealed.
The leading authority for section l(f)(ii)b is Selvey v DPP.629 Here, the House of 
Lords confirmed that invocation of this limb is based on a “tit for tat” principle:
If the accused is seeking to cast discredit on the prosecution, then the prosecution 
should be allowed to do likewise ... so that the jury may judge fairly between them 
instead of being in the dark as to one of them.630
It was also pointed out that the court always retains a discretion to disallow cross- 
examination under this limb even though it may technically apply. Further, the 
statutory wording should be interpreted literally so that it will not avail the accused to 
say that no imputation on character was intended or expressed (as opposed to implied)
629 [1970] AC 304.
630 Ibid (per Lord Pearse).
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or that insofar as there was an imputation it was true. Therefore, the shield may be 
thrown away even by an imputation which is, legally and tactically, an essential 
ingredient of the defence. However, the Lords did recognise one important 
qualification to the principle of literal interpretation and this is that the section does 
not apply where the accused is simply denying the offence alleged against him by the 
prosecution, albeit in emphatic language. Nevertheless, the upshot of the relevant 
caselaw is that an accused person having a record of convictions or a discreditable 
past would not advisedly ask questions whose effect was to cast imputations on the 
prosecutor for to do so might expose him to the risk that (if he himself gave sworn 
evidence) his own past might be disclosed to the jury.631 In fact, McEwan says that 
the manner in which the courts have interpreted the words ‘involve imputations on the 
character’ is “inexcusable”.632 This is because, she says, whilst the rhetoric of the 
adversarial tradition is that the accused has the right to defend himself, the application
/'TO
of section l(f)(ii)b is such as to make this a risky business.
3.4.2 Section 1(f) (ii)b and Rape Cases
Rape cases represent a sole exception to the general rule laid down by section 
l(f)(ii)b. The two authorities usually cited as giving rise to this exception are Sheean 
and Turner.634 In Sheean, the defendant gave evidence that the complainant had 
consented to the alleged act of intercourse. Prosecuting counsel there and then sought 
leave to cross-examine the accused as to his past on the basis that the latter had 
impugned the character of the prosecutrix. However, Jelf J held that the proposed 
cross-examination was not allowable because no imputation within the meaning of the 
statutory exception had been cast. In other words, the mere allegation of consent to 
an incident forming part of the res gestae was not taken as an imputation and the 
accused, therefore, retained his shield. Jelf J added, however, that if the accused 
“goes out of his way to make an attack upon the prosecutrix, based on matters outside 
the substance of the charge upon which he is being tried, it is otherwise”.635
631 For a review of the relevant caselaw, see McEwan (1992), pp 158-163.
632 Ibid, at p 161.
633 Ibid.
634 (1908) 21 Cox CC 561 and [1944] 1 KB 463, respectively.
635 (1908) 21 Cox CC 561 at 562.
In Turner, in laying the foundation for a defence of consent, the accused alleged that 
the complainant both consented to the act of intercourse and made an offer manually 
to masturbate him. The trial judge formed the view that the allegation about 
masturbation was an insinuation that the prosecutrix was a “grossly indecent” woman 
and he allowed cross-examination of the accused as to a prior sexual assault on a 
female.636 The subsequent conviction was overturned on appeal although not on the 
ground that no imputation had been cast. Rather, the view was that there had been an 
imputation but that it simply did not take away the accused’s shield. Turner has, 
therefore, been taken to have placed rape trials on a special footing.
McNamara explains that the effect of the authorities on this question is that the 
defendant in a rape case is entitled to lead all available evidence relevant to the issues, 
including consent, notwithstanding that the evidence might cast a grave slur on the 
character of the complainant and show her to be a woman of low moral character, 
without exposing himself to the risk that his shield will be taken away in the course of 
his own cross-examination.637 Therefore, whereas in a non-rape trial an allegation 
essential to a defence (apart from a mere denial of the Crown case) may amount to an 
imputation sufficient to cast aside the shield (subject to the court’s discretion), in a 
trial for rape, no allegation which is a necessary ingredient of the defence of consent 
or belief in it can, as a matter of law, amount to a sufficient imputation for this 
purpose.638 And, Temkin warns, this situation is likely to worsen in view of the Court 
ol'Appeal’s willingness to regard the complainant’s past sexual conduct as relevant to 
consent.639 The more the courts persist in regarding sexual history as relevant to 
consent on the facts of the case, she explains, the less likely it will be that defendants 
in rape cases will have their own background revealed.640
The traditional explanation offered in support of this state of affairs is that because 
consent is an issue raised by the prosecution, in putting forward the defence of 
consent, the accused is merely denying the Crown case. Seabrook and Sprack explain
636 [1944] 1 KB 463 at 465.
Today, it might be far-fetched to hold that such an allegation amounted to an imputation but Murphy 
points out that the evaluation of ‘imputations’ should be made “in the light of current public opinion” 
(1995, p 134).
637 McNamara (1981), p 30.
638 Ibid, at pp 30, 31.
639 Temkin (1993), p 17.
114
that it is now well established that the first imputation on character in a criminal case 
is made by the prosecution when they charge the accused with the offence and so 
when the accused denies the charge (albeit in emphatic language) he is simply “firing 
the second shot”.641 The same principle, they say, applies in rape cases when the 
accused raises the defence of consent even though this defence normally involves at 
least an implied attack on the character of the complainant.642 Indeed, arguably the 
exception did begin as a justifiable departure from the general rule under sl(f)(ii)b. 
However, although it was initially restricted to allegations of consent involved in the 
accused’s version of the res gestae, once created, the exception has become virtually 
unconfined in practice.643 As Zelling J noted in Gun; Ex Parte Stephenson, judicial 
interpretation of the exception has led to an “almost unlimited ferreting into the girl’s 
past and attack on her character by direct question, by innuendo, and regrettably 
sometimes by smear”.644 Similarly, Adler noted that the exception gave the defence 
“a virtually unconstrained licence to sling sexual mud”.645 The Heilbron Committee, 
too, observed that it has been widely interpreted in favour of the accused so that 
defence counsel can go to considerable lengths with no risk of letting the accused’s 
record in.646
Summary
The operation of section l(f)(ii)b of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 demonstrates 
that, once again, the normal rules of evidence are abandoned in the context of the rape 
trial. The development of the law in this area has meant that rape complainants are 
denied the protection against abusive cross-examination that is afforded victims in all 
other situations. The fact that section l(f)(ii)b does not apply where the imputations 
cast go to the issue of consent takes on even greater significance in light of the type of 
evidence most commonly adduced to prove this defence - sexual history evidence. It 
was shown in section 3.2 above that introducing evidence of their sexual life causes 
rape victims singular distress and humiliation. Defence counsel, therefore, enjoy 
unique latitude with which to ‘break’ complainants in rape cases. Therefore, whilst
640 Ibid.
641 Seabrooke and Sprack (1996), p 51.
642 Ibid.
643 McNamara (1981 ),p 32.
644 (1977) 17 SASR 165 at 173.
645 Adler (1982), p 666.
646 Heilbron Committee (1975), paras 127-128.
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victims as a whole suffer cruel cross-examination ordeals, the most objectionable 
questioning takes place in rape trials. Ironically, however, it is in these very cases that 
the victim is denied the protection traditionally afforded by section 1 (f)(ii)b and there 
can be no doubt that defence counsel exploit this anomalous state of affairs as far as 
possible. The further consequence of the differential application of section l(f)(ii)b in 
rape cases is that, whilst the jury is presented with a very negative picture of the 
complainant, they are “kept in the dark” as to the bad character of the accused. Thus, 
in clear contradiction of Lord Pearse’s dictum in Selvey, the jury in a trial for rape is 
prevented from judging “fairly” between the prosecution and the accused.647
3.5 Conclusion
As explained, the purpose of this thesis is to formulate effective and feasible 
suggestions for improving the experience of rape victims within the criminal justice 
system. To this end, it is sought to delineate clearly the types of problems facing this 
victim-group and, crucially, to determine the source of these problems. Chapters One 
and Two provided such an insight with regard to three specific features of the rape 
victim’s treatment at court. This present chapter has sought to complete this overview 
by examining three further aspects of their trial experience, namely, the use of sexual 
history evidence, the corroboration warning and the operation of section l(f)(ii)b of 
the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Following the comparative approach adopted in 
Chapter One, this present chapter not only outlined how these evidential rules operate 
in the context of the rape trial but also examined how they equate with the conduct of 
criminal trials generally. Critically, whilst Chapter One discovered that rape and non­
rape victims have a great deal in common in terms of how they are treated, the 
operation of these evidential rules evince a distinct margin of difference between their 
courtroom experiences.
The fact that the objectionable treatment outlined in this present chapter does not 
occur in non-rape trials is crucial to understanding just why rape victims are made to 
suffer in this way. This is because the singularity of this treatment strongly suggests 
that it is attributable to prejudicial attitudes towards this victim-group. The following 
chapter aims to establish whether this is so.





[T]he very concepts of “neutrality” and “rationality” to which the courts adhere are 
infused by male ideologies. Nowhere is this more apparent than in rape trials... 
masculinity stands revealed in their procedures and judgments.648
The central proposition of this thesis is that if the rape victim’s experience within the 
criminal justice system is to be sufficiently improved, then it is imperative that the 
factors shaping this experience are properly understood for it is these which any 
reform measures must aim to address. Such an understanding has already been 
achieved with regard to the specific problems outlined in Chapter One above. Thus, 
the cruel nature of cross-examination and the joint inadequacies of prosecuting 
counsel and judiciary were shown to be rooted in the structural and functional features 
of the Anglo-American criminal justice system.649 Because they derive in this way 
from the inherent characteristics of our legal system, these problems affect all victims 
equally. Accordingly, as shown in Chapter One, rape and non-rape victims have a 
great deal in common in terms of their negative courtroom experiences. However, 
Chapter Three of this thesis revealed that rape victims are subject also to a number of 
highly singular trial practices which render their courtroom ordeal much more 
traumatic than that experienced by victims generally. It is now intended to establish 
why rape victims are singled out for differential treatment.
The previous chapter revealed that, whilst they heighten considerably the rape 
victim’s courtroom trauma and, moreover, greatly inhibit conviction rates for this 
crime, there really is no practical justification for the peculiar rules of evidence which 
apply in a trial for rape. With regard to the routine adduction of sexual history 
evidence, there is simply no general probative link between chastity and the issues of 
consent or credibility. As for the corroboration warning requirement, there is no 
evidence that rape complainants are less trustworthy than witnesses generally. In fact.
648 Lees (1989b), p 14.
649 See Chapter Two above.
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false complaints are much less likely in this type of case than any other given the 
stress, trauma and public humiliation so often experienced by the victims of sexual 
offences in court. Finally, there is no reason that rape cases should form an exception 
to section l(f)(ii)b of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Or, at the least, there is no 
reason why they should form the only exception.650
In the absence of any practical justification, this present chapter explores the 
possibility that the dominant role played by men throughout the criminal justice 
system - from the formulation of laws through to their interpretation and application - 
is responsible for the arbitrary treatment accorded rape victims.651 There are a number 
of interrelated reasons for this proposition. First of all, because men are dominant it is 
their interests, values and perspectives which pervade the criminal process, 
significantly influencing matters therein. Secondly, this male dominance has 
inescapable misogynist undertones which similarly permeate the system and exert 
considerable influence. Finally, because of this male sovereignty, the perspective of 
females is almost entirely excluded. The undesirability of this single gender 
domination is most evident in rape cases. This is because rape is a unique crime in 
that it involves predominantly the victimisation of members of one gender group 
(women) by members of the other (men). Therefore, whilst it is an area of almost 
exclusive female concern, it is nevertheless men who formulate, interpret and apply 
the law of rape and, in so doing, import wholesale masculine preconceptions and 
interests. This results, ultimately, in an overwhelming bias towards the male 
defendant and against the female complainant. This bias is evident in the attitude of 
officials for, whilst there seems to be a distinct failure to understand the crime of rape 
from the perspective of the female victim, there is a clear empathy with the male 
offender. Selfe and Burke explain that there is an “over-understanding” of the 
defendant’s view which leads to a readiness to “explain”, “rationalise” and even 
“excuse” his conduct.652 This bias towards the male defendant is manifest not only in
650 McNamara questions why the exception has not been extended to other crimes where consent would 
be a defence or to crimes of a sexual nature (such as buggery, sexual assault and carnal knowledge) 
where consent would not be a defence (1981, p 31).
651 Indeed, Patullo argues that the overwhelmingly male legal profession affects the lives of all women 
who come into contact with it, whether as lawyers, defendants, or victims (1983).
652 Selfe and Burke (1998), p 56.
Selfe and Burke explain that this over-understanding” is evidenced by the wide range of commonly 
held ‘explanations’ for the defendant’s actions - they had both been drinking, he’s never done it before,
I 18
the attitude of officials but also in the law of rape itself, in terms of the legal definition 
per se , procedure, and evidence.653
The way in which masculinity defines the law of rape and the subsequent impact of 
this on the treatment of rape victims and the handling of their complaint will now be 
examined.
4.2 Origin of the Law of Rape
To a considerable extent, prohibitions on force against women have functioned to 
protect men. Historically, rape has been perceived as a threat to male as well as 
female interests; it has devalued wives and daughters and jeopardised patrilineal 
systems of inheritance.654
Perhaps the greatest anomaly of the law of rape is that it originated, not from a desire 
to protect women from sexual abuse by men, but to protect male property rights. 
Mitra explains that the essence of the crime was theft of another man’s property.655 
This is clear from the fact that redress for the crime lay in financial compensation to 
be paid, not to the victim, but to her rightful owner, be it her father or her husband.656 
In fact, even in the thirteenth century, when penal sanctions for rape were supposed to 
have supplanted pecuniary compensation, these were virtually never carried out in 
practice - financial compensation continued to be paid and judges colluded in this 
practice.657 Temkin says that this confirms how entrenched was the view that it was 
primarily an economic loss which was sustained when a rape took place.658
Reinforcing this idea of women as male property is the fact that the measure of 
damages awarded for rape varied according to an estimation of the woman’s M’orth in 
men’s eyes. This worth was attached primarily to her chastity so that the rape of a 
virgin incurred harsher penalties than the rape of an ‘unchaste’ woman. Thus, it was
she led him on, etc. - culminating, in extremis, in judicial statements at sentencing about the 
‘contributory negligence’ of the victim {loc. cit.).
653 Selfe and Burke (1998), p 53.
Rhode (1989), p 244.
655 Mitra (1979), p 560.
656 Los (1990), pp 160, 161.
657 Temkin (1982), p 400.
658 Ibid.
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considered that a chaste woman had undergone greater devaluation as a consequence 
of being raped. Loh explains that this was because her “marketability” to men would 
have been diminished by the “despoiling” and the institutions of marriage and family 
consequently threatened.659 To protect these institutions, he explains, rape was 
criminalised and chastity thus became a legally protected property value.660 A further 
determinant of the value of women was their social status. Therefore, whilst rape of a 
propertied virgin could result in castration or death, assaults against nuns, wives, or 
widows received lesser penalties.661 Since a woman’s status was to a considerable 
extent derivative, the vindication of her injury often depended on her relationship to 
men. So, for example, rape of a nobleman’s serving maid cost twelve shillings; rape 
of a commoner’s maid only five.662
LeGrand argues that rape laws continue to have the manifest function of protecting 
male property interests. She explains that they “bolster, and in turn are bolstered by, a 
masculine pride in the exclusive possession of a sexual object”, protecting the male 
from any decrease in the ‘value’ of his sexual ‘possession’, which results from 
forcible violation.663 And there is evidence to suggest that official reactions to rape 
continue to depend on assessments of the woman’s property value. Chastity, for 
example, continues to serve as a highly influential variable in this value appraisal with 
officials reacting less severely to defendants accused of raping women with ‘bad’ 
sexual reputations. Berger says that a notion of “it doesn’t matter since she wasn’t a 
virgin” permeates the culture of the criminal justice system.664 Clark and Lewis found 
that there was a similar tendency to be less punitive where the victim was of lower 
socio-economic status.665 Further, LaFree found that the race of the victim is decisive 
with officials reacting less punitively to defendants accused of raping black women.666 
Similarly, Rhode describes how in the United States, rapes of black women by white 
men were often discreetly overlooked, while black men accused of raping white 
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Therefore, between 1945 and 1965, she reports, a death sentence was eighteen times 
more likely for convicted black rapists with white victims than for any other racial 
combination.668
The fact that rape laws were conceived not for the protection of women but to 
safeguard male property rights illustrates the dominance of men and, further, the 
influence of misogyny within this area of the law. The substantive law of rape 
reinforces this perception of women as property and the corollary notion that their 
‘value’ is linked inextricably to their chastity.
4.3 The Substantive Law of Rape
Given the fact that legal language, the legislature and the judiciary have traditionally 
been men’s domain, it can be safely assumed that the process of the legal 
construction of rape has been shaped by ideological and cultural perceptions and 
assumptions that are shared by men rather than by both men and women.669
Just as rape laws originated for the protection of male interests, so too the substantive 
law of rape evidences the dominance of masculine perceptions and concerns.670 This 
can be seen in two ways. First of all, by the restriction of the rape offence to an act of 
penile penetration and, secondly, by the marital rape exemption.671
4.3.1 Penile Penetration
Because it allows only penile penetration of the vagina or anus to constitute rape, the 
legal definition of this crime is criticised as being too narrow. LeGrand, for example, 
argues that since the offence actually consists of a sexual outrage to the person, that
668 Ibid, at p 246.
669 Los (1990), p 160.
670 The legal definition of rape is provided by section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, as amended 
by section 142 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Thus,
...a man commits rape if (a) he has sexual intercourse (whether anal or vaginal) with a person who does not 
consent to it; and (b) at that time he knows that he or she does not consent to it or is reckless as to whether 
he or she consents to it.
In Northern Ireland, the current definition of rape is to be found in article 3(1) of the Sexual Offences 
(NI) Order 1978. This definition is identical to its English counterpart except in one major respect. 
This is that, whilst the English definition of rape has been extended to encompass anal as well as 
vaginal penetration, thus rendering it a gender-neutral crime in tenns of the victim, in Northern Ireland, 
rape remains gender-specific in terms both of the perpetrator and the victim.
671 This exemption was revoked by the House of Lords m RV R [1992] 1 AC 599. This decision was 
given statutory effect by section 142 of the Criminal justice and Public Order Act 1994 which removed 
the word ‘unlawful’ from its redefinition of rape. In the Northern Ireland context, the word ‘unlawful’
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outrage should probably include a broader range of sexual contact.67~ Thus, it is 
considered that a better definition would encompass such forms of serious sexual 
coercion as digital penetration, penetration by inanimate objects, forced oral sex, 
etc.673 Currently, these activities are collectively subsumed under the heading of 
indecent assault, a classification which covers other much less serious activities also.
Crimes classified as indecent assault attract lesser penalties than the rape offence - 
whilst the maximum sentence for rape is life imprisonment, it is only ten years in the 
case of indecent assault. In fact, until 1985, the maximum sentence for indecent 
assault against a woman was only two years imprisonment but, where the victim was 
a man, a ten-year sentence was available. Consequently, O’Doherty explains, a 
degrading sexual attack on a woman where the defendant forced her to commit 
fellatio or inserted objects into her body was not even an arrestable offence as this 
required a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment.674 The sexual abuse of men, 
on the other hand, was evidently taken much more seriously and this, it is suggested, 
was reflective of the general misogyny of the criminal law.
Section 3(3) of the Sexual Offences Act 1985 brought parity of sentencing to this area 
of the law. O’Doherty says that, finally, it seemed that the seriousness of indecent 
assault on females was appreciated.675 Further, he considers that the general attitude 
towards the crime of indecent assault has improved:
Indecent assault has at last passed from being viewed as a minor offence, particularly 
where women are concerned, to one where the sentencing powers available can more 
closely reflect the nature of any sexual assault short of rape.676 
Other commentators argue, however, that the sentencing powers available in no way 
match the seriousness of some of the forms of sexual abuse which are currently 
classified as indecent assault. Edwards, for example, says that the presumption is that 
indecent assault is trivial in consequence and so the forcible insertion of broom-
has yet to be removed from the legal definition of rape even though the exemption has been abolished 
here also.
672 LeGrand (1973), p 941.
67’ In the Republic of Ireland, section 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 provides 
that rape encompasses penetration of the vagina or mouth by the penis, or penetration of the vagina by 
any object held or manipulated by another person.
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handles, knives, bottles into the anus or vagina of women, as an indecent assault, has 
been rendered less serious than rape. Hence, it is argued that the definition of rape 
ought to be widened to cover these other serious forms of sexual violence.
Penile penetration of the anus or vagina attracts the most punitive response because it 
is considered to be the ultimate sexual violation. However, it must be asked just 
whose perspective this represents? From the point of view of those who have actually 
suffered the particular assault, is an act of forcible penetration by a bottle, for 
example, really less serious than forcible penetration by the accused's penis? Lees 
found that, in fact, many women find these other forms of sexual coercion to be just 
as humiliating as penile penetration.678 There is also the increased likelihood of injury 
where the victim is penetrated by an inanimate object. Nevertheless, the law 
continues to view penile penetration as the worst form of sexual abuse. In this way, it 
fails to take properly into account the experience and perspective of the actual victims 
of sexual crime. The fact that anal penetration was not incorporated into the 
definition of rape until 1994 may be seen as a further indication of this. Indeed, it 
might be said that this change came about more in response to the growing problem of 
male rape than out of acknowledgment of the gravity of such an act from the 
perspective of female victims.679
It is suggested that the legal definition of rape reflects male perspectives for it is men 
who believe that the ultimate sexual violation of a woman is penetration by the male 
sexual organ.680 In this regard, Selfe and Burke argue that the definition of rape is a 
product of the “male-fixated view of rape as being restricted to one form of 
intercourse”.681 The substantive law of rape is based, therefore, not on the experience 
and feelings of the actual victims of this crime, but on male perceptions of what 
constitutes the maximum sexual violation of women. Therefore, as Los argues, the
677 Edwards (1996), p 323.
678 Lees (1996), pxvi.
679 The number of reported cases of coercive buggery of males rose from 516 in 1982 to 1255 in 1992 
and indecent assault on males rose from 2082 to 3119 cases {The Times, 12/7/94). According to 
Gillespie, Home Office figures for 1984-1989 indicate that offences of buggery increased by ninety per 
cent and indecent assault of boys by twenty-four per cent (1996, p 152).
680 Los (1990), p 162.
681 Selfe and Burke (1998), p 62.
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normative message from the law of rape is that “women’s sexuality is complementary 
to and defined by men’s sexuality”.682
Going further, the restriction of rape to an act of penile penetration evinces not only 
male perspectives, but also male interests. As explained, the criminalisation of rape 
came about in order to protect male property rights. Thus, women were conceived of 
as belonging to men and their ‘value’ in this regard was linked inextricably to their 
chastity. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that very early rape laws sanctioned 
only the rape of virgins.683 Therefore, in 1244, Thurkleby J disallowed a widow’s 
appeal of rape because “a woman can only appeal concerning rape of her virginity”.684 
Given this preoccupation with chastity, it was necessary to formulate the substantive 
law of rape in terms which would sanction the specific activity which diminished this 
sexual value - sexual intercourse (penile penetration). Los explains that this can be 
tied in with the overriding concern to protect the patriarchal basis of marriage:
[T]he possibility that a woman might conceive a child outside marriage was viewed 
as more important than her own definition of sexual violence, which could include 
forced oral sexual acts, penetration with objects and so forth.685 
The continued insistence, despite the gravity of other acts of sexual coercion against 
women, that only penile penetration can constitute the offence of rape illustrates that 
the modern law of rape functions primarily to serve male interests, that it espouses the 
view that women are property, and that it is similarly fixated with female chastity.
4.3.2 Marital Rape Exemption
Until 1992, another constituent element of the legal definition of rape was that it be 
“unlawful”. Unlawful here means outside marriage. Therefore, non-consensual 
sexual intercourse which took place within marriage could not constitute rape. 
Temkin explains that this exemption can be traced to the early law’s exclusive 
concern with the protection of virginity.686 She says that in medieval times, the 
normal presumption of the courts was that any history or implication of consent on the 
part of the woman was a valid defence to an appeal of rape.687 In this way, wives 
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husband. When, in 1275, the Statutes of Westminister ostensibly extended the law of 
rape to cover all women, not merely virgins, there was still nothing to suggest that a 
man could be liable for raping a woman with whom he had previously had consensual 
sexual intercourse.688 Further, in 1279, a defendant was acquitted of rape because “he 
was betrothed to the complainant before he lay with her”.689 Thus, betrothal appeared 
to have carried with it a presumption of consent.
The eighteenth century writings of Sir Matthew Hale may be seen to have made 
explicit the marital rape exemption. Hale took the view that a concubine could 
withdraw her consent by withdrawing from cohabitation.690 It followed from this that 
women who had prior consensual sexual relations with a man could be protected if on 
a subsequent occasion she refused consent and he raped her. However, it was Hale’s 
opinion that a wife should be treated differently and he justified the marital rape 
exemption in the following terms:
The husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for 
by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife has given up herself in this 
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.691
This statement was invoked throughout the decades to preclude the conviction of 
husbands for having forcible sex with their wives.
The twentieth century, however, saw some inroads being made into this ancient 
common law doctrine. Thus, in Clarke, a husband was found guilty of raping his wife 
where she had obtained a separation order containing a non-cohabitation clause from 
the magistrate’s court.692 However, the exemption itself was upheld and Hale’s 
rationale invoked. In addition, no suggestion was made that consent could be revoked 
otherwise than by a court order. Therefore, in Miller, the court refused to accept that 
by petitioning for divorce a wife had revoked her consent.693 It was held that “an act 
of the parties or... an act of the courts” was necessary to revoke consent, and it was 
suggested that an agreement to separate, particularly if it included a non-molestation
688 Ibid, at p 44.
689 Ibid.
690 Hale (1736), pp 628,629.
691 Ibid at p 629.
692 [1949] 2 All ER 448.
693 [1954] 2 QB 282.
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clause, would suffice.694 Similarly, in O’Brien, the court held that a decree nisi of 
divorce would revoke a wife’s implied consent to marital intercourse.695 In Roberts, 
the Court of Appeal held that consent had on the facts been terminated where there 
was a formal deed of separation, even though this lacked both a non-cohabitation and 
a non-molestation clause.696
The marital rape exemption was finally revoked in 1992 by the House of Lords in /? v 
/?.697 In this case, the wife had moved out of the matrimonial home the previous 
October, and had gone to live with her parents. The defendant had broken into his 
wife’s parents’ house a month later and attacked her. He was sentenced to three years 
for attempted rape and eighteen months for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. 
This was the first case in which a husband was accused of rape where there was no 
legal separation or court order prohibiting him from molesting his wife. The Court of 
Appeal upheld the conviction and, in so doing, overturned 250 years of legal 
immunity for wife rapists.698 Lord Lane said that the decision did not create a new 
offence but “remov[ed] a common law fiction which has become anachronistic and 
offensive”.699 The House of Lords also upheld the decision and emphasised that 
Hale’s statement no longer represented the law and that the time had arrived “when 
the law should declare that a rapist remains a rapist and is subject to the criminal law, 
irrespective of his relationship with his victim”.700 This revocation of the marital rape 
immunity was integrated into statute in June 1994 when section 142 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act removed the word ‘unlawful’ from its redefinition of 
rape.
The exemption of husbands from the rape sanction illustrates again the proposition 
that rape laws were formulated and function, not for the protection of women, but to 
serve male interests. Temkin says that, given man’s greater physical strength and 
woman’s consequent vulnerability, the overriding objective of the law of rape should 
be to protect sexual choice, that is to say, a woman’s right to choose whether, when
694 Ibid, at 290.
695 [1974] 3 All ER 663 at 664.
696 [1986] CLR 188.
697 [1992] 1 AC 599.
698 Lees (1997), p 117.
699 (1991) 2 All ER 257 at 266.
700 (1991) 3 WLR 767 at 770.
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and with whom to have sexual intercourse.701 The marital rape exemption suggests, 
however, that this is not the primary objective of the law of rape. Similarly, LeGrand 
points out that if rape laws were designed to protect women, the exception would 
simply make no sense for, whilst there are “conceptual difficulties” involved in 
making rape a crime between husband and wife, if a woman suffers no less pain, 
humiliation, or fear from forcible sexual penetration by her husband than by a 
relative, a boyfriend, or a stranger, the difference is not great enough to warrant the 
total insulation of the former but not the latter from legal sanction.702 In fact, Russell’s 
research revealed that marital rape is one of the more upsetting kinds of rape.703
It is, therefore, of no benefit to women to exclude wives from the protection of the 
law of rape. The marital rape immunity does, however, clearly serve men for, in 
keeping with the perception of women as chattel, it prevents the curtailment of a 
husband’s property rights over his wife and, in turn, protects the patriarchal basis of 
marriage.704 As Brownmiller says, the idea that a husband could be prosecuted for 
raping his wife was unthinkable given that the law was conceived to protect his 
interests, not those of his wife.707 The fact that the exemption was abolished only in 
1992 illustrates that this misogynist perception of women as male property has almost 
completely survived the twentieth century. Indeed, Lees says that it continues to 
prevail for, whilst the change injudicial opinion reflected in R v R is significant, it is 
not reflected in sentencing policy.706 Rather, the vestiges of patriarchal rights lead 
judges to take the view that marital rape is less serious than rape by a stranger or
707acquaintance on the grounds that a husband has certain sexual rights over his wife.
The penile penetration element of the legal definition of rape and the marital rape 
exemption evince the present suggestion that despite being an area of almost 
exclusive female concern, it is men who dominate the law of rape and in so doing 
misconstrue and, indeed, subjugate the needs of this victim-group.
701 Temkin (1982), pp 400,401.
702 LeGrand (1973), pp 925, 926.
703 Russell (1982), pp 191, 192.
704 Los (1990), p 161.
705 Brownmiller (1976), p 380.
706 Lees (1997), p 120.
707 Ibid.
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4.4 Applying the Law of Rape
[R]ape laws are not designed, nor do they function, to protect a woman’s interest in 
physical integrity. Indeed, rather than protecting women, the rape laws might 
actually be a disability for them, since they reinforce traditional attitudes about social 
and sexual mores.708
As explained, the purpose of this present chapter is to illustrate how the dominance of 
men throughout the legal system shapes the treatment of rape victims therein. It has 
already been shown that it was in order to protect male interests that rape laws were 
conceived in the first place. In keeping with this, the substantive law of rape is 
formulated in terms which reflect male perspectives and best facilitate male 
objectives. However, nowhere is the fact that men are dominant more in evidence 
than in the interpretation and application of the law of rape. Many of the formal and 
informal practices adhered to in this regard derive from misogynist assumptions about 
women and rape. Of these, the two most influential are the interrelated ‘real’ rape and 
'lying woman' myths. The following discussion demonstrates that these myths 
underlie the arbitrary evidential rules outlined in Chapter Three above and are also 
responsible for other unacceptable practices during the processing of rape cases.
4.4.1. The Lying Woman Myth
No myth is more powerful in the tradition of rape law than the myth of the lying 
woman: the spurned lover who seeks revenge; the deflowered virgin who refuses to 
assume responsibility for her sexual activities; the vicious and spiteful woman who 
would lie about a rape charge.709
The belief that women frequently make false allegations of rape pervades the criminal 
justice system. It can be traced back to medieval times when a presumption existed 
against relying on the testimony of a woman bringing an appeal of rape. She had to 
prove that while the offence was recent she had raised the ‘hue and cry’ in 
neighbouring towns, and shown her injury and clothing to men. An alleged failure to 
do so could be raised as a defence by the appellee. The Law Commission tells us that
708 LeGrand (1973), p 919.
709 Estrich (1992), p 11.
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reference to this requirement was made as long ago as Bracton’s De Corona, circa 
1267.710 Hale provided the most succinct expression of the need to be wary of rape 
complainants:
It must be remembered that it (the allegation of rape) is an accusation easily to be 
made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho’ 
never so innocent.7"
This infamous warning evidences the dual concern that not only are false rape charges 
frequently made but they are also more likely to evade exposure than unwarranted 
accusations made in other contexts.
The previous chapter revealed that this mistrust is essentially groundless - there is no 
empirical evidence to show that false rape allegations are more prevalent than any 
other and, indeed, the greater likelihood is that false complaints are much rarer in this 
case-type.712 Nevertheless, rape victims continue to be viewed with deep distrust, 
giving rise to much of the singularity of the law of rape. A major illustration in this 
regard is the mandatory corroboration warning. This highly anomalous practice was 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter wherein it was shown to involve essentially 
a judicial invitation to the jury to accept that the majority of rape complainants are 
liars and to then decide on the facts whether the particular complainant before them 
was such a liar.714
The corroboration warning represented the law’s formal espousal of the lying woman 
myth. However, its profound influence may be seen informally also and at all stages 
of the criminal process. For example, research evidences a strong culture of mistrust 
at police level. Take the following guidelines which were issued to assist police 
officers in the ‘interrogation’ of rape complainants:
It should be borne in mind that except in the case of a very young child, the offence 
of rape is extremely unlikely to have been committed against a woman who does not 
immediately show signs of extreme violence. If a woman walks into a police station 
and complains of rape with no such signs of violence she must be closely 
interrogated. Allow her to make her statement to a policewoman and then drive a 
horse and cart through it. It is always advisable if there is any doubt of the
710 Law Commission (1990), p 88.
711 Hale (1736), p 635.
712 Chapter Three, section 3.3.
713 Berger (1977), p 10.
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truthfulness of her statement to call her an outright liar... Watch out for the girl who 
is pregnant or late getting home one night; such persons are notorious for alleging 
rape or indecent assault. Do not give her sympathy.715 
Similarly, in their Scottish study, Chambers and Millar found that the general 
orientation of police officers to be sceptical “seems to manifest itself more strongly in 
relation to sexual assault complainants”.716 They point out that training manuals used 
by the Scottish police give “repeated warnings about false complaining and place a 
major emphasis on the credibility of the complainer”.717 Chambers and Millar noted 
that an important aspect of this underlying sceptical attitude was the “unsupported 
assumption” that women make false complaints either maliciously, or to cover up for 
their “indiscretions”.718 This expectation of untruthfulness led to “a firm attitude in 
order to establish the complainant’s credibility” and was seen to “justify increased 
vigilance and scrupulousness on the part of the detectives in examining the woman’s 
story”.719 In 1999, even after the abolition of the mandatory corroboration warning, it 
seems that little has changed. Temkin found that “disbelieving and stereotypical 
attitudes about women who report rape persist”. Harris and Grace similarly report 
that police attitudes to rape have not changed significantly.721
The strength and pervasiveness of the lying woman myth evinces a major distinction 
between the treatment accorded rape and non-rape victims. That is, whilst it was 
shown in Chapter One that all victims are subject to discrediting tactics, the depiction 
of rape complainants as liars is more than just a tactic; it is a reflection of the cultural 
mistrust of this witness-group. Since this mistrust is essentially unwarranted, it must 
be asked just where has it come from and how has it acquired doctrinal status? It is 
here suggested that it is purely and simply a misogynistic creation, developed and 
perpetuated by the overwhelmingly male criminal justice profession. This can be 
seen most clearly from the corroboration warning requirement. For example, until 
1982, Canadian law expressly required that the warning be given only in the case of
714 Chapter Three, section 3.3.
715 Firth (1975).
716 Chambers and Millar (1983), p 83.
717 Ibid, at p 84.
718 Ibid, at p 94.
719 Ibid, at pp 94, 85.
720 Temkin (1999), p 38.
01 Harris and Grace (1999), pp 11-24.
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female sexual offence complainants.722 In the British context, whilst Gammon (1959) 
43 Crim App Rep 155 stipulated that the warning had to be given irrespective of 
whether the complainant was male or female, debates about the need for the warning 
and the actual warning itself were almost always expressed in terms of female 
“(un)qualities”.722’ Indeed, even in Gammon it was said:
We who have had long experience of these cases know that the evidence of a girl 
giving evidence of indecency by a man is notoriously unreliable, and you look in 
those cases for some other evidence making it more likely that her story is true. It 
does not apply nearly as much in the case of boysf*
Regardless of its form, the warning discriminated against women in practice for the 
majority of sexual offence complainants (and all rape complainants) were female.725
It is clear that the profound mistrust of sexual offence complainants is inextricably 
linked to the female gender and, in the absence of any practical justification, it is 
clearly the product of misogyny. As to why such suspicion should be generated, it is 
suggested that the answer lies again in the inherently patriarchal nature of our 
criminal justice system. That is, this environment of male supremacy may have 
resulted in an unwillingness to believe the word of a mere woman over that of a man. 
In this regard, McEwan says that a rape complaint may be perceived as “an 
inconvenient and unseemly slur” so that women should anticipate a cautious and 
sceptical reaction from the criminal justice system before it assists them.726 There is 
the further possibility that this male dominated environment has bred an inability to 
understand rape from the victim’s perspective and that this ignorance has transmuted 
into suspicion. A final suggestion is that the myth was consciously propagated to 
ensure that rape laws do not deviate too far from their original purpose as a means of 
assisting men. That is, whilst they were formulated to prevent the devaluation of 
women as male property, rape laws represent a threat to men by their obvious 
potential to sanction wholesale male sexual activity. By its proposition that rape 
complainants are as a class liars, the lying woman myth works to reduce considerably 
the effectiveness of the law of rape as a challenge to male sexual activity.
722 Boyle (1984), pp 155-157.
723 Wells (1990), p 1032; Temkin (1987), p 136.
724 (1959)43 Crim App Rep 155 at 159. (Emphasis added.)
725 Wells (1990), p 1032.
726 McEwan (1992), p 103.
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4.4.2 The ‘Real ’ Rape Myth
While the sexual offence of rape formally penalises men, it is also clear that the way 
the offence is enforced actually reinforces male rights of domination over women.
By focusing on rape as a crime committed by strangers who are deviant, the reality of 
interpersonal male violence that rape actually entails is obscured.727
The ‘real’ rape myth comprises the belief that rape occurs only according to a very 
specific set of conditions. Adler has described this ‘real’ rape as rape where the 
victim is sexually inexperienced and has a “respectable” lifestyle, whose assailant is a 
stranger and whose company she had not willingly found herself in. She will have 
been subjected to a brutal attack, fought back, been physically hurt and, afterwards, in 
a state of hysteria, promptly reported the offence.728 This set of rape circumstances is 
variously referred to as ‘real’, ‘ideal’, ‘classic’ or ‘blitz’ rape. Kelly and Radford 
describe it as the “Bad Wolf attacking Little Red Riding-Hood” scenario.727
Research reveals that the majority of rapes do not conform to this stereotype.730 The 
‘real’ rape concept is, therefore, a major fallacy. Nevertheless, it has a hugely 
influential impact on the processing of rape complaints at every stage of the criminal 
justice process.731 For example, Chambers and Millar found that it featured heavily in 
police evaluation of complainant veracity. More recently, Harris and Grace 
confirmed its heavy influence on police decision-making. Bohmer found that 
judges, too, rely on the ‘real’ rape myth in evaluating the credibility of complainants, 
referring to those who conformed to the stereotype as “genuine victims”.734 
Sentencing practices also reflect the influence of this myth.735 Juries are similarly 
influenced. Loh, for example, observed that although local community attitudes may
Lacey, Wells and Meure (1990), p 317.
728 Adler (1987), pp 119-120.
729 Kelly and Radford (1987), p 247.
730 Amir (1971); Legrand (1973); Smith (1989); Grace, Lloyd and Smith (1992); Home Office 
Research and Statistics Department (1995); Lees (1996); Harris and Grace (1999).
731 See, for example, Lee (1971); Feldman-Summers and Palmer (1980); Chambers and Millar (1983); 
Williams (1984); Adler (1987); Lloyd and Walmsley (1989); Smith (1989); Grace, Lloyd and Smith 
(1992); Gregory and Lees (1993); Harris and Grace (1999).
7,2 Chambers and Millar (1983), pp 87-89.
7” Harris and Grace (1999), pp 11-24.
734 Bohmer (1974), pp 304, 305.
7,5 See, for example, Wright (1984); Chambers and Millar (1986); Lloyd and Walmsley (1989) and 
Rook and Ward (1993).
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insist on aggressive rape prosecution, at the same time, their representatives on the 
jury tend not to convict except in the most compelling of circumstances.
Ultimately, the degree of fit between any alleged rape to the ‘ideal’ rape scenario has 
a profound effect on the chances that a complainant will see her attacker convicted.737 
In this regard, Rhode accuses the system of “a pronounced sexual schizophrenia” 
whereby one form of abuse - intercourse achieved through physical force against a 
chaste woman by a stranger - has been treated as the archetypal antisocial crime, 
attracting severe (sometimes draconian) penalties. By contrast, coercive sex that
H7.Qhas departed from this paradigm frequently has been denied or discounted. The 
‘real’ rape myth determines conviction rates in this way because complaints which do 
not conform to this stereotype are much less likely to be believed at any stage of the 
attrition process.740 In this way, the ‘real’ rape myth and that of the lying woman are 
closely interrelated. That is, the main proposition of the former is that there is only 
one kind of genuine rape situation. Therefore, women complaining of rape in other 
circumstances must be telling lies. Put another way, the presumption involved in the 
lying woman myth that rape complainants are liars tends only to be rebutted if the 
particular case fits the ‘real’ rape scenario. And, because only the minority of rape 
complaints so conform, the majority of rape complainants are seen to be lying. All in 
all, Berger says, it is small wonder that the law in this area has taken its highly 
singular turns, transmuting the system’s presumption of innocence from a procedural 
protection into a virtual immunity from conviction.741
As explained, the ‘real’ rape scenario accounts for only the minority of rapes. 
Therefore, it must be asked just why it is so heavily relied upon in the processing of 
rape complaints? Returning to the historical origin of the law of rape as an offence
736 Loh (1980), p 581.
See also the large body of research which reveals the negative reaction of juries to complainants who 
do not conform to the sexually ‘respectable’ rape victim ideal, for example, Kalven and Zeisel (1966); 
Catton (1975); Bordiga and White (1978); La Free, Reskin and Vischer (1985); Adler (1987) and 
Brown, Burman and Jamieson (1993).
737 Adler (1987), pp 119, 120. (In Adler’s study only thirty-three per cent of incidents not matching the 
real rape stereotype resulted in conviction compared with seventy-two per cent of those incidents that 
did.)
738 Rhode (1989), p 245.
739 Ibid.
740 It also works by enabling defence counsel to depict the complainant as blameable (see Chapter One, 
section 1.2.1.2).
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designed to protect male property interests, the failure of the criminal justice system 
to assist rape victims not conforming to the ‘ideal’ victim stereotype can perhaps 
partially be explained. Since women’s value to men arose historically from their 
chastity, unchaste women were of significantly less value. Therefore, the defilement 
of an unchaste woman merited little or no retribution. In its implicit proposition that 
only ‘respectable’ women are ‘rapeable’, the ‘real’ rape myth supports this 
perception. And, even though contemporary social mores dictate that very few 
women today are ‘chaste’ in accordance with this antiquated view, the continued 
reliance on the ‘real’ rape myth indicates that the perception that unchaste women are 
of lesser value still permeates the culture of the legal system.
Further, by demonising the rape of virginal women by sexual psychopaths, the ‘real’ 
rape myth ensures that the law of rape does not depart from its original role as a 
means of assisting men. That is, whilst they were formulated to protect male property 
rights, rape laws represent a threat to men by their obvious potential to sanction their 
sexual behaviour. This is because the legal definition of rape does not stipulate that 
the victim must be a virgin or that the offender a sex-crazed psychopath. Rather, the 
substantive law of rape has really quite a broad latitude for finding men guilty. This 
is as it should be for, in contrast with the ‘real’ rape stereotype, the real “locus of 
violence against women rests squarely in the middle of what our culture defines as 
‘normal’ interaction between men and women”.742 However, to acknowledge this 
would be to leave all men open to the law’s curtailment and this would, of course, run 
counter to the implicit purpose of the rape sanction - the protection of male interests. 
Therefore, in order to ensure that rape laws do not enable majority male interests to be 
displaced in favour of those of the crime’s actual victims, the ‘real’ rape myth, with 
its insistence on the least occurring rape scenario as being the only genuine rape, is 
propagated. The fact that the system continues to rely heavily on this myth at all 
stages of the process despite its proven inaccuracy, supports this assertion that it is a 
misrepresentation which has been purposefully introduced and perpetuated by those in 
authority in order to prevent the wholesale sanctioning of male sexual activity.
741 Berger (1977), p 22.
742 Johnson (1980), p 146.
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The ‘real’ rape and Tying woman’ myths are inexorably intertwined. These and other 
misogynist beliefs form the backbone of the law of rape, influencing both formally 
and informally the treatment of rape complainants at every stage of the criminal 
process. Ultimately, they reduce considerably its effectiveness as a potential sanction 
on the sexual abuse of women. This can be seen most clearly by examining their 
influence on the determination of the consent issue.
4.5 Consent
Legal standards reflect male views and judgements on male interaction; when female 
actors become involved, these male standards are used to judge the conduct of 
women... The law of rape particularly demonstrates the phenomenon of judging 
circumstances by male standards.74’
Rape is a unique crime. It comprises an act which is perfectly legal per se but which 
is made criminal because of the state of mind of the parties to it. That is, in order to 
prove rape, the prosecution must show that the accused had sexual intercourse with 
the complainant and that this intercourse took place without her consent. Further, it 
must be shown that the accused knew or suspected that she was not consenting.744 
The defendant’s honest, even if unreasonable, belief that she was consenting will 
constitute a defence.745
Consent is, therefore, a crucial element of the offence of rape and it is raised as a 
defence in the majority of contested rape cases.746 However, the way in which this 
issue comes to be determined underscores the dominance of masculine ideology 
within the law of rape. This is because it is male attitudes towards women, sex and 
rape which determine whether or not a particular complainant consented. Basically, 
an incident is rape only if men perceive it as such.747 Otherwise, it is normal 
consensual intercourse. This makes a nonsense of the consent element for whilst the 
criminality of rape centres around the non-consent of the victim, it is precisely her 
experience which is disqualified. The ways in which misogynist ideology displaces
743 Murphy (1992), pp 277, 278.
744 Satnam (1983) 78 Crim App Rep 147 clarified the point that objective recklessness on the part of the 
defendant will not satisfy the mem rea of rape.
745 Morgan [1975] 2 All ER 347.
746 McNamara (1981), p 27, note 11.
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the rape victim’s experience in determining the subjective issue of consent will now 
be examined.
4.5.1 The ‘Real' Rape Myth
When the relationship, degree of intimacy, and interaction between victim and 
assailant are raised as relevant issues in courtroom cross-examination, determining 
consent from non-consent is interpreted from patriarchal standards. When this 
happens, the female’s experience of violation is disqualified, since male hegemonic 
ideology is institutionalised or built into the very structure of the legal system and the 
law.748
Whilst it was shown in Chapter One that all complainants stand to be contrasted with 
an ‘ideal’ victim stereotype, the ‘real’ rape myth may be seen to set rape cases quite 
apart. This is because it is a much more powerful stereotype and this is evidenced by 
the fact that aspects of it are formally incorporated into the law of rape. The 
‘independent observation’ rule is one indication of this, the doctrine of recent 
complaint another.749 Ultimately, the ‘real’ rape myth is used as an official blueprint 
for determining whether a particular complainant consented or not - if its various 
ingredients are absent, an incident is likely to be classified, not as rape, but as 
consensual sexual intercourse.
4.5.1.1 Injury
The legal definition of rape stipulates only that there be lack of consent. It does not 
require the offender to have used force on the complainant or to have threatened such. 
In Olugboja, the Court of Appeal emphasised that neither force nor the threat of it is 
necessary to prove lack of consent.750 Nor, it was held, is mere submission to be 
equated with consent - consent involves submission, but submission does not 
necessarily involve consent.
Despite the substantive law’s clear position on this issue, the ‘real’ rape myth has 
caused a concept of ‘force’, over and above the coercion implicit in the act of rape
747 MacKinnon (1989), p 180.
748 Matoesian (1993), p 16.
740 See sections 4.5.1.3. and 4.5.1.4 below.
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itself, to be injected informally into the offence. This is because the ‘real’ rape myth 
presupposes that all rapists are psychopaths who carry out frenzied and brutal attacks 
which indubitably leave their victims visibly injured. It also presumes that women 
cannot be made to have sexual intercourse against their will unless extreme force is 
used. In this way, the presence or absence of injury is highly influential in 
determining whether or not the complainant consented. Chambers and Millar, for 
example, found that most complainants in their study were examined and cross- 
examined in detail about the extent of the injuries which they suffered.751 They found 
that prosecutors were keen to introduce evidence of injury in order to show lack of 
consent and from the defence’s point of view, lack of visible injuries were certainly 
taken as indicative of consent. Lees similarly found that “judge and counsel almost 
always demand physical evidence of force or violence if they are to convict”.753
Using injury as a means of determining consent may well be of benefit to those 
victims who have suffered such. However, many victims do not suffer visible injury. 
This does not mean that they have not been raped. Using injury as a determinant of 
the consent issue reflects not the experience of rape victims but, rather, male 
perceptions of this crime. First of all, men believe that ‘real’ rapists are psychopathic 
and brutal. The reality, on the other hand, is that rapists are generally ‘normal’ men. 
Secondly, men believe that rape can only be achieved through force. Again, the 
reality is quite different with offenders using other forms of coercion to achieve their 
objective. As Atkins and Hoggett explain, force is a male threat which men fear; 
there are many other less explicit ways in which men can cause women to fear 
them.754
4.5.1.2. Resistance
The substantive law of rape does not require the victim to have resisted her attacker. 
However, once again, the ‘real’ rape myth may be seen to have put a “gloss” on the 
non-consent element, shifting the focus from the woman’s subjective state of mind, as
750 [1982] QB 320.
751 Chambers and Millar (1986), p 96.
752 Ibid, at p 97.
753 Lees (1989a), p 10.
7,4 Atkins and Hoggett (1984), p 69.
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affected by the man’s actions, to her behaviour in response. ' Chambers and Millar, 
for example, found that it was sometimes implied that a ‘real’ victim would have 
resisted fully even if this meant being badly injured or that she should have tried to 
escape from her attacker rather than suffer the dishonour of a sexual attack.756 They 
report that the women in their study were asked whether they had shouted or 
screamed at the time of the attack. In fact, they were questioned on the precise details 
of what they had screamed.757 Defence counsel tried in this way to distinguish 
between screaming/crying in order to repel the attacker or to call for help and 
screaming/crying as the result of embarrassment at being discovered engaging in 
consensual sex.758 Similarly, they report that it was suggested that the 
screaming/crying was part of a cover-up to explain the situation to others.759 In this 
way, victims are put in a double bind - lack of verbal resistance is used to show 
consent whilst the presence of verbal resistance may be used to feed into the myth that 
women make false allegations for reasons such as shame and regret at having 
indulged in consensual sex.
With regard to physical resistance, Chambers and Millar found that complainants
were questioned more on what they had not done than on what they had done.760
Thus, where the complainant had failed to offer any resistance, even where there were
1apparently understandable reasons, she was cross-examined in depth about this. 
Chambers and Millar report that the defence made much of this in order to convince 
the jury that the woman had in fact consented. Even when the complainant had 
offered physical resistance, the defence often attempted to suggest that she had not 
resisted sufficiently to convince the attacker of her lack of consent.763 Alternatively, 
her actions were often belittled by suggestions that a different method of resistance 
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The resistance requirement evidences once again the displacement of the victim’s 
experience of rape by how men perceive this crime. It ignores the fact that many 
women are too frightened to do anything other than submit to the rape. As Lees 
points out, brutal sex murders do occur and provoke massive media coverage. 
Therefore, a woman’s fear for her life, or of being seriously injured, is not 
unreasonable.765 Moreover, where victims do physically resist, they are much more 
likely to sustain serious injuries. In fact, to physically resist is incompatible with 
advice given to women by police forces in the US. That advice, which is 
substantiated by research on sex offences, is that passive resistance and attempts to 
appeal to or reason with the assailant are probably safer and as effective as counter 
attacks which may provoke further violence.766 Rhode states that the resistance 
requirement places women in “a perverse dilemma” for they are practically required 
by the law to struggle with their attacker despite the fact that in so doing they are 
more likely to suffer physical injury or even death.767
It is only in the context of rape that victims are required to resist their attacker. By 
contrast, Berger explains, in a crime like robbery, also a “non-consensual and forcible 
version of an ordinary human interaction,” the law imposes no burden of opposition: 
it simply inquires whether the accused took something from another person by 
violence or intimidation.768 Yurchesyn et al similarly remark that, whilst robbery 
victims are told by others that they did the right thing to avoid injury by not resisting, 
women who are sexually assaulted face both the social and legal expectation that they 
should have resisted to the point of risking injury.769 Thus, rape victims are required 
to satisfy a much stricter burden of proof than any other type of victim.
4.5.1.3 The Hysterical Complainant
According to the ‘real’ rape myth, a genuine rape victim will be in extreme, visible 
distress after the attack. This element of the ‘real’ rape concept has been formally 
incorporated into the law of rape by the ‘independent observation’ rule which 
provides that where a complainant’s distress has been independently observed and
765 Lees (1989a), p 11.
766 Howard League (1984).
767 Rhode (1989), p 247.
768 Berger (1977), p 8.
769 Yurchesyn, Keith and Renner (1992), p 82.
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appears to the court to have been genuine and unfeigned, it may amount to 
corroboration of her evidence.770 This rule deviates from the normal position on 
corroboration which is that for evidence to be properly corroborative it must be 
independent of the source requiring to be corroborated.771 Whilst sexual offence 
complainants appear in this way to have an advantage over other witnesses, the fact is 
that the independent observation rule operates simply to rebut the usual inference of 
untruthfulness in rape cases.
Distress not independently observed cannot serve as corroboration. In Redpath, Lord 
Parker CJ explained that where the distress is, for example, no more than part and 
parcel of a recent complaint made by a girl to her mother, the jury should be directed 
to attach little or no weight to it.772 This is simply in keeping with the general rule that 
for evidence to be properly corroborative, it must be independent of the source 
requiring to be corroborated. However, it seems that in explaining to juries why this 
type of distress may not amount to corroboration, judges are casting a different slant 
on the matter. For example, in a case tried at the Old Bailey, Judge Smedley directed 
the jury as follows:
A word of warning. If the account the complainant is giving was completely
fabricated, you may think she is clever, then clever enough to act out distress.777 
Thus, the fact that the complainant’s distress could not serve as corroboration was not 
explained in the standard terms that it lacked independence but, rather, it was 
pointedly suggested that it might have been feigned. This is bound to have had a 
prejudicial impact on the jury’s reception of the complainant’s evidence as a whole, 
particularly since the corroboration warning requirement was still in force at that time.
Lees argues that the issue of distress presents a difficult paradox for rape victims for, 
whilst only independently observed distress can be corroborative of their allegation, 
lack of distress is frequently used against them to corroborate, as it were, the defence 
case.774 She observed that a “common defence tactic” is to use the complainant’s lack
770 Chauhan [1981] 73 Crim App Rep 232; ZWey [1983] CLR 168.
771 Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 at 667.
It seems that, in sexual cases, the requirement of independence is satisfied by applying it to the person 
who observes the complainant’s distress and not to the distress itself.
772 [1962] 46 Crim App Rep 319, 321. See also Knight [1966] 1 WLR 230.
77 ’ As seen in Lees (1996), p 120.
774 Ibid, at p 119.
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of visible distress to suggest that her reactions are not typical of a rape victim and 
that, therefore, she has not been raped.775 However, research has revealed that there is 
no typical reaction to having been raped - some women express anxiety and hysteria 
immediately; for others the reaction may be delayed but is nevertheless every bit as 
traumatic.776 That there is no prescribed reaction to being raped has been recognised 
by courts in the United States. There, the prosecution is permitted to introduce expert 
testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in cases where the alleged rapist suggests that 
the victim’s conduct after the incident was inconsistent with her claim of rape.777 It 
was explained in Bledsoe that the value of this type of evidence is that it may 
“disabus[e] the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, 
so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths”. Lees 
demands that British judges also take on board the findings on Rape Trauma 
Syndrome, rather than “collud[ing] with the defence counsel’s position” vis a vis 
these popular myths.779
4.5.1.4 Recent Complaint
The Teal’ rape myth further dictates that a ‘genuine’ rape victim would report her 
attack to the police immediately. Oliver Wendell Holmes J described this belief as “a 
perverted survival of the ancient requirement that a woman should make hue and cry 
as a preliminary to an appeal of rape”. Indeed, Blackstone tells us that there was a 
statute of limitations on rape cases in early times, which ran in the absence of a recent 
complaint and at one time had statutory force.781 The recent complaint doctrine 
survives in modern law where, Murphy says, it “fits uneasily into the role of 
admissible evidence”.782 In fact, it has been formally incorporated into the law of rape 
by the rule that a sexual offence complainant may give evidence that at the earliest 
reasonable opportunity she voluntarily and without prompting reported the rape to a 
third party.783 Alternatively, another witness may testify that the complainant reported 
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credibility since it indicates a consistency between her conduct and her evidence at 
the trial. Furthermore, where consent is in issue, it may be used to show that her 
conduct was not consistent with consent. However, the complaint may not be used as 
evidence that the events in question actually occurred or that the complainant’s 
allegations are true.
The recent complaint doctrine exists as an exception to the general rule excluding 
evidence of previous consistent statements.784 This gives the impression that 
something of a concession has been made to sexual offence complainants. On the 
contrary, however, the doctrine operates “to rebut the adverse inference that might 
otherwise be drawn from the victim’s failure to complain of the attack upon her”.785 
This is because rape complainants do not benefit from the presumption of truthfulness 
which exists in respect of witnesses to other crimes.786 The exception can be seen, 
therefore, to be grounded in the usual misogynist folklore surrounding rape 
complainants.787 Moreover, far from assisting rape complainants, the recent complaint 
rule often acts as an impediment to them. This is because whilst a prompt report is no 
longer a prerequisite for conviction, the absence of such is invariably used by the 
defence to suggest that the complainant was not raped but, for one reason or another, 
fabricated the charge against the accused. Adler, for example, observed that defence 
counsel may be relied upon to point out forcefully to the jury any delay in reporting.788 
Judges, too, comment adversely upon the matter in their summing-up to the jury.789 
The effect, Adler noted, was a significantly lower conviction rate in these cases.790
Using the promptness of a rape victim’s complaint to assess her veracity is based on 
typically fallacious preconceptions as to what constitutes a genuine rape victim for, as 
Chambers and Millar found, it is not an obvious or normal reaction for many rape 
victims to report to the police immediately but, rather, many women decide to tell no
784 Although they may be admitted where they are part of the res gestae or where there is an allegation 
of recent invention (McColgan (1996), p 277).
785 Tapper (1990), p 283.
786 See, particularly, Chapter Three, section 3.3 above.
787 Whilst originally confined to rape complainants, the recent complaint rule now applies in all sexual 
cases. However, where consent is not at issue, only the complainant is allowed to give evidence of the 
terms of the complaint (Wallwork (1958) 42 Crim App Rep 153).
788 Adler (1987), p 119. See, also, Chambers and Millar (1986), pp 104-105.
789 Temkin (1987), p 145; Adler (1987), p 119.
790 Adler (1987), p I 19.
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one in an attempt to try to forget what has happened to them.791 Temkin says that 
manipulation of the recent report rule reveals a total failure to understand the impact 
of the crime of rape on its victims, for many perfectly genuine rape victims do not tell 
a third party, either immediately or at all.792 There are many reasons for this. For 
example, Chambers and Millar explain that the situation is particularly difficult for 
women who know their attacker either as a friend or as a relative, since a report to the 
police and subsequent involvement in the criminal justice system could cause major 
problems within a family.793 Where the victim knows her attacker there is the further 
possibility that she is too afraid of repercussions to report the incident immediately. 
These considerations must be taken seriously given the fact that the majority of rapes 
are carried out by men known to their victims. The emphasis on the importance of 
recent complaint is, therefore, quite unjustified and it also represents yet another 
barrier to prosecution and conviction in rape cases.794
4.5.1.5 The ‘Respectable’ Complainant
Perhaps the most influential aspect of the ‘real’ rape stereotype is the sexual 
‘respectability’ or otherwise of the complainant.795 Adler, for example, found that 
ninety-four per cent of defendants charged with raping sexually ‘respectable’ women 
were convicted.796 Where the complainant’s sexual reputation had been markedly 
discredited, on the other hand, the conviction rate was only forty-eight per cent.797
It was already shown in Chapter Three that sexual history evidence is routinely 
introduced in rape trials to go to the issue of consent.798 However, also revealed in 
that chapter, was that much of such evidence bears no logical relationship to this 
issue. McColgan says that, in fact, the perceived relevance of sexual history evidence
791 Chambers and Millar (1986), p 104.
792 Temkin (1987), p 145.
79’ Chambers and Millar (1986), p 104.
794 Temkin (1987), p 146.
795 In addition to sexual respectability, Chambers and Millar found that complainants were also cross- 
examined about their general ‘bad character’ and about their living arrangements and general social 
activities in order to depict them as unrespectable (1986, pp 106-108, 111-1 13). They further observed 
that complainants were asked about contraceptive methods or about knowledge of sexual terms. This, 
they explain, was done in order to equate such knowledge with sexual experience or promiscuity (loc. 
cit. at p 109). In a similar vein, Lees found that even the act of explaining what the rapist did and how 
she responded is enough to render the complainant “unrespectable” (1989a, p 13).
796 Adler (1987), p 101.
797 Ibid.
798 Chapter Three, section 3.2.
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lies in its relationship with the ‘real’ rape myth.7'” She explains that introducing this 
type of evidence enables the defence to feed into anachronistic cultural assumptions 
about women and sex which lead, ultimately, to a shift in focus from the question of 
whether the complainant was raped, to the question of whether she is a ‘rapeable’ 
woman.800 Women who indulge in non-marital sexual activity are not considered to 
be rapeable. LeGrand explains that this notion reflects the dichotomy between the 
“good” woman, who is the sole sexual possession of one male, and the “bad” woman 
who, lacking status as a sole possession, functions as the outlet for “normal” male
O A I
promiscuity and therefore cannot be raped. By depicting the ‘ideal’ rape victim as 
sexually inexperienced, the ‘real’ rape myth supports this proposition that 
‘unrespectable’ women are not rapeable. This is, of course, completely unrealistic for 
even prostitutes are capable of being raped.
4.5.2 Reconstructing Rape
The unequal status which women possess in society results in a situation in which 
what they have to say is for many purposes discounted or reinterpreted for them. So 
it is in the context of sex. Women who expressly state that they do not consent to 
sexual intercourse may nevertheless be deemed to consent to it... To justify a 
treatment of women which denies their autonomy, resort has been had to a ragbag of 
ideas about female and male sexuality, varying from the bogus to the irrelevant and 
culled formerly from medicine and latterly from psychoanalysis.802
The reconstruction or “normalisation” of rape into consensual sexual intercourse 
demonstrates further the way in which the experience of the actual victim is overruled 
by patriarchal ideology in the course of determining the issue of consent.803 This 
reconstruction takes place by feeding into the worst excesses of misogynistic 
assumptions about heterosexual sexual relations.
McColgan (1996), p 276.
800 Ibid, at p 287.
801 LeGrand (1973), p 938.
802 Temkin (1987), p 82.
803 See, for example, Temkin (1987); Lees (1989a); Matoesian (1993); Edwards (1996); McColgan 
(1996).
144
A major assumption in this regard is that consensual intercourse incorporates a degree 
of violence and, certainly, “forcible persuasion”.804 Matoesian explains that, because 
of the convergence between law and patriarchy, the legal system “enshrines male 
predatory sexual activity as the normal model of sexuality”.805 Lees says that this 
enables violence during a sexual encounter to be somehow neutralised; it is not “real” 
violence because violence is part of sex. This means that even where the woman 
gives evidence of being violently assaulted or threatened, this does not necessarily 
preclude her consent. The defence will argue that only further violence, or her active 
resistance, is adequate proof of her non-consent.806 Similarly, Edwards explains that 
even serious injury can be reconstructed within the sexual discourse of pain and 
pleasure, of masochism and sadism, rather than within the discourse of violence, 
domination and tyranny.807
Harris and Grace found evidence of this type of reasoning in police decision-making. 
They refer to one rape complainant who alleged that, as far as the police were 
concerned, blood which was found at the scene of the incident was indicative only of 
Tough sex’ having occurred.808 At court, Chambers and Millar report that even where 
victims had suffered obvious injury, defence counsel would try to re-interpret these by 
suggesting that they had been “part of the lovemaking process”, or “an unusual form 
of sexual behaviour”.809 In one such case, the victim had been punched in the face, 
strangled, bitten on the leg and then raped in front of the accused’s car and, in another 
case, she had been punched in the face, knocked to the ground, dragged by the hair 
over waste-ground into the bushes and kicked in the head before being raped.
Judges, too, are guilty of normalising sexual abuse into ordinary sex. For example, in 
a 1977 appeal case, Mr. Justice Slynn remarked:
It does not seem to me that the appellant is a criminal in the sense in which that word 
is used frequently in these courts. Clearly he is a man who, on the night in question, 
allowed his enthusiasm for sex to overcome his normal behaviour.
804 Lees (1989a), p 10.
805 Matoesian (1993), p 17.
806 Lees (1989a), pp 10, 11.
807 Edwards (1996), p 331.
8118 Harris and Grace (1999), p 21.
809 Chambers and Millar (1986), pp 96, 97.
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The appellant’s “enthusiasm for sex” had, in fact, involved an attack on a seventeen 
year-old barmaid whom he had met previously that evening in a park. When the girl 
refused to have sex, he kept on touching her, pulled at her clothes, and put his hand up 
her vagina (he was wearing rings), not just once but several times. On one occasion 
she had passed out with the pain. He also grabbed her round the ribs, bit her nipples 
and wrenched her earrings out. The doctor who examined her said that the extreme 
swelling of the vulva would have caused extreme pain which he had only seen in 
cases of recent childbirth. Again the injury was not consistent with normal 
intercourse and a great deal of force would have been necessary. Nevertheless, the 
appellant was told that he was an “asset” to the British army and that the best thing he 
could do to make amends was to go back to his unit and continue to serve his 
country.810 His three year prison sentence was replaced by a six month suspended 
sentence.
A second major assumption is that women are ambivalent about sex. It is believed, 
for example, that they often do not mean it when they say “no”. In fact, the “no” 
means “yes” school of thought represents one of the major underpinnings of rape 
trials. Take the following comment by Judge Dean at the Central Criminal Court at 
the Old Bailey:
As gentlemen of the jury will understand, when a woman says “no” she doesn’t
always mean “no”.
Lees says that this attitude voices a common view which is used to support the 
argument that women do not share male rationality, in other words, their evidence is 
no evidence at all.8" The implication is that if women do not know whether or not 
they want sex, then rape cannot happen as their will is always confused.812 In this 
way, the concept of consent becomes irrelevant and the very definition of rape as 
sexual intercourse without consent is undermined.813 This attitude further depicts 
women as coquettish creatures who indulge in sexual games-play with men. The 
implication from this is that women want men to override their objections. Podhoretz, 
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process of courtship.814 This, he adds, is precisely what some (and probably most) 
women want men to do.815 A further implication is that, in the natural order of 
consensual sexual relations, men must assume a dominant role in order to complement 
and offset women’s coquetry.
Another aspect of woman’s alleged ambivalence about sexual matters is the argument 
that whilst the complainant withheld her consent initially, she came to enjoy the 
experience in the end. For example, in one trial observed by Adler, the trial judge 
asked the defendant “The enjoyment wiped out her initial resistance - is that what you 
are saying?”.816 Similarly, take this astonishing comment made to the press by a New 
York judge regarding a case in which a masked assailant raped a woman after 
breaking into her apartment:
As I recall [the defendant] did go into [the victim’s] apartment without permission...
1 think [the sexual intercourse] started without consent, but maybe they ended up
enjoying themselves.817
The implication from such comments is that women can want sex without even 
knowing it themselves. This effectively denies them any decisive knowledge of their 
own desire and so, once again, the concept of consent is totally undermined. It also 
portrays women as sexually capricious - they are apt to change their minds about 
whether or not they want sex at any time, even when intercourse has gotten underway. 
Men should, therefore, simply press ahead for the woman will invariably end up 
enjoying herself. Again, the consent element is negated. Another more insidious, 
implication is that women actually enjoy being raped. That is, although she did not 
want it, the complainant nevertheless enjoyed the intercourse. Lees explains that this 
dangerous proposition is facilitated by the gulf between male and female views on 
this crime.818 According to the male judicial view, the essence of rape is penetration. 
For the victim, rape is a deeply personal, humiliating and life-threatening experience 
with a much wider coercive context that simply that of the penetrative act. However, 
because men believe that it is penetration that constitutes the basis for female pleasure 
in sex, rather than being part of a wider sexual intimacy, the man can argue that the 
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it and described a terrifying experience. In this way, the rape victim’s experience is 
eclipsed by the male preoccupation with penile penetration and the question of 
whether or not she consented obscured.
4.6 Conclusion
[F]ar from being effective in controlling sexual violence against women, the law 
reinforce[s] the informal control of women and help[s] to perpetuate the ideological 
premises of the traditional gender order.820
The central proposition of this chapter is that the dominance of men throughout the 
criminal justice system is responsible for much of the arbitrary treatment accorded 
rape victims. Men formulate, interpret and apply the law. These processes are 
invariably infused with patriarchal ideology and devoid of feminine perspectives. 
Moreover, misogyny is rife for it infiltrates naturally and seamlessly into this 
masculine environment and exerts major influence therein. It is suggested that rape 
cases attract the worst excesses of this misogyny. This is because in no other type of 
case do men come under such direct challenge from women. Misogyny dictates that 
this is an untenable proposition because of men’s superiority to women. Women 
should not, therefore, be permitted to take men to task over any issue. Above all, 
women should not be permitted to challenge men’s sexual treatment of them for this 
conflicts with their status as sexual property.
The influence of misogyny on the law of rape is profound. Lees, for example, 
observed that rape trials represent “barometers of ideologies of sexual difference, of 
male dominance and woman’s inferiority”.821 Indeed, the entire law of rape is steeped 
in misogyny. This can be seen first from the fact that rape laws originated, not for the 
protection of women, but to safeguard male property. The substantive law then 
endorses this misogynist attitude by the marital rape exemption which enshrined male 
ownership of wives and the restriction of rape to an act of penile penetration which 
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is the influence of misogyny more in evidence than in the interpretation and 
implementation of the law of rape. The formal and informal practices adhered to in 
this regard reflect patriarchal ideology and its objectives. This was illustrated by an 
examination of the way in which the crucial issue of consent is determined. It was 
shown that although the central concern is to establish the victim’s state of mind, it is 
precisely her experience which is excluded - the ‘real’ rape myth disqualifies the 
experience of those victims whose rape does not fulfil this archetype; the 
reconstruction of rape into consensual sex disqualifies the experience of those victims 
whose rape does match it. In this way, the consent element is reduced to an absurdity 
and only the minority of complainants succeed in convincing the courts that the 
defendant had sexual intercourse with them against their will. Ultimately, Matoesian 
argues, by failing to take into account the female’s experience of violation, the law 
and the judicial system institutionalise a decriminalised position on rape.822
Chapters One and Two of this thesis revealed the extent to which the structural 
features of our criminal justice system shape the rape victim’s trial experience. This 
present chapter has shown that cultural factors also contribute significantly to their 
treatment at court. Therefore, a complete understanding of why rape victims are 
treated so objectionably has been achieved. In the following chapter, this 
understanding will be channelled into formulating suggestions which will bring 
maximum improvement to this area of the law.





We must seize the legal system and turn it upside-down to shake out the fear, 
cowardice and hypocrisy.82.
Rape victims clearly undergo a considerable ordeal when they embark upon the 
criminal justice process - in addition to the difficulties which they experience 
alongside victims generally, they are subject to further, highly singular abuses. The 
central objective of this thesis is to determine how this ordeal might be alleviated so 
that this victim-group can, at last, have proper access to justice. The previous 
chapters have provided the background information necessary to achieving this 
objective. Thus, those aspects of the rape victim’s treatment which must be addressed 
as a priority were outlined. Moreover, a critical insight into the factors responsible 
for this treatment was provided.822 Drawing on this information, this present chapter 
puts forward a number of proposals which, it is suggested, will bring about the 
improvement required. These proposals address not only the problems singular to 
rape victims but also those which are incumbent upon victims as a whole. In this 
way, it is intended to provide an holistic approach to reform, guaranteeing better 
treatment of both rape and non-rape victims in all major respects.
5.2 Rape Victims
Chapter Three of this thesis revealed that on top of the difficulties which are common 
to victims as a whole, rape victims are subject to further maltreatment which sets 
them quite apart. It was shown that this singular treatment exacerbates this victim- 
group’s trial ordeal and, moreover, greatly inhibits conviction rates for the crime of 
rape. Chapter Four then demonstrated that this differential treatment derives from the 
misogynist culture of our criminal justice system. This section aims to examine the 
ways in which the arbitrary treatment of rape victims might be brought to an end.
823 Johnson (1986), p 177.
824 Chapters One and Three.
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Following from Chapter Four’s critical findings, it is proposed that the key to this lies 
in eradicating the negative attitudes which surround the law of rape.
In the event, the legislature has very recently grasped the nettle of rape law reform. 
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 proposes to newly regulate the
admissibility of sexual history evidence, that feature of the rape trial which causes
826complainants the most distress and results in greatest prejudice to their case. 
Therefore, it is convenient to begin this discussion on reform by examining this new 
legislation in order to determine whether it really will resolve this most contentious 
aspect of the law of rape.
5.2.1 Evidential Law Reform
Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 came into force in 
April 2000, repealing section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. The 
question now is whether this latest measure will fare any better than the ill-fated 
section 2 in regulating the admission of sexual history evidence. Under section 2, the 
gravamen of the problem was that far too much irrelevant sexual history evidence 
made its way into the courtroom, having been admitted on the basis of the crude 
assumptions that sexually active women are prone to lying and that they consent 
indiscriminately. If section 41 is to bring about the required relief, it must be able to 
ensure, as far as possible, that only such sexual history evidence as is properly 
relevant is admitted. In this way, the adduction of this type of evidence will be 
dramatically reduced but without simultaneously jeopardising the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial.X27
The format of any rape shield legislation plays a critical part in its success. Section 2 
simply stated that other than where there is evidence of a previous sexual relationship
825 Chapters Two and Four.
826 Chapter Three, section 3.2.
827 This right requires that the defendant be permitted to adduce all evidence relevant to his defence. 
On occasion, a complainant’s sexual history may be so relevant (Home Office (1998), para 9.67, p 69). 
Therefore, an outright prohibition of this type of evidence would clearly interfere with the defence case 
and, as such, is to be avoided. Permitting the adduction of such sexual history evidence as is relevant 
presents, on the other hand, no challenge to the legitimate running of the defendant’s case. In this 
regard, Eisenbud argues that if the proponents of rape shield laws “prove - not merely assert” that the 
evidence the statutes bar is not relevant to the issues in the trial, they will not deny defendants any 
protected right (1975, pp 407, 408).
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with the defendant, sexual history evidence should not be admitted save where it 
would be unfair to the defendant to exclude it. The decision as to unfairness was 
made by the trial judge. It can be seen, then, that section 2 granted the judiciary an 
almost unfettered discretion as to when to admit sexual history evidence. It is widely 
accepted that this is what undermined section 2’s usefulness for, clearly, the judiciary 
espouses the spurious notions of relevancy which section 2 was enacted, in the first
O') o
place, to counteract. The role of the judiciary in undermining section 2 was 
recognised by the Home Office in its Speaking Up For Justice report, the precursor to 
the 1999 Act. In considering how the issue of sexual history evidence might best 
be resolved, it was expressly stated that a mere Practice Direction would not be 
enough to bring judicial practice into line with the objective of section 2.830 This 
recognises that the erroneous assumptions about what is relevant in this context are 
too deeply ingrained among the judiciary to be addressed by mere guidelines. 
Consequently, it was recommended that only legislative reform which curtailed 
judicial discretion by delineating when sexual history evidence is properly admissible, 
would suffice.8’1
Following from this, section 41 adopts the ‘category’ approach favoured in many 
jurisdictions. That is, it prohibits the admission of evidence of “any sexual 
behaviour” save where it comes within one of a number of pre-defined categories. 
These are laid out in subsections (3) and (5) which, on their face, are quite restrictive. 
Section 41(3) allows sexual history evidence to be introduced if the court is satisfied 
that it “relates to a relevant issue in the trial”.832 Where, however, this “relevant issue” 
is consent, specific restrictions apply and these are contained in subsections (3)(b) and
828 See, for example, Temkin (1993); Lees (1996).
829 Home Office (1998).
8,0 Ibid, at para 9.65, p 69.
831 Ibid, at p 175 and Recommendation 63, para 9.72, p 69.
8j2 Section 42(1 )(a) explains that “relevant issue in the case” means any issue falling to be proved by 
the prosecution or defence. The “relevant issues” in most rape trials will be (i) whether intercourse 
occurred; (ii) whether the accused was the actor; (iii) whether the complainant consented; and (iv) 
where the complainant did not consent, whether the accused knew or suspected this. It is unlikely, 
however, that a complainant’s prior sexual behaviour will bear any legitimate relationship to whether 
or not intercourse took place (however, compare De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 at 292 wherein it was 
said that previous sexual episodes might be indirectly relevant in this regard). With regard to the issue 
of identification, the complainant’s sexual history will again have only limited usage for DNA testing 
has the effect that the defendant’s responsibility (or lack thereof) for a particular result will often be 
established independently of the adduction of evidence of the complainant’s other sexual activity 
(McColgan (1996), p 288, note 67). Consequently, it can be expected that, as with section 2 of the
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(c). Section 41(5) then permits sexual history evidence to be admitted for the purpose 
of rebutting any evidence adduced by the prosecution about any sexual behaviour of 
the complainant. This subsection explicitly states that any information adduced in 
this regard is to go no further than is necessary for rebuttal.
Will section 41’s structured approach ensure that only properly relevant sexual history 
evidence is admitted? Promisingly, section 41(4) explicitly rejects the spurious notion 
that sexually active women are prone to untruthfulness, stipulating that sexual history 
evidence shall not be regarded as relating to a “relevant issue” in the trial if it appears 
to the court to be reasonable to assume that the purpose (or main purpose) for which it 
would be adduced or asked is to establish or elicit material for impugning the 
credibility of the complainant as a witness. In addition, section 41(1) provides that 
evidence pertaining to the complainant’s sexual conduct with the defendant will be 
regulated in the same way as evidence pertaining to her behaviour with third parties. 
In this way, section 41 may be seen to reject the presumption of relevance which has 
existed to date in the former context, whatever the circumstances. Finally, section 
41(6) stipulates that any evidence to be adduced must relate to a specific instance (or 
instances) of alleged sexual behaviour. This should help prevent the admission of 
speculative sexual history evidence and sexual reputation evidence, both of which 
tend to be much more prejudicial than probative. However, with regard to the issue 
of consent, it is suggested that section 41 will not preclude sufficiently the adduction 
of sexual history evidence on the basis of the crude assumption that sexually active 
women consent indiscriminately.
Section 41 proposes to restrict the use of sexual history evidence for the purpose of 
showing consent by specifying exactly when such evidence may be introduced. Thus,
1976 Act, section 41(3) will be invoked mainly to go to the issue of consent (both the question of 
whether the complainant consented and the defendant’s belief in this regard).
833 Section 2, on the other hand, placed no qualification whatsoever on the specific nature of admissible 
sexual history evidence. Consequently, there was nothing to prevent information about a 
complainant’s sexual history being introduced without any “hard evidence” (McColgan (1996), p 301). 
Thus, Adler observed that suggestions that the complainant was a prostitute were frequently made 
without any evidentiary basis whatsoever (1985, p 778). Brown, Burman and Jamieson similarly found 
that suggestions of prostitution would casually be thrown at complainants (1993, pp 135-163). As to 
sexual reputation evidence, Woods describes the “standard-type” defence in New South Wales prior to 
the outright prohibition of this type of evidence as being for the accused to make an unsworn statement 
from the dock alleging his belief that the complainant was promiscuous, that she slept with virtually 
anyone and was reputed to be a ‘slut’ or a ‘lowey’ (1981, p 4).
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subsection (3)(b) allows sexual history evidence to be introduced where it “relates to” 
sexual behaviour which took place “at or about the same time as” the incident in 
question. Subsection (3)(c) then provides that it may be admitted where it “relates to” 
sexual behaviour which is “so similar in any respect”, to any sexual behaviour which 
took place “as part of the incident in question” or, “at or about the same time as” this 
incident but is not part of the charge, “that the similarity cannot reasonably be 
explained as a coincidence”.
Under subsection (3)(b), it seems that the relevancy of the complainant’s sexual 
behaviour is predicated merely by its proximity to the incident in question. This is 
surely dubious as a general proposition. Take, for example, where the evidence in 
question concerns the complainant’s sexual behaviour with a third party. Much of the 
criticism surrounding the operation of section 2 has been the tendency of the courts to 
admit almost indiscriminately the complainant’s sexual history with third parties. The 
objection to this is that a complainant’s sexual behaviour with one party is rarely 
properly relevant to whether or not she consented to intercourse with another but is 
admitted, instead, on the crude assumption that women who go willingly with one 
man will behave similarly with all others. The question is whether the proximity of 
the sexual behaviour to be adduced increases its legal relevance. It is suggested that 
even very proximate sexual behaviour with a third party will not necessarily be 
properly relevant to the issue of consent. Therefore, whilst the requirement of 
proximity will prevent the defence from delving into the complainant’s wider sexual 
past, it is, nonetheless, insufficiently stringent to prevent the adduction of irrelevant 
and highly damaging sexual history evidence.
This problem is compounded by the legislature’s choice of the term “sexual 
behaviour”. The word ‘behaviour’ is clearly open to very wide construction and, 
falling to be interpreted by a patriarchal and misogynist judiciary, it may well be 
taken to include behaviour which is scarcely sexual. It is suggested that if the term 
“sexual behaviour” comes to be interpreted in such a loose manner, then this will 
increase subsection (3)(b)’s latitude for introducing irrelevant but highly prejudicial 
material. For example, it is possible that a complainant who was kissing a third party 
may have this information used against her to show that she consented to intercourse 
with the defendant half an hour later. The point is that it is one thing to kiss someone
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but quite another to have sexual intercourse with him or her or, further, a third party. 
In addition, the problems typically encountered by ‘acquaintance’ and ‘date-rape’ 
complainants who are deemed to have consented by simple virtue of their 
relationship, however limited, with the defendant prior to the incident in question,
834may be greatly compounded by misuse of subsection (3)(b).
Certainly, there may be occasions when the complainant’s proximate sexual conduct 
is properly relevant to the issue of whether or not she consented to the intercourse in 
question, perhaps where this conduct is overtly sexual and involves the defendant 
himself. Therefore, defendants should not find themselves precluded outright from 
introducing such information. However, subsection (3)(b) is simply too flabby, 
providing the defence with considerable opportunity to go beyond the requirements of 
relevancy. It is suggested that the New South Wales’ approach is far preferable. 
There, contemporaneity alone will not guarantee admissibility - the sexual behaviour
in question must also “form part of a connected set of circumstances in which the
835alleged prescribed sexual offence was committed”.
Under subsection (3)(c), whether or not a complainant’s sexual past is admitted to go 
to the issue of consent depends upon its similarity in any respect to the sexual 
behaviour of the complainant which took place as part of the event in question, or, at 
or about the same time as that event. This similarity must be of such a degree that it 
cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. Unlike subsection (3)(b), this 
provision enables the defence to probe the complainant’s wider sexual past. The first 
limb of subsection (3)(c) is similar to the Heilbron recommendation that the 
complainant’s sexual history should be allowed in where it concerns previous 
incidents of a strikingly similar nature to the incident in question and which are so 
highly relevant that it would be unfair to exclude them. Vera Baird, author of Rape 
in Court, argues that this approach is “extremely flawed” because “it gives a 
defendant who knows about a particular sexual encounter the woman may have had.
834 See, for example, Grace, Lloyd and Smith (1992) and Harris and Grace (1999) for an indication of 
the impact which the relationship between complainant and accused have on the attrition of the rape 
offence.
835 The Crimes Act 1900, section 409B(3)(a). (Emphasis added.)
836 Heilbron Committee (1975), para 137.
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the opportunity to do something similar and blame her for his approach”. The 
second limb of subsection (3)(c) goes further and permits evidence of sexual 
behaviour also where it is similar to behaviour which took place at or about the same 
time as that event. As pointed out, sexual behaviour will not necessarily be relevant 
simply because of its contemporaneity with the alleged rape. Therefore, to deem the 
complainant’s more remote sexual past relevant because of its similarity with events 
proximate to the alleged rape could have the effect of enabling irrelevant material to 
be adduced on the basis that it is similar to other irrelevant material! Baird concludes 
that subsection (3)(c) “will just be abused, with defence counsel arguing her past
OTO
proves she likes it in a particular way”.
It is suggested that subsection (3)(c) would have provided adequate protection for 
defendants if it had not gone beyond the Heilbron formulation. Alternatively, its 
second limb could have been more restrictive. For example, instead of its current 
formulation, it could have provided that the evidence to be adduced had to be 
strikingly similar to the complainant’s sexual behaviour at or about the same time as 
the incident in question, which behaviour “forms part of a connected set of 
circumstances in which the alleged prescribed sexual offence was committed”. 
Further, the clause “in any respect” should have been excluded or made to read “in 
any material respect”. This is because, as it stands, the past sexual behaviour of a 
complainant may satisfy the striking similarity test and so be admitted on the basis of 
one superficial similarity even though it is disparate in all other major respects from 
her behaviour during or, at or about the same time as, the event in question.
The other purpose for which sexual history evidence may be admitted under the new 
legislation is in order to rebut any evidence adduced by the prosecution about any 
sexual behaviour of the complainant.839 Section 41(5) explicitly states that any 
information adduced in this regard is to go no further than is necessary for rebuttal. 
An example may be where the prosecution asserts that the complainant is a virgin and 
there is evidence that she is not. The normal rules of evidence would allow her to be 
cross-examined upon that assertion for the purposes of challenging her credibility.
14,7 See Langdon-Down (2000).
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However, as McColgan explains, such a challenge does not rest on any link between 
truthfulness and chastity per se but depends, rather, upon the general view of 
credibility as indivisible - if a witness can be shown to have lied about any particular 
fact, her testimony in relation to the matters at issue is less worthy of belief.840 
Credibility is a collateral issue so that, generally speaking, rebuttal evidence cannot be 
led once the witness has answered the challenge as to the truth of his or her evidence. 
However, if the prosecution rely on sexual history evidence to suggest non-consent, 
the normal rules mean that this evidence would be subject to rebuttal evidence.
Therefore, on its face, subsection (5) is quite unobjectionable. However, the danger is 
that evidence will be admitted in cases where the prosecution has not in fact made any 
assertion relating to the complainant’s sexual behaviour or lack thereof, but where it is 
alleged that the prosecution case rests in part upon an implied assertion about that 
sexual behaviour.841 For example, according to McColgan, any young complainant in 
England and Wales is invariably taken impliedly to represent her virginity. She 
cites SMS [1992] CLR 310 as an example. There, the Court of Appeal accepted that 
evidence of alleged sexual activity on the part of the fourteen year old complainant 
should have been admitted to counter the assumption which would, allegedly, 
otherwise have been made by jurors that she was a virgin. Therefore, if section 41 
is to protect complainants from the introduction of irrelevant sexual history evidence, 
subsection (5) must not permit rebuttal evidence unless the prosecution have made 
explicit claims about the complainant’s sexual behaviour.844 McColgan suggests that 
if it appears to the defence that the prosecution is making an implication about the 
complainant’s sexual behaviour then a voir dire should be held to establish whether 
this is, in fact, part of the prosecution case. If it is, then the prosecution should be 
required to make the claim explicitly which would, in turn, entitle the defence to lead
845sexual history evidence in rebuttal.
8 ,9 This is similar to the second of the Heilbron Committee’s recommended exceptions to a general rule 
of exclusion of sexual history evidence ( 1975, para 138).









Ultimately, although much more restrictive than section 2, section 41 leaves too many 
loopholes. Given the centrality of sexual history evidence to the defence’s key 
strategy of undermining the personality of the complainant, it is a certainty that these 
will be exploited at every opportunity. Unfortunately, the judiciary has shown that 
they cannot be relied on to prevent section 41 being circumvented in this way. 
However, yet more worrying is section 4Us almost complete failure to restrict the 
introduction of sexual history evidence for the purpose of showing the defendant’s 
belief in the complainant’s consent, this being a “relevant issue in the case”.846
The defendant’s mistaken belief that the complainant consented to the intercourse 
forming the rape allegation is a valid defence. Following Morgan, whilst this belief 
must be honest, it need not also be reasonable. Consequently, it might have been 
thought that the ‘mistaken belief defence would be heavily relied upon. However,
848Lees reports that it has given rise to appeal on only two occasions since 1976. 
Jamieson explains that the only reason that it is not used more often is because 
defence counsel simply find it so easy to attack the complainant’s credibility.846 This, 
together with the spurious standards used to determine non-consent, means that
8S0complainants find it very difficult to prove that they did not consent. 
Consequently, the question of the defendant’s state of mind is generally quite 
superfluous. However, it is suggested that this state of affairs will change under 
section 41.
Despite their flaws, it is clear that subsections (3)(b) and (c) will manage to reduce the 
introduction of sexual history evidence for the purpose of showing the complainant’s 
consent. This will mean that more complainants will be able to persuade the courts of 
their non-consent. However, if this happens, defendants will rely more and more on 
the ‘mistaken belief defence and, given the prejudicial impact of sexual history 
evidence, will seek to base this defence on their knowledge of the complainant’s 
sexual conduct. Because subsection (3) places little restriction on the introduction of 
sexual history evidence for this purpose, a great deal of irrelevant material will find its
846 See section 41(3) in conjunction with section 42(b).
847 [1976] AC 182.
848 Lees (1996), p 245.
849 Jamieson (1994).
850 See Chapter Four, section 4.4.
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way into the courtroom. Moreover, because the defendant’s belief does not have to be 
reasonable, it is suggested that greater reliance on this defence will mean that 
acquittals will be granted on more spurious grounds than under section 2 as 
defendants seek to support their mistaken belief on such sexist assumptions as that a 
woman consents to sex when she accepts a lift from him, goes to his house or invites 
him to hers, accepts a drink or a dinner, etc.8'^1
Because the defendant’s belief in consent is a valid defence, it must be possible to 
support it with evidence. However, section 41 could have done much more to prevent 
this defence being abused in the context of sexual history evidence. Again, the New 
South Wales approach is preferable for it places a requirement of contemporaneity on 
the evidence to be adduced in this regard. Woods explains that this prevents the 
accused from arguing, ‘Because I heard she slept with X last month, I thought she was 
consenting to sex with me on this occasion’. Providing that he refers to a specific 
instance (or instances), then this is precisely the highly objectionable stance that 
defendants in this jurisdiction are able to take and will take more often following 
section 41.
5.2.2 Substantive Law Reform
The Home Office is reviewing the substantive law of rape and is thought to be in
or->
favour of changing the defence of belief in consent. Baird argues that one option 
would be to adopt Canadian legislation which requires the prosecution to show that 
the complainant did not consent and that the defendant did not take reasonable steps 
to ascertain this. ' One benefit of this approach is that the defendant cannot rely 
solely on a mistaken belief, reasonable or otherwise, that the complainant was 
consenting to get him off the hook - he must be able to support his belief by having 
taken reasonable steps to ascertain her consent. Consequently, this prevents him from 
“trawling through the woman’s past” in an effort to justify his actions.8:0 It is 
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problem which the ‘mistaken belief defence is likely to cause under section 41 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
Another reason for adopting the Canadian approach is that it would restore proper 
balance to rape trials. Currently, because they are fought on the basis of consent, the 
focus in the majority of rape trials is unswervingly upon the complainant - did she 
consent or did she not? Then, the methods used to determine this question centre 
around her conduct and character. Loh argues that the way in which the consent issue 
is determined is “prejudicial to and weakens prosecution”.8^1 One reason for this is 
the spurious nature of the various standards of non-consent which are used.8:17 
Another reason is that, with the complainant being served up like a “laboratory 
specimen on a microscope slide”, there is consequently much less scrutiny of the 
defendant, in terms both of his conduct immediately surrounding the specific incident
oro
in question and also his wider behaviour and character. Ultimately, this prevents 
any realistic evaluation of his guilt. In the first place, not being possessed of the full 
facts about his conduct and character, juries frequently do not have adequate 
information with which to determine properly his culpability. In the second place, 
they are distracted from this question by the profusion of damning information about 
the complainant which causes them to get caught up in adjudging her guilt and not 
his.
The Canadian approach is preferable because, by making the defendant’s conduct an 
operational indicator of the criminality of rape, the jury is formally required to give 
consideration to his culpability in the incident. This recognises that men should 
assume responsibility for their sexual conduct. Our substantive law, on the other 
hand, assists in nullifying male responsibility in this regard by its failure to formulate 
the issue of consent in bipartisan terms, that is, as one which also imposes certain 
obligations on the man prior to intercourse such as, for example, the obligation to seek 
approval and agreement. Similarly, Lees explains that the problem is that there are no 
positive legal definitions of consensual sex, so that the burden of negotiated consent is
856 Loh (1980), p 556.
857 See Chapter Three, section 3.2 and Chapter Four, section 4.4.
858 McEwan (1989), p 642. See also Lees (1989b), pp 14, 15; (1997), p 61.
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not mutually shared and instead women are held responsible for giving or denying 
sexual access.X:,g She argues that it is important to determine legally exactly where to 
draw the line between coercive sex (rape) and mutually negotiated sexual relations.860 
The distinction between the two can be made, she says, by exploring the woman’s 
experience, focusing on the negotiation leading up to the sexual encounter, and 
recognising that normal sex involves some form of mutual negotiation.861 Ultimately, 
instead of the usual one-sided enquiry into the issue of consent (involving all sorts of 
ill-judged assumptions about women, rape and sex), much more focus should be 
placed on what led the defendant to deduce that the complainant consented. 
Amending our substantive law in accordance with the Canadian model would go 
some way towards ensuring such a bilateral approach.
5.2.3 Cultural Reform
Evidentiary and substantive changes of the type previously discussed would lead to 
significant improvement within the law of rape. Section 41, whilst by no means a 
perfect legislative instrument, will reduce the introduction of irrelevant sexual history 
evidence to some extent. Reforming the substantive law to include the defendant’s 
conduct as an operational indicator of rape would lead to a greater focus on the 
defendant’s conduct and, consequently, on the question of his guilt.862 It would also 
strengthen section 41 by removing the ‘mistaken belief defence and thus preventing 
defendants from using the complainant’s sexual past as a means of justifying their 
conduct. Indeed, it could conceivably lead to a general reduction in the use of this 
type of evidence. Loh explains that if the actor’s conduct is the legal criterion, then 
evidence pertaining to the victim’s prior unchastity becomes mostly irrelevant for 
proving that element. But if the victim’s conduct is determinative, past sexual
This lack of scrutiny of the defendant in a trial for rape is, in fact, formalised within the law by the fact 
that rape cases represent the only exception to section l(f)(ii)b of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (see 
Chapter Three, section 3.4).
859 Lees (1996), p xviii.
860 Ibid, at p xix.
86' Ibid.
s<’2 Another necessary and related move would be to give section l(f)(ii)b the same application in rape 
trials as it has in all others. The Home Office recognised the need for this and proposed that where the 
defendant raises the complainant’s sexual history or criminal record, the defendant’s criminal record 
should also be introduced (1998, p 175). To effect such change would mean that juries are presented 
with a much more accurate picture of the defendant by which to adjudge his guilt or innocence. In 
addition, by putting the defendant’s own bad character or even previous convictions in the balance, 
such a move might also lead to a reduction in the current tendency to gratuitously malign the character 
of rape complainants, whether by adducing their sexual history or otherwise.
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conduct can be material.863 Consequently, he explains, the definitional standard is the 
most important conceptual issue in rape law.864
However, it is suggested that if these and any other legislative reforms within the law 
of rape are not backed up by attitudinal reform, they will be seriously undermined. 
Take section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. This measure failed 
utterly to restrict the admission of irrelevant sexual history evidence because the 
sexist attitudes of the judiciary meant that they continued to admit this evidence on 
the basis of erroneous assumptions of relevance. Consequently, section 41 is a much 
less discretionary measure, reducing considerably the freedom of judges to admit
oz: c
improper sexual history evidence. Nevertheless, research shows that attitudes 
about sexual assault and its victims permeate the implementation of even model 
legislation.866 In Michigan, for example, the legislature took the radical step of 
removing the word consent from the substantive law, adopting the “actor’s force” as 
the new standard of criminalisation.867 The move was designed to eradicate the 
spurious indicators of rape that were traditionally used. However, Loh observed that 
reliance on them has not lessened - unless there is evidence of resistance, for example, 
it is less likely that the police will investigate, prosecutors will charge, and juries will 
convict.868
The question now is how exactly are the misogynist attitudes which currently pervade 
the criminal justice system to be broken down?
863 Loh (1980), p 548.
864 Ibid.
865 In every other context, the current trend is to reject rule-based evidential reform in favour of a more 
discretionary approach. This reflects the growing trust in decision-makers. The legislature’s most 
recent response to the problem of sexual history evidence, on the other hand, indicates that there is by 
no means the same trust when it comes to the law of rape.
866 Caringella-McDonald (1985), p 80. See also Loh (1980); Polk (1985); Renner and Sahjpaul (1986); 
LaFree (1989); Los (1990); Horney and Spohn (1991).
867 Criminal Sexual Conduct Act of Michigan 1974.
The move led to the early comment that “under the new law it is clearly no longer necessary for the 
prosecution to prove non-consent” (Legislative Note (1974), p 226). In practice, however, the fact of 
consent need not be elevated to a legal standard because of its potency in point of fact at trial - even 
removing it from the substantive law will not remove it from the jury’s collective mind. Similarly, 
Temkin explains that, no matter how rape laws are restructured, the issue of consent is hard to 
circumvent, so that the temptation remains for defence counsel to seek to show that the complainant is 
the type of woman who might have consented (1987, p 162).
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5.2.2.1 Legislation
Legislative alterations represent a step in the direction of progress. In recent years, a 
number of important changes have been made. In 1992, the House of Lords upheld 
the Court of Appeal’s decision that rape can be committed within marriage. This 
ruling was given statutory effect by section 142 of the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994. In 1993, the Sexual Offences Act changed the law so that boys 
under the age of fourteen can now be charged with rape, thus repealing the hitherto 
irrebuttable presumption that a boy under this age was incapable of committing 
rape.870 In 1994, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act abolished the mandatory 
corroboration warning requirement. In 1997, the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 
provided that a person convicted of rape or an attempt, who has served a sentence of 
imprisonment for an offence within the categories of offences listed in section 2(5),
872which includes rape and an attempt, must receive a sentence of life imprisonment. 
And in 1999, the rules as to the admission of sexual history evidence have been 
amended.873
O’Doherty says that the sheer scale of these changes shows the altered perception of 
Parliament and the courts towards the crime of rape and its victims. For example, 
greater sentencing severity suggests that the seriousness of this crime is being more 
fully appreciated, if only for the small number of rapes, which actually end in 
conviction.875 These legislative changes are also of considerable symbolic and 
political importance to women:
The significance of radical legislation lies also in the break which it represents with 
past history and the unfortunate saga of the mistreatment of rape victims by the
868 Loh (1980), p 557.
869 /?v/?[ 1992] 1 AC 599.
8711 This irrebuttable presumption remains intact in Northern Ireland.
871 Section 32(1).
872 Section 2.
However, in its Speaking Up For Justice, the Home Office remarked that it has yet to be seen how 
frequently judges will use their discretion in “exceptional circumstances” to impose sentences other 
than life (1998, p 156).
872 Sections 41 - 43.
This Act also contains a number of procedural reforms which will have a positive effect on the rape 
complainant’s experience at court (see section 5.3.1 below).
874 O’Doherty (1998), p 680.
^ In their study, Harris and Grace found that only six per cent of the cases originally recorded by the 
police as rape resulted in convictions for rape (1999, p x). This represents only nine per cent of those 
incidents crimed as rape which, they explain, equates with national statistics.
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criminal justice system. It is to be seen as an attempt to make a new beginning, free 
of some of the old associations.876
In this way, legislative reform acts as a catalyst for wider attitudinal change. Loh 
explains that the criminal law has a “moral or sociopedagogic” purpose to reflect and 
shape our values and beliefs - new rape law symbolises and reinforces newly 
emerging conceptions about the status of women and the right of self-determination in
877sexual conduct.
On this understanding, even though section 41 will not provide a total solution to the 
sexual history evidence dilemma, it does establish a strong policy in support of rape 
victims, giving notice that all women are ‘rapeable’, and this should help to 
counteract the historical bias against sexually active women. Similarly, Birch argues 
that the abolition of the mandatory corroboration warning has helped to remove, to 
some extent, the “last vestiges of respectability from the argument that complainants 
in sexual cases are, merely because they are complainants, likely to be motivated by
878spite, fantasy or neurosis”.
5.2.3.2 Education
Whilst legislative developments may discourage misguided, erroneous beliefs about 
rape, more is needed if they are to be totally eradicated. This can be seen from recent 
research which reveals that, despite the abolition of the corroboration warning, 
disbelieving and stereotypical attitudes about women who report rape persist. It is 
suggested that if criminal justice officials were appraised of the reality of rape, this 
would result in reduced adherence to the stereotypes and myths which currently shape 
their attitudes.
One way in which this could be done would be to run training schemes which would 
aim forcefully to dispel these myths by presenting a serious challenge to them. This 
could only be done by presenting hard, empirical evidence showing clearly the 
fallaciousness of current attitudes. For example, the research which shows that the
876 Temkin (1987), p 154.
877 Loh (1980), p 624.
878 Birch (1996), p 45.
879 Temkin (1999), p 38. See also Harris and Grace (1999), pp 11-24 in this regard.
In addition, the ‘real’ rape myth, which incorporates the assumption that rape complainants are liars, is 
still heavily relied on (see Chapter Four, section 4.4).
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‘real’ rape stereotype represents, in fact, only the minority of actual rapes would need 
to be presented and the more usual nature of this crime emphasised. Essential to this 
would be the presentation of the research which proves the existence, nature and 
impact of the Rape Trauma Syndrome. Data proving that false reporting rates for 
rape are comparable with/less than those for other crimes would also be crucial. 
Attrition rates for rape at every stage (including reporting) needs to be highlighted and 
compared with the known prevalence of this crime. This is among the information 
which must be vigorously disseminated.
As a double imperative, the scheme must be mandatory and must apply to every 
single criminal justice official, from the police right through to the judiciary. 
Furthermore, they must be conducted by an independently commissioned, specialist 
body, the composition of which would require careful consideration. Currently, 
training for the various professionals within the criminal justice system is provided by 
disparate bodies. The police, for example, receive the majority of their training from 
the Police Training Council; the judiciary is informed by the Judicial Studies Board. 
It is necessary to entrust this ‘attitudinaf training to a single, independent 
organisation because this would ensure that the essential messages are conveyed 
accurately, uniformly and in the spirit intended.
With specific regard to the judiciary, it is suggested that educating them about the 
realities of rape would go some way towards ensuring a more effective 
implementation of section 41. As explained, the central problem under section 2 was 
that the judiciary was admitting sexual history evidence on the basis of crude 
assumptions of relevance. Although allowing judges much less discretion, section 41 
still leaves room for these assumptions. If section 41 is not to go the way of section 2, 
a complete re-appraisal of the concept of relevancy in this context is necessary. This 
should aim to eradicate the myths which currently inform judicial determinations of 
relevancy and replace them with the truth about this crime, such as that all women are 
rapeable. This is where the aforementioned training would come in. Similarly, 
Temkin argues that section 41 must “go hand in hand with gender awareness training 
for judges” on the basis that “no provisions will work unless you have judges who
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understand the need for this sort of legislation, and who don’t come along with a
880whole baggage of myths and stereotypes”.
This type of ‘re-education’ is already in operation in the United States, albeit with 
regard to the police only. Harry J. O’Reilly, who supervised the setting up of the first 
Sex Crimes Analysis Unit (New York) has devised a training programme for sexual 
assault investigators who work in units of this kind.*81 It focuses primarily on 
attitudinal training, which involves inter alia, breaking down the myths of rape. 
Police officers are taught that rape does not only happen in dark alleyways and 
deserted places, that the victim’s dress is immaterial, that women do not enjoy rape, 
and most important of all, that few reported rapes are likely to be fabricated. Officers 
also receive a detailed explanation of the Rape Trauma Syndrome. O’Reilly 
concedes that attitudinal training is difficult but testifies that it can work. Indeed, he
GOT
claims that “the New York City police have changed their whole rationale”.
5.2.3.3 Democratisation
The overwhelming influence of stereotype and myth on the treatment of rape 
complainants and the disposition of their grievance demands that criminal justice 
officials be educated about the realities of this crime. However, it is suggested that 
the negative attitudes surrounding this offence are so institutionalised that more 
radical intervention will be needed to break them down. This is because these 
attitudes are the unavoidable product of our overwhelmingly male criminal justice 
system. Consequently, until this negative cultural environment is altered, these 
undesirable attitudes will continue to be bred, fostered and adhered to. What is 
needed, therefore, is to change the actual composition of the criminal justice system -
OQ C
Los argues that the control of men needs to be “broken”.
Take the judiciary for example. At present, there are no women Law Lords among 
the ten in the House of Lords and only one in the Court of Appeal. In 1995, only six 
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female. In 1992, only five per cent of QC’s were female. Moreover, a survey 
showed that eighty-four per cent of the twenty-seven judges appointed to the Lords, 
the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Appeal between 1989 and 1991 had been 
to public school, and seventy-seven per cent to Oxford or Cambridge.888 In addition, 
most high court judges are appointed between the ages of fifty and sixty.889 The 
judiciary is, therefore, largely comprised of a group of white, middle/upper-class, 
elderly men, many of whom have been educated in single-sex male public schools 
wherein extreme forms of masculinity tend to be fostered.890
A study conducted by Feldman-Summers and Palmer illustrates the way in which the 
demography of the criminal justice system shapes the treatment of rape victims. They 
carried out a comparative analysis of the attitudes toward rape complainants of 
criminal justice officials (police, prosecutors and judiciary) and social service 
personnel. They found that the criminal justice personnel tended to be 
unsympathetic towards and suspicious of many (if not most) rape victims. Their 
beliefs about the causes of rape and how rape can be prevented tended to place a 
substantial degree of the blame and responsibility on the victim as well as on the
OQT
stereotypical sexually frustrated and mentally ill attacker. Social service personnel, 
on the other hand, tended to see the cause of rape as being inherent in the socialisation 
process of men and thought that the frequency of rape would be reduced by changing 
social norms.894 This approach can be seen to be much more in tune with the realities 
of rape.
Feldman-Summers and Palmer found that the participants in the study differed widely 
on a number of variables in addition to group membership. That is, the social service 
personnel were considerably younger than the members of the criminal justice
one
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age and sex, rather than group membership per se could account for the differences in 
belief.896 On the basis of their findings, they recommended that to ensure positive 
treatment of rape victims and effective processing of rape complaints we must (a) 
provide appropriate education and training for people in the criminal justice system so 
as to encourage the development of beliefs which are inconsistent with blaming the 
victim or discounting her credibility, or (b) try to select people for positions of
897authority who hold non-stereotypic beliefs about rape and rape victims.
It is suggested that the best solution would be to introduce many more women to the 
system at all levels. Having concluded that the “male dominated judiciary” poses 
serious problems for rape complainants, the Home Office has similarly recommended
OQO
the appointment of more women. One way in which this could be done would be 
to overhaul recruitment and selection procedures. A full-scale study into 
discrimination within the Bar and judiciary, for example, revealed problems at all 
levels - in obtaining training places (pupilages) and permanent jobs (tenancies), in the 
allocation of work by clerks, in earnings and in the selection process for promotion.899 
Clearly, these are issues which need to be addressed so that many more women can 
take up their place within the legal profession.
Summary
The treatment of rape victims and the attrition of the crime of rape are dictated largely 
by the attitudes of criminal justice officials. These attitudes involve derogatory and 
unrealistic assumptions about women, sex and rape. Ultimately, they sustain and 
encourage violence against women.900 Until these misogynist attitudes are dispelled, 
rape victims will continue to get a raw deal within the criminal justice system and 
changes to the substantive and evidential law aimed at assisting them in this regard 
will be defeated. It was shown that the only sure way to eradicate these attitudes is by 
overhauling the physical composition of the criminal justice system to create a strong 
female presence. This would reduce the dominance of misogynist ideology and 
simultaneously raise the profile and influence of feminist perspectives. If this were
897 Ibid at p 38.
898 Home Office (1998), p 176.
899 Sex Prejudice Findings Prompt Demandfor Overhaul of Bar, The Times 25/11/92.
900 Temkin (1982), p 419.
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achieved, the system could be trusted to implement the law of rape with the integrity 
and fairness necessary to ensure justice for rape victims. In the specific context of 
sexual history evidence, for example, if the judiciary were free of misogynist cultural 
conditioning, the loopholes left by section 41 would pose no real threat to the overall 
efficacy of this provision. Indeed, the question of relevance could be left to their 
discretion without statutory regulation.901
5.3 Victims as a Whole
The objective of this thesis is to provide suggestions for reform which will lead to 
holistic improvement in the treatment of rape victims within the criminal justice 
system. So far, only those problems which are unique to rape victims have been 
addressed. Improving these specific aspects of their treatment is clearly imperative 
and the measures suggested would bring enormous relief, eradicating much of the 
arbitrary treatment to which they are currently subject. However, if the suffering of 
rape victims is to be fully alleviated, it is essential to go beyond the problems singular 
to them and address also the major difficulties incumbent upon victims as a whole.902 
This is because these generic difficulties cause victims considerable distress.903 For 
example, cross-examination is a gruelling ordeal for all victims.904 Therefore, even if 
the extent to which rape victims can be questioned about their sexual behaviour is 
dramatically reduced, this will not mark the end of improper assaults upon their 
character or bullying cross-examination. This is because these are rooted in the 
inadequate regulation of cross-examination not only in rape cases but across the board 
and in the nature of cross-examination itself.905
This section aims to establish how the central dilemmas facing victims as a whole - 
the cross-examination ordeal and their lack of information, participation and 
representation during the processing of their grievance - might be alleviated. Again, it 
is crucial to take into account the source of these dilemmas which. Chapter Two 
revealed, is located in the structural and functional features of our criminal justice
901 McColgan (1996), p 307.
These were outlined in detail in Chapter One of this thesis.
903 Indeed, it is arguable that they affect rape victims much more keenly given the degree of trauma 
associated with the offence itself (Chambers and Millar (1986); McEwan (1992); Brereton (1997); 
Home Office (1998)).
904 Chapter One, section 1.2.2.
905 Ellison (1998), p 614.
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system. As before, it is convenient to begin the present discussion on reform with a 
review of recent legislative change.
5.3.1 Procedural Reform
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 introduced a number of important 
procedural measures aimed at lessening the cross-examination ordeal for vulnerable 
and intimidated witnesses. The purpose of these ‘special measures’ is to enable these 
witnesses to give the best quality of evidence.
Sections 16 and 17 of the Act specify who is eligible for assistance. Section 17(4) 
specifically provides that sexual offence complainants are eligible. As to the special 
measures which may be available, these are listed in sections 23 to 30 and mirror, to a 
large extent, the recommendations outlined in the Speaking Up for Justice report.906 
Section 23 provides for the use of screens to shield witnesses from the accused.907 
Section 24 permits the giving of evidence by way of a live television link or other 
arrangement whereby a witness, while absent from the courtroom, is able to see and 
be seen by relevant persons.908 Section 25 permits, in sexual offence cases or where 
intimidation is a feature, the exclusion of certain parties from the court whilst the 
witness is giving evidence. Section 26 provides for the wearing of wigs and gowns to 
be dispensed with. Section 27 permits the giving of evidence-in-chief by way of pre­
recorded video, unless the interests of justice preclude this. Further, section 28 
provides for cross-examination and re-examination to be admitted in the form of pre­
recorded video where the witness has given his evidence-in-chief by this means. 
Section 29 provides for any examination of the witness to be conducted through an 
interpreter - an “intermediary” - if necessary. Finally, section 30 provides for the 
witness to be provided with communication aids if necessary. The Act further 
provides for the protection of certain witnesses from cross-examination by the 
accused. The witnesses automatically coming under this protection are complainants
See Chapters One and Two above in this regard.
906 Home Office (1998).
907 This facility is already available to children in certain types of case, having been first introduced in 
1987 {XYZ (1990) 91 Crim App Rep 36). The use of screens for adult witnesses was discussed in 
Cooper; Schaub [1994] CLR 531 in which it was stated that a screen should be used only in 
exceptional circumstances. In Foster [1995] CLR 333, the Court of Appeal stated that the trial judge 
was engaged in a balancing exercise between the interests of justice and the interests of the defendant.
908 Again, this facility is available, in certain circumstances, to child witnesses (section 32 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988).
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in sexual offence proceedings (section 34) and child complainants and other child 
witnesses in cases involving certain specified offences (section 35).909 Section 36 
provides the court with a discretion to prohibit the accused from cross-examining a 
witness in other situations.910
These procedural reforms will clearly go some way towards reducing the cross- 
examination ordeal for vulnerable victims. However, it remains to be seen whether or 
not the courts will often give leave for their use. Simply because a witness comes 
under either section 16 or 17 does not mean that the special measures will 
automatically be available. Rather, the court must decide whether any of the 
measures would, in its opinion, be likely to improve the quality of evidence given by 
the witness (section 19(2)(a)). The court must then consider whether the measure(s) 
might tend to inhibit such evidence being effectively tested by a party to the 
proceedings (section 19(3)(b)). This will lead invariably to a balancing exercise 
between the rights of the victim and those of the accused and, it is submitted, in rape 
cases, the defendant will win out. There is also the problem that many of the special 
measures involve considerable cost. The question then is whether or not sufficient 
funds will be made available to ensure a realistic possibility of providing these 
facilities for eligible witnesses. In the context of the Witness Support scheme, 
Shapland and Bell found that funding is “clearly problematic”.911 Therefore, it is 
arguable that schemes aimed at assisting particular witness-groups will fare no better.
5.3.2 Structural Reform
Whilst the procedural mechanisms introduced under the 1999 Act will alleviate the 
cross-examination ordeal for vulnerable victims, they do not address the central 
dilemma which is the inherent brutality of this process. Consequently, they will not 
prevent the worst excesses of cross-examination. The question then is whether
909 This step may be seen to be a direct consequence of two highly publicised rape cases in which the 
defendants had subjected the complainants to cross-examination ordeals lasting for days. In one case, 
the defendant Ralston Edwards, cross-examined the complainant for six days and wore the same 
clothes as had had on when he committed the offence. The victim, Julia Mason, said “I was raped by 
Edwards and again by the British justice system”. In the second case, the victim was cross-examined 
for twelve days by a number of co-defendants. (The Guardian', The Daily Telegraph', The Mirror 
23/8/96).
910 This discretion may be exercised if it appears to the court that the quality of the evidence given by 
the witness would be likely to be diminished if the accused cross-examined him or her and would be 
likely to be improved if the defendant did not. This discretion is subject to the interests of justice.
911 Shapland and Bell (1998), p 542.
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reforming the structure of our legal process would yield better results. That is, 
because much of the brutality of the cross-examination process is an inevitable 
consequence of the adversarial tradition, would a non-adversarial or inquisitorial 
approach hold any advantages for victims? Ellison suggests that victims would be 
greatly assisted by reducing reliance on oral testimony and allowing the judiciary to
912take a more active role in trial proceedings.
5.3.2.1 Oral Testimony
Challenging the adversarial tradition’s “deep-seated belief that oral evidence is 
invariably best”, Ellison questions whether cross-examination is always the most 
appropriate mechanism for testing the evidence of vulnerable witnesses. Perhaps, 
she suggests, an examination directed by a trial judge or by an appointed impartial 
third party would be preferable, in certain circumstances, to live cross-examination 
conducted by opposing counsel.914 Alternatively, greater reliance could be placed on 
written evidence rather than oral testimony. She refers to the Dutch approach 
whereby written statements largely replace the oral evidence of witnesses.9This is 
because the criminal trial serves a very different function in the Netherlands than it 
does here - it is not a forum for oral argument but for the evaluation of the written 
evidence contained in the dossier.916 Therefore, direct oral testimony is not regarded 
as inherently superior to written evidence.
The implication of the Dutch approach for victims is that they are often spared the 
considerable ordeal of presenting their evidence orally and being cross-examined in 
open court. Moreover, the particular vulnerability of sexual offence complainants is 
given special acknowledgement for, Ellison explains, it is endeavoured as a general
912 Ellison (1999).
Ellison criticises the Home Office for not having taken such a root and branch approach to reform in its 
Speaking Up For Justice report:
While recognising that many of the difficulties encountered by vulnerable witnesses stem directly from the 
adversarial trial process, the appropriateness of that process is not questioned by the Working Group. The 
failure of the Working Group to look beyond the framework of the adversarial criminal trial for solutions 
or to re-assess the validity of key evidentiary safeguards is presented as a missed opportunity (loc. cit. at 
pp 29,30).
913 Ibid, at p 37.
9,4 Ibid
915 Ibid at p 39.
916 Ibid, at p 38.
The dossier, Ellison explains, is a record of each stage of the investigative process and it will contain, 
among other documents, the written statements of witnesses and the accused. In serious or complex
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rule to keep them out of the courtroom.<,l7 Placing greater reliance on documentary 
evidence in this jurisdiction would obviously hold great advantages not only for rape 
victims but victims generally.918 Whilst affecting one of the mainstays of our criminal 
process, such a move would not compromise our adversarial identity.919 
Consequently, it is a feasible possibility. Indeed, the Home Office has made the 
suggestion that, in the case of vulnerable or intimidated witnesses, the police should 
pay particular attention to obtaining alternative forms of evidence with a view to 
reducing the need for such witnesses to attend court.920 Therefore, although the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 has not effected this recommendation, 
the fact that the Home Office has given it consideration is promising.
5.3.2.2 Judicial Activity
Chapter One of this thesis revealed that our judiciary does not do enough to prevent 
the objectionable treatment of victims during cross-examination. Chapter Two then 
explained that this lack of intervention is attributable, in part, to the constraints 
imposed by the adversarial tradition.922 Ellison contrasts this with the position in 
inquisitorial systems. There, she explains, judges play a much more active role and, 
consequently, have greater freedom to intervene to restrict unfair and irrelevant 
questioning of witnesses.922 Further, she explains, inquisitorial judges are better 
placed to identify improper questioning because they will have studied the 
investigative file before the trial.924 Adversarial judges, on the other hand, having had 
no prior cognisance of the case, often do not know the relevance or propriety of 
evidence until it has been put before the court when, invariably, it is too late to 
prevent the harm. And, even then, intervention may be risky because, not knowing 
the defendant’s instructions, there is the danger of impeding the running of his case.
cases, statements made by witnesses at pre-trial hearings held before an examining magistrate will be 
included in the file {loc. cit.).
917 Ibid, at p 41.
918 See McEwan (1989).
919 Damaska explains that the oral tradition is not indispensable to the adversarial model for it is only 
part of its naturalia, not its essentialia (1973, p 564).
92,1 Home Office (1998), Recommendation 76, para 11.
921 Chapter One, section 1.4.
922 Chapter Two, section 2.4.
923 Ellison (1998), p 612.
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Ellison, therefore, suggests that a more active role for trial judges in this jurisdiction 
which allowed tighter control of questioning might well have advantages for 
witnesses here. However, she adds that the dominant role given to judges in civil 
law jurisdictions is rooted in a trial system that is structured very differently to our 
own. It is a system that is structured as an official inquiry into the truth as opposed to 
a party contest and one that has traditionally placed greater trust in public officials.
To significantly alter the role of our trial judges would, she says, inevitably disturb the 
balance of the adversarial trial.927 Consequently, it is unlikely that radical reform of 
this nature will ever be implemented. Further, given the attitude of the judiciary in 
rape cases, it is arguable that giving them greater powers of intervention could be 
counter-productive.
5.3.3 Enforcing the Rules
The worst excesses of cross-examination are attributable, not only to adversariness, 
but also to defence counsel’s blatant disregard for the rules together with the failure of 
both the judiciary and the prosecution to keep him in check. It is suggested, therefore, 
that a very effective and practicable way of curbing the brutality of cross-examination 
would be to enforce rigourously the protections which already exist within the normal 
conduct of the criminal trial.
5.3.3.1 Defence Counsel
Chapter Two of this thesis revealed that defence counsel’s cruelty during cross- 
examination is often purely strategic, taking the form of a series of tried and tested 
tactics carried out in order to win the case. It was also explained that it is the 
adversarial concept of justice which causes the cross-examination process to function 
in this way.929 However, it was further shown that defence counsel are not given free 
rein in how they cross-examine witnesses - codes of professional conduct impose 
certain ethical constraints on barristers.930 These constraints are compatible with 










Chapter Two, section 2.2.1. 
Chapter Two, section 2.2.2. 
Chapter Two, section 2.2.2.
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931protagonists must conduct their contest within the rules. Because of this, Ellison 
explains, the usual excuse given by defence counsel that any ethical constraints 
necessarily conflict with his duty to his client, is “unpersuasive” for whilst the 
assumptions of the adversary process do demand vigorous advocacy, this advocacy
932must be within proper limits.
Basically, adversariness cannot be blamed for the worst excesses of cross- 
examination. Rather, these are more accurately attributable to defence counsel’s 
blatant disregard for the rules, prompted by a desire to win cases at all costs. 
Therefore, it is suggested that they should be brought to task for breaching the codes 
of professional conduct which they undertook to uphold when they entered the 
profession. In its Speaking Up For Justice report, the Home Office took a similar 
view, recommending the setting up of a complaints procedure for complainants who 
suffer inappropriate cross-examination.933 Critically, this would include penalties for 
the barristers concerned.9’4 It is here suggested that in addition to a formal complaints 
procedure for witnesses, independent checks should be carried on how counsel 
conduct themselves in court. This would formalise the intent to regulate and sanction 
their activity and consequently would lead to greater adherence to the rules.
5.3.3.2 Prosecuting Counsel
Prosecuting counsel represent the interests of the public, not specifically those of the 
victim.935 Nevertheless, they are required to protect victims from improper cross- 
examination. Clearly this is not being done. The situation in rape trials provides the 
starkest evidence of this. Section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
purported to restrict the introduction of irrelevant sexual history evidence. This was 
to be done by requiring defence counsel to obtain leave from the judge before any 
such evidence could be admitted. However, Adler found that not only were judges 
consciously giving leave for cross-examination in situations which clearly conflicted 
with the intention of the legislator, but questions were frequently being asked without
931 Chapter Two, section 2.4.1.1.
932 Ellison (1998), p 613.
933 Home Office (1998), p 176.
934 Ibid.
935 See Chapter Two, section 2.3.1.3.
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any application having been made and without any objection being raised by either 
the judge or prosecuting counsel.936
McEwan remarks that prosecutor’s indifference here is odd. given that juries are more 
reluctant to convict those accused of rape when they have heard of the complainant’s 
sexual history. ' She attributes the problem, not only to the fact that the complainant 
does not enjoy a lawyer-client relationship with the prosecutor, but also to the fact 
that that some prosecution lawyers have not worked out what the central issues in the 
case are, nor, therefore, that the questions asked by the defence may be irrelevant.938 
Given the disastrous effect of this type of questioning on the rape complainant’s 
experience in court and, moreover, on the likelihood of conviction, it is absurd that 
prosecutors do not do more to prevent it. The possibility that this inaction derives 
from ineptitude is completely unacceptable.
Rape trials involve very complex issues and the implementation of section 41 will 
undoubtedly bring much greater complexity. Therefore, it is suggested that only 
experienced counsel should be charged with the task of prosecuting rape cases. 
Temkin similarly suggests that if rape trials are to be improved, a more robust 
approach to prosecution must be taken and only those with enough experience to 
challenge defence strategies should be given the task.939 Likewise, Harris and Grace 
report a widespread view among practitioners that barristers should ideally have had 
several years’ experience before tackling rape trials, which call for a degree of 
specialism.940 However, ensuring that the prosecutor is suitably skilled and 
experienced is not easy in any case-type. This comes down to money. Harris and 
Grace discovered that whilst more serious cases command higher fees, the CPS send 
rape cases to chambers with relatively small fees attached.941 This then precludes 
senior barristers from taking them. Harris and Grace concluded that prosecution 
standards in rape cases must be improved and, in order to achieve this, greater pay 
equality between prosecution and defence lawyers must be secured. This would, they 







McEwan (1992), p 111.
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Temkin (1998).
Harris and Grace (1999), p 36.
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the issues.942 This view mirrors GlidewelTs finding that prosecuting counsel are 
generally paid much less than defence counsel.94' On average, CPS fees are about 
sixty-six per cent of the value of fees paid to defence counsel out of the Graduated 
Fee Scheme. Consequently, it is suggested that if complex cases are to be prosecuted 
effectively, the fees paid to prosecution counsel should be drawn into line with those 
paid to the defence so that suitably experienced counsel will take them on.
5.3.3.3 The Judiciary
Chapter Two of this thesis described how the adversarial tradition dictates that the 
judiciary adopts only a very passive role within the trial process.944 However, it was 
also shown that, in practice, our trial judges are not nearly so restricted for they enjoy 
a number of powers and duties which enable them to play a much more active role 
than that contemplated for the truly passive judge.^ In theory, these powers mean 
that judges are well equipped to protect victims from the worst cruelties of cross- 
examination. In practice, however, they are not being exercised.
A major reason for judicial inactivity is that whilst there is an area of permissible 
activity, excessive or inappropriate intervention may lead to an overturned 
conviction.946 The problem is that the line between permissible and impermissible 
intervention is by no means clear. This places judges in a considerable dilemma since 
the price of making a wrong decision is a quashed conviction. This dilemma needs to 
be resolved if judges are to be more proactive in preventing the abuse of victims in the 
witness-box. What is needed is clear guidance as to what is unacceptable judicial 
behaviour in this context. The Home Office has recommended that the Lord Chief 
Justice issue a Practice Direction “giving guidance to barristers and judges on the 
need to disallow unnecessarily aggressive and/or inappropriate cross-examination”.947 
It is not clear whether the Home Office envisaged this guidance to include how this
941 Ibid.
942 Ibid, at p 49.
943 Glidewell (1998).
944 Chapter Two, section 2.4.1.
945 Chapter Two, section 2.4.1.1.
946 Chapter Two, section 2.4.1.1.
947 Home Office (1998), Recommendation 43, para 8.53.
It is important to note that it was explicitly concluded that a mere Practice Direction would be 
insufficient in the context of rape trials, “given the experience of the last twenty years”, to bring judges 
into line with the objective of section 2 (para 9.65). It was recommended, instead, that section 2 be 
replaced by a statute which delineated clearly when sexual history evidence may be admitted.
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could be achieved but, it is submitted, this would be a crucial feature of any such 
Direction. Another critical aspect of solving the judicial dilemma would be to 
establish a clear policy of support in the appellate courts. The point is clearly 
illustrated in the context of rape trials. Chapter Three highlighted the tendency of the 
Court of Appeal to overturn convictions in those rape cases where the complainant’s 
sexual history had been withheld.948 Temkin remarks that this is particularly 
discouraging since the one thing that does appear to have changed since 1976, if the 
reported cases are anything to go by, is that some trial judges at least are less inclined 
to permit sexual history evidence and have clearly understood the purpose of section 
2.949 The Court of Appeal may be seen to have undermined the efforts of these judges 
and, further, to have deterred wider adherence to section 2. The danger is that the 
Court of Appeal will take a similarly unhelpful approach under section 41.
However, in the context of the rape trial, the failure of the judiciary to protect victims 
from improper cross-examination cannot be attributed solely to the aforementioned 
‘dilemma’. In 1998, the Home Office stated that, whilst it is possible for judges to 
intervene to halt inappropriate cross-examination, this “has to be set against 
comments made by some members of the judiciary in sex cases which suggest at best 
lack of sympathy”.9M) The inference from this is that some trial judges do not protect 
rape complainants from improper cross-examination because they are not concerned 
with what happens to them or else they agree with the objectionable questioning.
Given the distress caused to victims as well as the fact that character evidence tends to 
be misused by juries and have a distorting effect on the verdict, it is imperative that 
the judiciary take greater responsibility for ensuring that inappropriate cross- 
examination is prevented. It is suggested that if they do not discharge this function 
adequately, they should be held accountable. Commendably, the Home Office has 
similarly suggested that judicial accountability be increased by, for example, 
instituting a performance appraisal system and revoking the rule that a judge cannot 
be sued.91’1 There really is no reason for granting the judiciary immunity from
,,4K Chapter Three, section 3.2.
94<) Temkin (1993), p 17.
950 Home Office (1998), p 176.
951 Home Office (1998), p 176. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice had similarly argued that 
judges should be subjected to a performance appraisal system (1993).
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sanction - if they do unjustifiable harm to people who have come or been brought 
before them for justice they should be made accountable like all other 
professionals.952
5.3.4 Status for Victims
The previous section discussed ways in which cross-examination might be made less 
gruelling for victims. However, the cross-examination ordeal is only one aspect of 
the shoddy treatment of victims which needs to be addressed. Chapters One and Two 
revealed that victims are also deprived of information, participation and 
representation during the processing of their grievance.9^ To victims, this represents 
a lack of concern with their victimisation and causes them severe disappointment and 
aggravation.9^4 In reality, it is simply the result of the structural role which they 
occupy within the criminal justice system.9" Basically, victims have no formal status 
and, consequently, few formal rights. Accordingly, it is suggested that the key to 
improving their experience within the legal system is to increase their standing 
therein. This would do no more than reflect their importance to the functioning of the 
criminal justice system. That is, if victims failed to report crime and to assist in its 
prosecution, the criminal justice system would be unable to sanction criminal activity 
and thereby to impose social control and, in the end, would lose its reason for being. 
However, despite their practical importance, criminal justice officials both ignore and 
are ignorant of the attitudes and experience of victims.956 Consequently, Shapland et 
al describe the victim’s position within the criminal justice system as 
“paradoxical”.957
Certainly, there has been some shift in attitude toward victims in recent years. 
Officials are beginning to recognise their importance and how this does not equate 
with the treatment that they are usually afforded. For example, the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice stated:
952 It is true that judges can be dismissed for misconduct, but such powers are rarely exercised and only 
where judges have been convicted of offences ( Lees (1996), p 250).
95’ Chapter One, section 1.3 and Chapter Two, section 2.3.
954
955
MacBarnet (1983), pp 299, 300.
See Chapter Two, section 2.3.
Shapland, Willmore and Duff (1985), p 50. 
Ibid.
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The evidence of victims and other witnesses is crucial to the criminal justice process 
because prosecutions will founder, and guilty people thus escape justice, if victims 
and other witnesses are not prepared to make statements to the police and thereafter 
to give evidence. It is important, therefore, that everything possible is done to 
support and, where necessary, protect witnesses in what is often an unenviable 
role.958
In 1996, the then Chief Constable Charles Pollard made a similar statement:
The willingness of victims and witnesses to come forward and/or give evidence is the 
oxygen of policing, and indeed of the whole criminal justice system. Turn the 
oxygen off, or reduce it, and efforts to improve policing and to help communities 
fight crime will come to naught. It is time for this to change, and time for the system 
to acknowledge that the concept of ‘rights’ does not just apply to the defendant.959 
In addition, the ECHR which is more traditionally concerned with the rights of 
defendants, is also now talking much more openly about the interests of witnesses and 
victims.960 In a recent judgement, for example, the Court said that the “principles of 
fair trial also require that in appropriate cases the interests of the defendant are 
balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify”.961
This growing recognition of the importance of victims has led to considerable 
practical change thus proving that their treatment is dictated by their status. For 
example, Jackson explains that the law of evidence is no longer seen purely in terms 
of crime control and due process.962 Rather, there is now much greater recognition of 
the need to value the interests of victims as well as defendants. Therefore, theorists 
have begun to develop more victim-oriented, restorative models of criminal justice 
where the aim of the criminal justice system is not seen in terms of the state, through 
the courts, prosecuting and punishing offenders, but in terms of the offender restoring 
or repairing the harm done directly to victims of crime.963 In addition, whereas 
twenty years or so ago, there were almost no formal arrangements for the support and 
assistance of victims, today, expectations in relation to services have been firmed 
up.964 For example, the organisation known as Victim Support exists to help victims
958 Home Office (1993), para 5.44.
959 The Daily Express, 30/09/96.
960 Jackson (1997), p 9.
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Glidewell (1998), para 80, p 112.
See also Van Mechelen v Netherlands (1998)
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and witnesses and their families at Crown Court Centres throughout England and 
Wales. The Victim ’s Charter sets out the rights and expectations of victims, setting 
down the guiding principles that victims deserve to be treated with both sympathy and 
respect and that any upset and hardship connected with the victim’s involvement with 
the criminal justice system should be minimised.%:i Most recently, the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act introduces a number of procedural initiatives aimed at 
assisting vulnerable and intimidated witnesses at court.
Such initiatives have effected some positive change.966 However, evidently, they 
have proved incapable of eradicating the objectionable treatment outlined earlier in 
this thesis. It is suggested that in order to ensure the necessary improvement, victims 
must be given a type of third-party status.967 This would carry with it certain 
unnegotiable and wholly enforceable rights, the most important of which would be 
the provision of a separate legal representative, for special categories of victim at the 
least.968
5.3.4.1 Separate Legal Representation
The advocate would be procured by the victim himself or could be appointed from a 
pool of advocates (in much the same way as the state provides defence solicitors) 
where the victim does not already have a solicitor. In recognition of the fact that the 
victim is performing a “public duty”, the state should bear the costs of his or her 
representation.969 It is suggested that the advocate should be available during police 
questioning of the complainant. The need for victims to have someone present at this 
stage was recognised by the Home Office who envisaged, however, only a
;65 Home Office (1991) and (1996).
966 For example, Shapland and Bell noted a “significant improvement” in the practical facilities 
available to victims in Magistrates’ and Crown Courts (1998, p 537). They found that the “vast 
majority” of courts have not only taken on board the need for facilities for victims and witnesses, but 
have implemented significant change {loc. cit. at p 545). They commend the efforts of magistrates’ 
courts in particular (loc. cit.).
967 Currently, the criminal process countenances only two official parties to a case - the State and the 
defendant (Chapter Two, section 2.3.1.3). However, it is not here suggested that victims should be 
given the same status as defendants who enjoy primacy as a consequence of their peculiar vulnerability. 
Rather, defendants should continue to be paramount and nothing which is done in the name of assisting 
victims should be allowed to compromise the defendant’s right to fair treatment.
968 Sexual offence complainants in Denmark and Norway are already entitled to legal representation 
from the moment that they report their assault to the police (Temkin (1987), p 162).
969 Home Office (1998), para 8.53.
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“supporter”.970 The presence of a legal representative during police questioning of 
rape complainants would be particularly beneficial in light of the widespread criticism 
of police practices in this regard. The advocate would, for example, be able to ensure 
that the investigating officer did not probe the complainant’s sexual history beyond 
the permitted limit.971
From this point onwards the advocate would be responsible for keeping the victim 
informed about the progress of his complaint. Since Glidewell attributed the current 
failure to keep victims adequately informed to the absence of a “clear line of 
responsibility”, centralising the task in this way would ensure its fulfillment. The 
advocate would also be responsible for preparing the victim for the rigours of the trial 
process. The argument that this will encourage coaching is without foundation. After 
all, the opportunity for such foul play already exists because the police may interact 
freely with witnesses. Furthermore, there is no reference made to the fact that 
defendants are equally open to being coached. The advocate’s job would simply be to 
enable the victim to give his evidence in court with the least anxiety possible. In turn, 
this would have a positive effect on prosecution and conviction rates as more ‘stand 
up’ witnesses became available.
At court, it is suggested that the advocate operate in conjunction with the prosecutor 
rather than in his place or as supplementary to him. Therefore, the advocate would 
not be involved in the prosecution of the case - he would not question witnesses nor 
address the question of the defendant’s guilt nor advise the victim how to respond to 
questions. In this way, the traditional adversarial relationship between the state and 
the defendant would not be compromised. The advocate would perform a more 
supervisory function, being concerned with such issues as whether the case should be 
dealt with in camera. He would also be expected to ensure that defence counsel 
abide by the rules regulating the cross-examination process. This takes on particular
y7(l Ibid., Recommendation 22, para 6.7.
1,71 Home Office Circular 25/1983 stipulates that “It should not in general be necessary to ask questions 
about her previous sexual experience... Particular care should be exercised in deciding whether to ask a 
complainant questions about any previous sexual experience with a third party” (Home Office (1983), 
para 6).
972 Glidewell (1998), para 88. This led in one murder case to the principal witness being abroad when 
the trial was listed to start (/oc. cit.).
973 Because it is envisaged that the advocate would fulfil only a supervisory and regulatory role, it is 
suggested that the vulnerability of defendants would not be increased.
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significance in the context of the rape trial where much injustice has resulted from 
abuse of the rules governing the admissibility of sexual history evidence. The 
advocate would also be required to consult with the victim at the time of plea­
bargaining and sentencing and to ensure that the victim’s interests were put forward 
during these processes.
The principal argument in favour of separate legal representation is that it would 
provide victims with a voice with which they can communicate with the ‘system’. 
This would reduce the sense of isolation and non-involvement currently experienced 
by them. More importantly, it might also lead to decision-making which more closely 
reflects the interests of victims. Ultimately, providing even restricted victim-groups 
with personal legal representation would provide the strongest statement of official 
commitment to the welfare of victims because it would give victims status, something 
which reform measures to date have stopped short of doing.
Summary
Victims as a whole are treated very shabbily within our criminal justice system. This 
cannot be reconciled with their role as the “oxygen” of this system. Promisingly, 
victim issues are gaining in profile, suggesting that greater efforts will be made to 
secure their interests. However, unless any future reforms take into account the 
structural and functional factors responsible for this shoddy treatment, they will have 
the same minimal effect as the piecemeal measures to date. The previous discussion 
revealed that what is needed primarily is greater accountability amongst criminal 
justice officials and also greater status for victims. Other important changes include 
placing greater reliance on documentary evidence and procedural measures of the 
type introduced under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
5.4 Conclusion
The central objective of this thesis has been to provide an overview of how the 
treatment of rape victims within the criminal justice system might be improved to best 
effect. Critical to achieving this objective was understanding both what the central 
dilemmas facing this victim-group are and, moreover, why these dilemmas exist. 
These issues were resolved throughout the course of chapters One to Four. Thus, the 
major difficulties affecting rape victims were shown to be the generic brutality of
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cross-examination, their exclusion from the processing of their grievance (with the 
many attendant negative ramifications of this), and the evidential peculiarities of the 
rape trial.974 These difficulties were duly shown to derive from the structural, 
functional and cultural nature of our criminal justice system.97:1
This present chapter has channelled all of this information into a bundle of reform 
suggestions encompassing evidential, substantive, procedural, structural and cultural 
change. Some of these measures address only those problems which are unique to 
rape victims; others are aimed at improving the treatment of victims generally. 
Consequently, a truly holistic approach to reform has been provided, offering fullest 
assistance not only to rape victims but to victims as a whole. In addition, so as not to 
compromise the utility of this study, the greatest care has been taken in this final 
chapter to ensure that the reforms suggested herein are entirely practicable and 
worthwhile.
974 See, principally, Chapters One and Three in this regard.
975 See Chapters Two and Four in this regard.
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Conclusion
The primary objective of this thesis has been to provide an effective and 
comprehensive response to the considerable problems facing rape victims within the 
criminal justice system. The key proposition of this study is that, if real improvement 
is to be achieved, a root and branch approach to reform must be taken. That is, any 
reforms must go directly to the source of the problems facing this victim-group. 
Consequently, a critical objective of this thesis was to identify as accurately and fully 
as possible the factors underlying the objectionable treatment of rape victims.
The traditional explanation for the shoddy treatment of rape victims is that it is the 
product of a specific prejudice against them. This perspective derives from the 
assumption inherent in most rape literature that the difficulties incumbent upon rape 
victims are singular to them. However, a central argument of this thesis was that most 
rape literature is methodologically flawed because of its tendency to examine the 
treatment of rape victims without making any comparative reference to the treatment 
of victims as a whole. It was argued that the narrowness of this approach precludes a 
full understanding of the factors shaping the rape victim’s experience. This is, in fact, 
the inherent paradox of most rape literature - its very concern to isolate the rape 
victim for special attention renders it incapable of explaining their experience at all. 
Consequently, this study aimed to provide a much broader framework for 
understanding why rape victims are treated as they are. To this end, a comparative 
methodology was adopted, the most objectionable aspects of the treatment of rape 
victims being examined within the context of the treatment of victims as a whole. 
This comparative exercise revealed that there is, indeed, a distinct margin of 
difference between how rape and non-rape victims are treated.976 It was shown that a 
number of the rules of evidence which apply in a trial for rape are irreconcilable with 
the conduct of trials generally. These unique rules have caused rape complainants 
enormous hardship and, moreover, have significantly inhibited conviction rates for 
this crime. However, this comparative analysis further revealed that there are also 
significant similarities between how rape and non-rape victims are treated.977 For 
example, the cross-examination process represents a gruelling ordeal for all victims.
976 See Chapter Three.
977 See Chapter One.
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The finding that important aspects of the shoddy treatment of rape victims are 
common to all victims equally demonstrated that it is clearly erroneous to explain the 
rape victim’s experience simply in terms of negative attitudes towards them. 
Certainly, it was shown that this victim-group does encounter exceptional prejudice 
within the criminal justice system but this can only be used to account for their 
differential treatment therein. It was duly shown that the structural and functional 
features of our criminal justice system are responsible for the difficulties which rape 
victims experience alongside victims generally.479 These features include the 
constraints imposed by adversarial processes and structures, the structure and logic of 
legal talk, the laws of evidence and the judicial concept of relevance, the ways in 
which lawyers are trained to cross-examine witnesses and interpret evidence, and 
courtroom work practices.980 Because these features are endemic to the judicial 
process, they create problems for all victims, regardless of case-type.
Recognising the impact which these systemic factors have on the treatment of rape 
victims proved critical to the issue of reform, demonstrating that, whilst eradicating 
those difficulties which are unique to this victim-group is crucial to improving their 
lot, the generic deficiencies of the judicial process must also be addressed if their 
suffering is to be fully alleviated. Consequently, the reform proposals made in this 
thesis encompassed not only modifying the substantive and evidential law of rape as 
well as addressing the cultural prejudice against this victim-group but also reducing 
the inherent brutality of the cross-examination process and increasing the status of 
victims generally.981 This comprehensive approach to reform is to be contrasted with 
the traditional tendency to focus narrowly on how to improve those aspects of the rape 
victim’s treatment which are peculiar to them.
Of course, it is all very well to identify the changes which must be made in order to 
improve the treatment of rape victims but the question is whether these changes are at 
all likely to be made. Certainly, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
has effected important procedural and evidential reform within the law of rape.982
8 See Chapter Four.
';79 See Chapter Two.
980 Brereton (1997), p 259.
981 See Chapter Five.
982 The changes wrought by this Act were discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis.
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However, whilst these changes will provide rape victims with some respite, they are 
quite insufficient to offer a total solution to their problems. As explained, the 
treatment of rape victims will be fully resolved only when the cultural prejudice 
against them is dispelled and the generic deficiencies of the judicial process are 
eradicated. However, the problem following the 1999 Act is that, having offered 
some response to the difficulties facing rape victims, it is extremely unlikely that the 
government will pursue further reform in the name of this victim-group. However, 
this need not mean that the opportunity to effect the necessary cultural and structural 
reforms has been lost. It is suggested that these specific objectives can easily be 
pursued in the name of victim-welfare generally, an issue which recent developments 
indicate is burgeoning. That the interests of rape victims can be secured in this way 
is clear from the argument put forward in this thesis that a necessary part of 
improving the treatment of rape victims involves improving the treatment of victims 
as a whole. Even addressing the cultural prejudice specifically toward rape victims 
can take place as part of improving the treatment of victims generally. It was shown 
that the single most important step in dispelling this prejudice would be to 
democratise the criminal justice system.984 However, given the race, ethnic, class and 
youth issues which the current composition of the legal system must surely pose, 
increasing its representativeness needs to go beyond merely redressing the gender 
imbalance. Therefore, democratising the criminal justice system is something which 
needs to be done for the benefit of all victim-groups and, indeed, defendants.
To conclude, it is submitted that this thesis has provided a fuller and more accurate 
representation of the treatment of rape victims than that traditionally provided by rape 
commentators. It is hoped that this thorough and honest account has both highlighted 
the need for reform and illuminated the way to achieve it.
983 See Chapter Five, section 5.3.4. 
,84 See Chapter Five, section 5.2.3.3.
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